- From: Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>
- Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 13:34:13 -0800
- To: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
- Cc: "Eduardo' Vela" <evn@google.com>, Daniel Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com>, public-webappsec@w3.org, Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com>
What about triggering a DOM event by default, and (possibly) allowing opt-outs? Am I missing a threat? --dev On 22 November 2012 11:43, Mike West <mkwst@google.com> wrote: > You can add more than one endpoint to the report-uri directive, so yes, this > suggestion would support that use case as (for instance) `report-uri 'self' > /report-collection-url.cgi`. > > -- > Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, Developer Advocate > Google Germany GmbH, Dienerstrasse 12, 80331 München, Germany > Google+: https://mkw.st/+, Twitter: @mikewest, Cell: +49 162 10 255 91 > > > On Thu, Nov 22, 2012 at 7:11 PM, Eduardo' Vela <evn@google.com> wrote: >> >> Could it be possible to get both? A report-uri and the DOM errors? >> >> That way we can deploy one policy on a large set of apps and if we need to >> debug one in particular we just ask that one to monitor the script. >> >> On Nov 22, 2012 4:36 AM, "Mike West" <mkwst@google.com> wrote: >>> >>> I've talked to a few developers about deploying CSP, and the request for >>> some form of violation DOM event has popped up several times. It's something >>> I'd like to implement if we can find a good way of making it work. >>> >>> What do you think about making such a feature an opt-in portion of the >>> policy by adding a `'self'` keyword to the `report-uri` directive? If the >>> keyword is set, violation events would be fired at the >>> `document.securityPolicy` object; if not, no violation events would fire for >>> that policy. >>> >>> That mechanism might actually also give vendors a mechanism of directing >>> violations of extensions' policies to the extension rather than the page by >>> interpreting 'self' in some reasonable way. >>> >>> -- >>> Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, Developer Advocate >>> Google Germany GmbH, Dienerstrasse 12, 80331 München, Germany >>> Google+: https://mkw.st/+, Twitter: @mikewest, Cell: +49 162 10 255 91 >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 12:53 AM, Dan Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 11:18 PM, Eduardo' Vela <evn@google.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> We have found a lot of challenges triaging reports to the point we are >>>>>> considering disabling CSP since it's useless as we can't effectively >>>>>> debug >>>>>> it, this is very important for large scale applications. >>>> >>>> >>>> Are you trying to debug a broken application, or figure out where >>>> injected content is coming from? >>>> >>>> I'm sympathetic to your need and it may be worth experimenting with, but >>>> I would not want user-applied CSP to report to the page. At least not >>>> detectably as a "CSP" error; if we want to fire normal existing onerror= >>>> handlers for images that don't load that may be fine. >>>> >>>> I'm not sure what to do about extension-supplied CSP. Again, I would not >>>> want it reporting to the page, but it would be handy if there were a way to >>>> report it to the extension. I'm sure extensions can root around in the web >>>> console messages and find it, but a more direct API might be good. >>>> >>>> Such APIs would be out of scope for this WG so I'd just like to state >>>> the privacy principal that user-agent supplied policies do not report >>>> violations to the originating server or page content. I'm not against firing >>>> events at the page for violations of the page's own policy. >>>> >>>> -Dan Veditz >>>> >>> >
Received on Tuesday, 27 November 2012 21:35:01 UTC