- From: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
- Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2015 14:49:24 -0600
- To: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
- Cc: Tanvi Vyas <tanvi@mozilla.com>, John Wong <gokoproject@gmail.com>, Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>, Alex Russell <slightlyoff@google.com>, Joel Weinberger <jww@google.com>, Emily Stark <estark@google.com>, Jim Manico <jim.manico@owasp.org>, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>, Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
On the topic of using HSTS to blocked mixed content, it seems like IE10 has just done that: http://blogs.msdn.com/b/ie/archive/2015/02/16/http-strict-transport-security-comes-to-internet-explorer.aspx I haven't tested it though, so I'm not sure if it's active, passive, or both. -tom On 9 February 2015 at 02:37, Mike West <mkwst@google.com> wrote: > Hey Tanvi! > > On Fri, Feb 6, 2015 at 8:27 PM, Tanvi Vyas <tanvi@mozilla.com> wrote: >> >> * Option 1 - Fallback and try the HTTP version; the mixed content blocker >> will be invoked and the content will be blocked if it is blockable with an >> option for the user to override the blocking (shield shows up in Firefox and >> Chrome) or loaded if it is optionally blockable with a degraded security UI. >> * Option 2 - No attempt to access the HTTP version and no mixed content >> UI. >> >> Option 2 will result in a user experience that is worse than the current >> experience with mixed content blocking. Also, with Option 2, sites may be >> less likely to set the CSP directive because it could potentially break >> their site. Hence, I like Option 1 where we fallback to the HTTP version. >> But this could cause performance issues since in the fallback case we are >> doing two resource loads instead of one. > > > The strawman I posted is option #2; resources are upgraded, and if the > upgrade fails to target a viable resource, you'll end up with a network > error, just as you would if you typed the upgraded URL manually. > > The intention is that only sites for which this behavior provides a net gain > will opt-into it. So, while I agree that there's some risk, it can be a > calculated one which sites can choose to opt-into. > >> >> We could also have Option 3 - only fallback for optionally blockable >> subresources, since many users don't click the shield and override >> protection anyway and hence end up with a similar user experience. > > > This is probably worth experimenting with today, especially in combination > with HSTS. I worry that it's likely to have negative performance impact on > sites, as it would no longer be opt-in, meaning that sites that wouldn't > support upgrade for particular resources would be generating unexpected > requests that they weren't prepared to handle. > > -mike > > -- > Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, @mikewest > > Google Germany GmbH, Dienerstrasse 12, 80331 München, Germany, > Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891, Sitz der Gesellschaft: > Hamburg, Geschäftsführer: Graham Law, Christine Elizabeth Flores > (Sorry; I'm legally required to add this exciting detail to emails. Bleh.)
Received on Tuesday, 17 February 2015 20:50:16 UTC