W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > January 2014

Re: Subresource Integrity strawman.

From: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@coredump.cx>
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2014 08:38:59 -0800
Message-ID: <CALx_OUCW9_moBXikYpk=jDznXgguCbs0wjPYeZsbL7K9gupLjg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
Cc: "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>, Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>, Frederik Braun <fbraun@mozilla.com>, Joel Weinberger <jww@google.com>, Brad Hill <bhill@paypal.com>, Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl>, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>, Tab Atkins <tabatkins@google.com>, Ilya Grigorik <igrigorik@google.com>
The possibility of examining the contents of cross-origin documents by
attempting to load them with different known hashes and then
triggering the reporting behavior (or noticing that navigation in an
<iframe> has not taken place) seems like a fairly significant issue,
right? It feels that it would make it considerably easier to
fingerprint user state across a large number of sites, compared to
previously demonstrated approaches.

What would be the behavior of clicking on a non-download link with the
integrity parameter specified? What would happen if this link is
opened in a new window? It seems that it may be difficult to behave
consistently in this case (e.g., how to handle right-click + "open in
an incognito window" in Chrome?).

Received on Wednesday, 8 January 2014 16:39:48 UTC

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