- From: Gervase Markham <gerv@mozilla.org>
- Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:14:10 +0000
- To: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>, blink-dev <blink-dev@chromium.org>, security-dev <security-dev@chromium.org>
- To: mozilla-dev-security@lists.mozilla.org
On 13/12/14 00:46, Chris Palmer wrote:
> We, the Chrome Security Team, propose that user agents (UAs) gradually
> change their UX to display non-secure origins as affirmatively non-secure.
> We intend to devise and begin deploying a transition plan for Chrome in
> 2015.
I think this is a good idea - in fact, it's essential if we are to make
secure the 'new normal'.
I agree that a phased transition plan based on telemetry thresholds is
the right thing. This is a collective action problem ("Chrome tells me
this site is insecure, but Firefox is fine - so I'll use Firefox") and
so it would be awesome if we could get cross-browser agreement on what
the thresholds were and how they were measured.
I wonder whether we could make a start by marking non-secure origins in
a neutral way, as a step forward from not marking them at all. Straw-man
proposal for Firefox: replace the current greyed-out globe which appears
where the lock otherwise is with a black eye icon. When clicked, instead
of saying:
"This website does not supply identity information.
Your connection to this website is not encrypted."
it has a larger eye icon, and says something like:
"This web page was transferred over a non-secure connection, which means
that the information could have been (was probably?!) intercepted and
read by a third party while in transit."
There are many degrees of this; let's start moving this way.
Gerv
Received on Thursday, 18 December 2014 17:14:41 UTC