W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > February 2015

Re: Upgrade mixed content URLs through HTTP header

From: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2015 12:51:35 -0800
Message-ID: <CACvaWvYqNLT=goChcgt+EZByfCBa3+1UVprL7w7dyiWSe9-naw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Cc: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, Tanvi Vyas <tanvi@mozilla.com>, John Wong <gokoproject@gmail.com>, Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>, Alex Russell <slightlyoff@google.com>, Joel Weinberger <jww@google.com>, Emily Stark <estark@google.com>, Jim Manico <jim.manico@owasp.org>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>, Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Hopefully Microsoft will reply to

Particularly relevant to this are questions 2 and 3.

On Tue, Feb 17, 2015 at 12:49 PM, Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> wrote:
> On the topic of using HSTS to blocked mixed content, it seems like
> IE10 has just done that:
> http://blogs.msdn.com/b/ie/archive/2015/02/16/http-strict-transport-security-comes-to-internet-explorer.aspx
> I haven't tested it though, so I'm not sure if it's active, passive, or both.
> -tom
> On 9 February 2015 at 02:37, Mike West <mkwst@google.com> wrote:
>> Hey Tanvi!
>> On Fri, Feb 6, 2015 at 8:27 PM, Tanvi Vyas <tanvi@mozilla.com> wrote:
>>> * Option 1 - Fallback and try the HTTP version; the mixed content blocker
>>> will be invoked and the content will be blocked if it is blockable with an
>>> option for the user to override the blocking (shield shows up in Firefox and
>>> Chrome) or loaded if it is optionally blockable with a degraded security UI.
>>> * Option 2 - No attempt to access the HTTP version and no mixed content
>>> UI.
>>> Option 2 will result in a user experience that is worse than the current
>>> experience with mixed content blocking.  Also, with Option 2, sites may be
>>> less likely to set the CSP directive because it could potentially break
>>> their site. Hence, I like Option 1 where we fallback to the HTTP version.
>>> But this could cause performance issues since in the fallback case we are
>>> doing two resource loads instead of one.
>> The strawman I posted is option #2; resources are upgraded, and if the
>> upgrade fails to target a viable resource, you'll end up with a network
>> error, just as you would if you typed the upgraded URL manually.
>> The intention is that only sites for which this behavior provides a net gain
>> will opt-into it. So, while I agree that there's some risk, it can be a
>> calculated one which sites can choose to opt-into.
>>> We could also have Option 3 - only fallback for optionally blockable
>>> subresources, since many users don't click the shield and override
>>> protection anyway and hence end up with a similar user experience.
>> This is probably worth experimenting with today, especially in combination
>> with HSTS. I worry that it's likely to have negative performance impact on
>> sites, as it would no longer be opt-in, meaning that sites that wouldn't
>> support upgrade for particular resources would be generating unexpected
>> requests that they weren't prepared to handle.
>> -mike
>> --
>> Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, @mikewest
>> Google Germany GmbH, Dienerstrasse 12, 80331 München, Germany,
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>> (Sorry; I'm legally required to add this exciting detail to emails. Bleh.)
Received on Tuesday, 17 February 2015 20:52:04 UTC

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