- From: Rigo Wenning <rigo@w3.org>
- Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2012 01:17:38 +0200
- To: public-tracking@w3.org
- Cc: Tamir Israel <tisrael@cippic.ca>, ifette@google.com, Shane Wiley <wileys@yahoo-inc.com>, Jeffrey Chester <jeff@democraticmedia.org>, Ninja Marnau <nmarnau@datenschutzzentrum.de>, Bjoern Hoehrmann <derhoermi@gmx.net>, David Singer <singer@apple.com>
Tamir, On Monday 11 June 2012 20:12:02 Tamir Israel wrote: > I'm not sure this is the solution. The OPC's guidelines make it > clear that there has to be an effective, readily available > opt-out mechanism in place before the server can rely on opt-out > consent. The fact that the server denies a UA's DNT-1 /on the > basis that it deems the signal invalid /(not on the basis of > scope) and lets the UA know this -- this would not amount to > consent, so servers will still lack a mechanism for achieving > consent in this particular context. If the context is a context that is required to provide an opt-out under Canadian law and if the Service has no other opt-out offerings, the Service may not comply to Canadian law. And the OPC will have to deal with it. So if the Service denies the DNT signal (for one reason or another), the Service has to live with the consequences. DNT is a tool, not a replacement. It is one tool in many. If it works really well, it will know large deployment. But this remains to be seen. It is much too early for a "one and only" mandating of this technology. But it is not to early for a "try it and report" use of this technology. Best, Rigo
Received on Tuesday, 12 June 2012 23:18:15 UTC