- From: Alex Russell <slightlyoff@google.com>
- Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2013 12:31:36 +0000
- To: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
- Cc: Ian Melven <imelven@mozilla.com>, Ashar Javed <justashar@gmail.com>, Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@google.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>, Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com>, Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>
- Message-ID: <CANr5HFX1cM3ap=ccf-yY1O++_+zXC8=3sfwmmeOrEysv=ZJGiw@mail.gmail.com>
It's a nit, but the property should be "base-url" and not "base-uri". Also, I don't know why we'd add a default restriction when no other CSP property behaves that way. E.g., it's all allowed *until* you specify some sort of a rule for a property. Making CSP an exception to that doesn't feel like it carries its weight in terms of needing to be explained, etc. On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 3:54 PM, Mike West <mkwst@google.com> wrote: > I'd kinda like to set "base-uri 'self'" by default, yes. That's not in the > spec strawman I put up, because I'd like to hear other opinions. > > At the moment, I think the overlap between sites using base elements and > those currently using CSP is close to null. :) > > -mike > On Mar 26, 2013 4:28 PM, "Ian Melven" <imelven@mozilla.com> wrote: > >> >> so a user agent supporting CSP 1.1 will block (ignore) a <base> element >> when there is a CSP with no base-uri directive ? >> (ie. there's possible breakage due to non-backwards compatibility with >> existing policies for documents that may use >> <base>) >> >> i agree that #2 seems like the best option, fwiw. >> >> thanks, >> ian >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Mike West" <mkwst@google.com> >> To: "Alex Russell" <slightlyoff@google.com> >> Cc: "Devdatta Akhawe" <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>, public-webappsec@w3.org, >> "Michal Zalewski" <lcamtuf@google.com>, "Adam Barth" <w3c@adambarth.com>, >> justashar@gmail.com >> Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 8:23:05 AM >> Subject: Re: Restricting <base> URLS via CSP >> >> >> I've landed a very rough strawman of this functionality in >> http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/146886 . Should be in a Canary later >> this week (locked safely behind the "Experimental WebKit Features" flag, of >> course) for experimentation. >> >> >> I think I agree with you, Alex. #2 seems like the best and most >> consistent option. #3 probably isn't worth doing. >> >> >> -mike >> >> >> -- >> Mike West < mkwst@google.com >, Developer Advocate >> Google Germany GmbH, Dienerstrasse 12, 80331 München, Germany >> Google+: https://mkw.st/+ , Twitter: @mikewest, Cell: +49 162 10 255 91 >> >> >> On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 2:56 PM, Alex Russell < slightlyoff@google.com > >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, March 25, 2013, Mike West wrote: >> >> >> >> In the hopes of sparking conversation, I've strawmanned up a first pass >> at this: https://dvcs.w3.org/hg/content-security-policy/rev/4b89c246ea16. >> >> >> I see three ways of approaching this: >> >> >> 1. 'base-uri [URI]' actually set the document's base URL. After >> consideration, I don't think this is a good idea; it seems surprising. >> >> >> 2. 'base-uri [source-list]' sets a set of URIs which are acceptable base >> URLs for the document. A <base> element would still be required in order to >> change the document's base URL. That is what the commit above implements. >> >> >> This was my assumption about how this would work. >> >> >> >> >> >> 3. We add some mechanism of explicitly saying "the base URL can't be >> changed". Perhaps 'lock-base-uri' directive, or a more generic >> 'page-options' directive with a 'lock-base-uri' value? >> >> >> I dislike this because it means that in a first-wins <base> case (har >> har) with an HTML injection vuln in the head, you can still be hosed. This >> seems both dangerous and misleading. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> #2 seems to me to be most clearly in line with what we're currently doing >> in CSP directives; I'd love other opinions. :) >> >> >> -mike >> >> >> -- >> Mike West < mkwst@google.com >, Developer Advocate >> Google Germany GmbH, Dienerstrasse 12, 80331 München, Germany >> Google+: https://mkw.st/+ , Twitter: @mikewest, Cell: +49 162 10 255 91 >> >> >> On Mon, Mar 18, 2013 at 12:15 PM, Mike West < mkwst@google.com > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> Thanks for the suggestion, both Alex and Ashar. >> >> >> >> I agree that there's some value in a directive like this one, but it's >> unclear to me how it should work. In particular: >> >> >> * '*-src' directives set a list of accepted sources, while 'sandbox' >> actually changes a flag on the document. How should base restrictions be >> handled? Should 'base-uri http://example.com/ ' set the protected >> resource's base URL, or should it allow the page to set its base URL to ' >> http://example.com/ ' if it chooses? >> >> >> * I'm sympathetic to setting something like "base-url 'self'" by default >> whenever a policy is active. I suspect that would have little to no impact >> on the web at large, and would kill an attack vector. I'll see what I can >> find out about <base> usage in general; in the absence of data, are there >> objections to this? It's not exactly consistent with some other decisions >> we've made (allowing unlisted items by default, for instance)... if >> "whenever a policy is active" is unappealing, would "whenever any >> non-sandbox directive is enforced" be better (as I vaguely recall that >> being the sticking point)? >> >> >> -- >> Mike West < mkwst@google.com >, Developer Advocate >> Google Germany GmbH, Dienerstrasse 12, 80331 München, Germany >> Google+: https://mkw.st/+ , Twitter: @mikewest, Cell: +49 162 10 255 91 >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Mar 1, 2013 at 7:03 PM, Alex Russell < slightlyoff@google.com > >> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Feb 27, 2013 7:28 PM, "Devdatta Akhawe" < dev.akhawe@gmail.com > >> wrote: >> > >> > > This isn't just about scripts; it affects forms, images, and every >> other >> > > sort of network behavior. >> > >> > My point was that web application authors opt-in to XSS protection >> > only when they specify a script-src. In the absence of script-src, we >> > are in XSS world, not post-xss. >> >> >> Ah, yes. Apologies for getting your meaning the first time. >> >> >>
Received on Thursday, 28 March 2013 12:32:37 UTC