Re: ACTION-390: alternative UA affordances for DNT choice

> 
> On Apr 20, 2013, at 0:04 , Alan Chapell <achapell@chapellassociates.com>
> wrote:
> 
>> Thanks David. A few things come to mind after reading your and Ed's examples.
>> 
>> The radio app running on a computer
> 
> No, no.  Maybe I did not explain.  It's not an app, it's a little black box.
> The computer is only needed to *configure* it over the network.  Once
> configured, it runs without a computer.  My Onkyo stereo is an example.  This
> is not hypothetical.

Ok, thanks. Just so I understand. The computer configures the radio service,
correct? Why can't the disclosures be provided via the computer when DNT is
enacted?


> 
> 
>> in your example can be seen as an extension of the radio service's UA and
>> therefore compliant so long as it otherwise meets the proposed guidelines. If
>> you don't feel that the proposed language address your use case, I'd be happy
>> to work with you on language that addresses that concern.
>> 
>> That said, It seems imprudent to spend too much time constructing a standard
>> around a hypothetical edge case unless there's a compelling benefit and
>> little risk of creating a loophole.
> 
> That's your characterization that it's only a "hypothetical edge case".
> 
>> 
>> I'm sure that regardless of how this standard is constructed, there will be
>> use cases that don't fit perfectly within the spec. This is undoubtedly an
>> area that is rife for future learnings. If having these guidelines in place
>> causes unnecessary heartburn for some with no demonstrable benefit for
>> consumers, we can adjust down the road ­ particularly after consumers obtain
>> more of an understanding of what DNT does. But starting the DNT experiment
>> with virtually no disclosure requirements on UA's
> 
> PLEASE stop repeating that strawman.  NO-ONE is arguing for no disclosure
> requirements;  we're just arguing that they should not be tied directly to the
> UA, but to the enabling of the signal.
> 
>>  seems less than ideal, given our shared goal of ensuring informed consent.
> 
> We need to actually discuss the question: does the disclosure requirement need
> to be tied to the user-agent (the end-point of the HTTP transaction that does
> the fetches), or does it need to be functionally tied to the enabling of the
> DNT:1 signal that is tied?
> 
> 
>> 
>> Alan
>> 
>> From:  David Singer <singer@apple.com>
>> Date:  Thursday, April 18, 2013 11:58 PM
>> To:  Alan Chapell <achapell@chapellassociates.com>
>> Cc:  "Edward W. Felten" <felten@CS.Princeton.EDU>, "<public-tracking@w3.org>"
>> <public-tracking@w3.org>
>> Subject:  Re: ACTION-390: alternative UA affordances for DNT choice
>> Resent-From:  <public-tracking@w3.org>
>> Resent-Date:  Fri, 19 Apr 2013 03:58:54 +0000
>> 
>>> 
>>> On Apr 18, 2013, at 21:30 , Alan Chapell <achapell@chapellassociates.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>> No one is suggesting your strawman -- that the user was not informed *at
>>>>> all*.  They are suggesting that the user may be informed by something
>>>>> other than the UA itself, and that the DNT signal still result from an
>>>>> informed choice.
>>>> 
>>>> Can you provide some examples of how this would work for your UA's?
>>> 
>>> I am sure that my imagination is poor compared to the products people
>>> envisage or invent, but I can try.
>>> 
>>> As Ed suggests, audio-only UAs are an obvious case.  Imagine an internet
>>> radio -- it has audio out, and a network connection.  When it is running, it
>>> is the UA (the user agent, that makes HTTP requests for audio segments).
>>> 
>>> Now, imagine a radio service that puts some or all of its requests through a
>>> re-direction service, so that they can track people and what they are
>>> listening to. The radio station gets some revenue in return for allowing
>>> this tracking.  This means that some users may be interested in a more
>>> private radio experience, and may desire a DNT setting.
>>> 
>>> Finally, imagine that the internet radio appliance is set up using an
>>> application you run on a personal computer of some sort.  There is no reason
>>> I can see to prohibit the device from having a privacy setting that enables
>>> DNT, that is configured and explained in the setup app that users run.  That
>>> setup app is not a user-agent.
>>> 
>>> (There are some practical issues (which are out of our scope), such as that
>>> it may be prudent to cause the device to do a 'test fetch' to each of its
>>> stations while the app is running, to see if they are willing to provide
>>> service with DNT turned on.)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I feel sure that there are other cases, as well.
>>> 
>>> David Singer
>>> Multimedia and Software Standards, Apple Inc.
>>> 
> 
> David Singer
> Multimedia and Software Standards, Apple Inc.
>