- From: Bob Futrelle <bob.futrelle@gmail.com>
- Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2006 17:11:59 -0400
- To: public-semweb-lifesci@w3.org
I would suggest that both natural language *and* ontologies are views of (possibly shallow) underlying knowledge. This knowledge is difficult to characterize. It is also difficult to achieve agreement on it within or across communities. I find the following study sobering. Don't be misled by the term "folk". Today's science is tomorrow's folk science. - Bob Futrelle ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Abstract Cognitive Science: A Multidisciplinary Journal 2002, Vol. 26, No. 5, Pages 521-562 (doi:10.1207/s15516709cog2605_1) The misunderstood limits of folk science: an illusion of explanatory depth Leonid Rozenblit - Department of Psychology, Yale University Frank Keil - Department of Psychology, Yale University People feel they understand complex phenomena with far greater precision, coherence, and depth than they really do; they are subject to an illusion—an illusion of explanatory depth. The illusion is far stronger for explanatory knowledge than many other kinds of knowledge, such as that for facts, procedures or narratives. The illusion for explanatory knowledge is most robust where the environment supports real-time explanations with visible mechanisms. We demonstrate the illusion of depth with explanatory knowledge in Studies 1–6. Then we show differences in overconfidence about knowledge across different knowledge domains in Studies 7–10. Finally, we explore the mechanisms behind the initial confidence and behind overconfidence in Studies 11 and 12, and discuss the implications of our findings for the roles of intuitive theories in concepts and cognition. (c) 2002 Leonid Rozenblit. Published by Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved.
Received on Monday, 19 June 2006 21:12:06 UTC