- From: Nicholas Doty <npdoty@w3.org>
- Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2011 19:17:13 -0700
- To: Roy T. Fielding <fielding@gbiv.com>
- Cc: Karl Dubost <karld@opera.com>, Matthias Schunter <mts@zurich.ibm.com>, public-tracking@w3.org
On Oct 28, 2011, at 1:09 PM, Roy T. Fielding wrote: > The response is only necessary for the very small percentage of DNT enabled > browsers, which in turn is just a small percentage of overall browsers, that > also want to see verification of tracking. In other words, the ultra-paranoid > mode or the regulators checking for deployment/compliance. A user that just > wants to enable DNT will just send the DNT request header. Do we think only "ultra-paranoid" users will have any interest in the response from the server? One of the goals we identified was to add visibility to the case of opting back in. This seems like a potentially very common situation, given the interest we've heard from advertisers and content providers in having a negotiation with users. In fact, if the only effective signal that a user has opted-back-in will be the response header/well-known location, then I would suggest that all implementing user agents ought to check (through whichever mechanism) for every potential tracker. Otherwise it would be very easy for users to believe they've configured their browser to opt out and browse the Web while being regularly tracked. —Nick
Received on Saturday, 29 October 2011 02:17:26 UTC