- From: Eduardo' Vela\ <evn@google.com>
- Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2015 10:09:38 +0100
- To: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
- Cc: Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl>, Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>, Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org>, WebAppSec WG <public-webappsec@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAFswPa94C+34uFhD4sb8pX0LOhw_aKQU=3KmL0sjtKRLmL5YSA@mail.gmail.com>
Could we use CSP for this? default-src https: 'upgrade-unsafe' On Feb 3, 2015 10:03 AM, "Mike West" <mkwst@google.com> wrote: > On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl> > wrote: > >> On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 7:53 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor >> <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote: >> > Why does this need to be a separate header at all? Why not just assume >> > that sites with STS set should opportunistically upgrade http resources >> > to https? >> >> We have already decided that a resource on example.com (with HSTS) >> that has a subresource <img src=http://example.com/img> will result in >> a mixed content warning. > > > This actually seems meaningfully different from the way we've phrased the > question before. If we began interpreting strict transport security as > rewriting all URLs on a page, we'd avoid some of the questions around > request-order-specific behavior. > > In MIX, we currently point to some of this in > https://w3c.github.io/webappsec/specs/mixedcontent/#further-action. I'd > been thinking about STS as a signal to enable strict-mode (e.g. don't even > attempt to load any insecure resource), but optimistically rewriting > resource URLs (and hard-failing if they fail to load) is an interesting > approach. > > On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 1:42 AM, Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org> wrote: > >> > That said, I'm not sure it actually solves W3C's concern, as it would >> leave >> > legacy clients out in the cold. The only way to support clients that >> don't >> > support the thing we haven't implemented yet would be to alter the >> links at >> > the source. I totally understand that that's difficult, but it seems >> > essential. >> >> It seems like you're saying that a security mechanism can't be allowed >> to help new clients upgrade to HTTPS if it doesn't also help old ones? >> > > That's not what I mean to say. With regard to the W3C, my (apocryphal?*) > understanding is that the main blocker to deploying HTTPS more widely is > legacy clients, not legacy content, and that they'd need to alter the > source in order to get over that hurdle. The legacy concern was specific to > this example, not a general statement on adding features to the platform. > > *Wendy (hi!) could probably comment here. > > -- > Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, @mikewest > > Google Germany GmbH, Dienerstrasse 12, 80331 München, > Germany, Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891, Sitz der > Gesellschaft: Hamburg, Geschäftsführer: Graham Law, Christine Elizabeth > Flores > (Sorry; I'm legally required to add this exciting detail to emails. Bleh.) >
Received on Tuesday, 3 February 2015 09:10:08 UTC