W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > June 2013

Re: Content Security Policy

From: Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2013 10:40:35 -0700
Message-ID: <CAEeYn8iHDu1JXFAC=Z_qGPL9eR9PpVpQmF7fH3L2Fs=gr2EVDQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@google.com>
Cc: Joel Weinberger <jww@chromium.org>, Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>, Neil Matatall <neilm@twitter.com>, Евнгений Яременко <w3techplayground@gmail.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
Just to play devil's advocate, if the HTML is truly being served in a
completely static manner, is "unsafe-inline" actually unsafe?  (there
should be no inline-content injection vulnerabilities in such a resource)


On Mon, Jun 17, 2013 at 10:36 AM, Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@google.com> wrote:

> Does CSP support inline scripts and styles in statically served HTML
> files? My impression was that nonce only works for dynamic serving. If
> that's the case then IMO hashes are warranted to support the static case
> alone.
>
>
>
> On Mon, Jun 17, 2013 at 1:22 PM, Joel Weinberger <jww@chromium.org> wrote:
>
>> I'm not particularly against, hashes, but I'm naturally hesitant to add
>> more constructs to CSP, especially since the use of nonces seem to
>> completely overlap with the use cases for hashes. I think the concern about
>> nonce abuse as Yoav pointed out are valid concerns, but I'd be hesitant to
>> add a new construct just to cover that particular concern. Put differently,
>> I don't see any dramatically different uses for hashes from nonces.
>> --Joel
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 17, 2013 at 4:09 AM, Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws> wrote:
>>
>>> +1 for discussing it further.
>>>
>>> The advantages I see:
>>> * The author is authorizing a *specific* script/style and can do so
>>> using static configuration
>>>   - No need for a dynamic backend that changes the nonce for each
>>> request..
>>>   - This can simplify deployment, resulting in more people using it
>>> * I'm afraid of authors abusing nonces, sending the same nonce over and
>>> over as means to "bypass" CSP
>>>   - Offering an alternative to nonce can reduce that risk
>>>
>>> The complications I can think of:
>>> * Make sure that either hashes don't break with small white-spaces
>>> removals, text encoding changes, etc.
>>>   - An alternative is tools that can give authors the resulting hash for
>>> a specific script/style. (e.g. inside the Web inspector tools). That may be
>>> more fragile, though.
>>>
>>> All in all, I think hashes can make it easier for "copy&paste" authors
>>> to integrate CSP. They can also make deployment of third party scripts
>>> easier.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Jun 15, 2013 at 8:00 AM, Neil Matatall <neilm@twitter.com>wrote:
>>>
>>>> This is the script-hash proposal. I would love it if we discussed this
>>>> more as it has numerous benefits over a nonce as well as complications :)
>>>> On Jun 15, 2013 1:11 AM, "Евнгений Яременко" <
>>>> w3techplayground@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Is it possible to verify(whitelist) inline script block via checksum
>>>>> of its logic(uniform) as alternative to "Nonce"?  ie send checksum of the
>>>>> allowed script via header and if inlined script checksum is the same it's
>>>>> allowed to execute.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
Received on Monday, 17 June 2013 17:41:03 UTC

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