W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > February 2015

Re: Upgrade mixed content URLs through HTTP header

From: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2015 10:00:27 +0100
Message-ID: <CAKXHy=dX62kHnaJbjZuXKRRG5-7AvMHjQQSvCsokCX6wcxJdQg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org>
Cc: Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl>, WebAppSec WG <public-webappsec@w3.org>, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>, Adam Langley <agl@google.com>, Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>
On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl> wrote:

> On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 7:53 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor
> <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
> > Why does this need to be a separate header at all?  Why not just assume
> > that sites with STS set should opportunistically upgrade http resources
> > to https?
>
> We have already decided that a resource on example.com (with HSTS)
> that has a subresource <img src=http://example.com/img> will result in
> a mixed content warning.


This actually seems meaningfully different from the way we've phrased the
question before. If we began interpreting strict transport security as
rewriting all URLs on a page, we'd avoid some of the questions around
request-order-specific behavior.

In MIX, we currently point to some of this in
https://w3c.github.io/webappsec/specs/mixedcontent/#further-action. I'd
been thinking about STS as a signal to enable strict-mode (e.g. don't even
attempt to load any insecure resource), but optimistically rewriting
resource URLs (and hard-failing if they fail to load) is an interesting
approach.

On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 1:42 AM, Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org> wrote:

> > That said, I'm not sure it actually solves W3C's concern, as it would
> leave
> > legacy clients out in the cold. The only way to support clients that
> don't
> > support the thing we haven't implemented yet would be to alter the links
> at
> > the source. I totally understand that that's difficult, but it seems
> > essential.
>
> It seems like you're saying that a security mechanism can't be allowed
> to help new clients upgrade to HTTPS if it doesn't also help old ones?
>

That's not what I mean to say. With regard to the W3C, my (apocryphal?*)
understanding is that the main blocker to deploying HTTPS more widely is
legacy clients, not legacy content, and that they'd need to alter the
source in order to get over that hurdle. The legacy concern was specific to
this example, not a general statement on adding features to the platform.

*Wendy (hi!) could probably comment here.

--
Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, @mikewest

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Received on Tuesday, 3 February 2015 09:01:15 UTC

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