W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > May 2013

Re: [filter-effects][css-masking] Move security model for resources to CSP

From: Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl>
Date: Thu, 30 May 2013 14:10:23 +0100
Message-ID: <CADnb78jJj=B+ginssQKk87CVEAFhNJxN_z6+st0zvUfp4jUpoQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Robert O'Callahan" <robert@ocallahan.org>
Cc: Dirk Schulze <dschulze@adobe.com>, Bjoern Hoehrmann <derhoermi@gmx.net>, "public-fx@w3.org" <public-fx@w3.org>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>, Daniel Holbert <dholbert@mozilla.com>, Philip Rogers <pdr@google.com>
On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:35 AM, Robert O'Callahan
<robert@ocallahan.org> wrote:
> Note that if we do this, we'll need to continue to apply an origin check
> when filter/mask/clip/use/pattern etc refer to an element in an external
> document, at the time they use the element. Anne, can we make regular image
> loads record presence of an Access-Control-Allow-Origin header if the server
> sends one, without causing the load to fail if it happens to be cross-origin
> with no header?

There's no such concept right now. You either opt into CORS or you get
a tainted cross-origin request which cannot be untainted. Note this
would also be problematic with respect to cookies, unless you'll do
something different for those than tainted cross-origin requests do.

> Even if the spec allows it, that's going to be a pain to implement for us
> since there's currently no notion of delaying CORS-enabled origin checks in
> our code.

There's no such notion in spec-land either.

Received on Thursday, 30 May 2013 13:10:58 UTC

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