Re: CORS versus Uniform Messaging?

On Sun, Dec 13, 2009 at 1:29 PM, Mark S. Miller <erights@google.com> wrote:

> On Sun, Dec 13, 2009 at 12:26 PM, Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com> wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Dec 13, 2009 at 8:54 AM, Mark S. Miller <erights@google.com>
>> wrote:
>> > On Sat, Dec 12, 2009 at 7:17 PM, Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com> wrote:
>> >> I agree with Jonas.  It seems unlikely we'll be able to
>> >> design-by-commitee around a difference in security philosophy dating
>> >> back to the 70s.
>> >
>> > Hi Adam, the whole point of arguing is to settle controversies. That is
>> how
>> > human knowledge advances. If after 40 years the ACL side has no defenses
>> > left for its position, ACL advocates should have the good grace to
>> concede
>> > rather than cite the length of the argument as a reason not to
>> resolve the
>> > argument.
>>
>> I seriously doubt we're going to advance the state of human knowledge
>> by debating this topic on this mailing list.  The scientific community
>> is better equipped for that than the standards community.
>>
>>
> AFAICT, the last words on this debate in the scientific literature are the
> Horton paper <
> http://www.usenix.org/event/hotsec07/tech/full_papers/miller/miller.pdf>
> and the prior refutations it cites:
>
> Because ocaps operate on an anonymous “bearer right” basis, they seem to
> make reactive control impossible. Indeed, although many historical
> criticisms of ocaps have since been refuted [11, 16, 10, 17], a remaining
> unrefuted criticism is that they cannot record who to blame for which action
> [6]. This lack has led some to forego the benefits of ocaps.
>
>
> The point of the Horton paper itself is to refute that last criticism.
>
> [11] Capability Myths Demolished <
> http://srl.cs.jhu.edu/pubs/SRL2003-02.pdf> or <
> http://www.usenix.org/events/hotsec07/tech/full_papers/miller/miller_html/
> >
>
>
Copy paste error, sorry. That second link was an additional link for Horton,
not for Myths.



> Referee rejection of Myths at <
> http://www.eros-os.org/pipermail/cap-talk/2003-March/001133.html>. Read
> carefully, especially Boebert's criticisms.
>
> [16] Verifying the EROS Confinement Mechanism <
> http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.43.6577>
>
> [10] Robust Composition <http://erights.org/talks/thesis/>. Notice in
> particular the counter-example to Boebert's famous claim in seven lines of
> simple code, in Figure 11.2.
>
> [17] Patterns of Safe Collaboration <
> http://www.evoluware.eu/fsp_thesis.pdf>, which does a formal analysis of
> (among other things) confused deputy, Boebert's claim, and my
> counter-example.
>
> [6] Traditional capability-based systems: An analysis of their ability to
> meet the trusted computer security evaluation criteria. <
> http://www.webstart.com/jed/papers/P-1935/>
>
>
> If you know of any responses to these refutations in the scientific
> literature, please cite them. If you believe (as I do) that the lack of
> responses is due to ignorance and avoidance, then either
> 1) the scientific community has shown itself less well equipped to engage
> in this debate than those who are actively engaged in it -- such as us here
> on this list,
> 2) that the case against these alleged refutations are so obvious that they
> need not be stated, or
> 3) that the members of the scientific community that cares about these
> issues have found no flaw in these refutations -- in which case they
> legitimately should stand as the last word.
>
> In either of the first two cases, since you are a member both of the
> scientific community and of this standards committee, if you don't respond
> in the scientific literature, please don't cite merely the lack of response
> in the scientific literature in support of your points.
>
>
> --
>    Cheers,
>    --MarkM
>



-- 
   Cheers,
   --MarkM