Re: Origin (was: Re: XHR LC Draft Feedback)

* Adam Barth wrote:
>There are three cases:
>1) Origin header missing:  This is a non-supporting browser.  Fall
>back to existing CSRF defenses.
>2) Origin header has a trusted value:  Accept the request.
>3) Origin header has an untrusted value:  Reject the request.

Yes, and I am saying, if the first case properly protects against these
attacks, then you do not need the header. If it does not, then you have
an insecure web application at least until you drop this case. For this
kind of web application, when it needs to be used cross-site, the header
does indeed have some "advantage" over the simpler cross-site indicator,
but making inherently insecure applications a little less insecure, if
you could also fully secure them, does not strike me as a good deal.

Note again that I am not talking about "XHR2+AC" here, as the security
model is completely different there (you ask before you post) and until
very recently, it used a different header than the 'Origin' header that
has been proposed. I would be quite interested in having an indicator
that helps blocking unwanted cross site requests, like legacy cross site
form posts, I just don't see how the non-"XHR2+AC"-'Origin' header is
better than a much simpler, more difficult to manipulate, and privacy-
enhanced cross site indicator.
Björn Höhrmann · ·
Weinh. Str. 22 · Telefon: +49(0)621/4309674 ·
68309 Mannheim · PGP Pub. KeyID: 0xA4357E78 · 

Received on Monday, 23 June 2008 20:18:54 UTC