Re: [integrity]: latency tradeoffs

On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 1:23 PM, Oda, Terri <> wrote:
> Anything that sounds like "take this existing cryptographic algorithm and
> alter it in this way..." is a bit of a red flag in security.   For those of
> us not particularly familiar with the Merkle tree and its applications,
> could you provide some links that show that cryptographers believe that this
> variation is a safe and reasonable way to provide stream verification of
> data?

Merkle trees are old (by cryptography standards: late 1970's) and it's
easy to show that they have the desired properties by assuming an
ideal hash function. The Wikipedia page isn't bad and lists some
current uses: There is also
the original use:



Received on Wednesday, 15 January 2014 18:35:07 UTC