- From: Ambarish S Natu <ambarish.natu@gmail.com>
- Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2015 22:17:02 +1100
- To: David Singer <singer@apple.com>
- Cc: "Mike O'Neill" <michael.oneill@baycloud.com>, Danny Weitzner <djweitzner@csail.mit.edu>, Rigo Wenning <rigo@w3.org>, "public-privacy@w3.org" <public-privacy@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAO6L_b770_NAP6xq5o4h7U1DZfn-Szdv7fy96ZG6MmXqqt+hFw@mail.gmail.com>
Here is a list of requirements to start thinking of a framework ! The problem could easily spiral out of any proportion ! Privacy-Abusive Data Collection and Retention - *Demands for User Data* - identity data - profile data - contacts data - location data - *Enticement of the Disclosure of User Data* - about the user - about the user's location - about others - *Collection of User Data * - about users' online behaviour - when transacting with the particular social media service - even when transacting with other services - about users' reading, interests, opinions and attitudes - about users' locations over time - from third parties: - without notice to the user and/or - without meaningful consent - *Retention of User Data* - without meaningful consent - without a deletion-cycle - compiling an intensive track of users' readings, behaviours and movements Privacy-Abusive Service-Provider Rights - *Terms of Service Features* - substantial self-declared, non-negotiable service-provider rights - a right to exploit users' data for the service-providers' own purposes - a right to disclose users' data to other organisations - a right to retain users' data permanently, even if the person terminates their account - a right to change Terms of Service: - unilaterally - without advance notice to users; and/or - without any notice to users - *Exercise of Self-Declared Service-Provider Rights* - in ways harmful to users' interests - in order to renege on previous undertakings - without notice of the action being provided to the user - *Avoidance of Consumer Protection and Privacy Laws* - location of storage and processing in data havens - location of contract-jurisdiction distant from users - ignoring of regulatory and oversight agencies - acceptance of nuisance-value fines and nominal undertakings as 'a cost of doing business' Privacy-Abusive Functionality and User Interfaces - *Privacy-Related Settings* - non-conservative default settings, such as default-open for profile-data, postings, and even location-data - inadequate granularity - complex and unhelpful user interfaces - changes to the effects of settings - without advance notice - without any notice and/or - without meaningful consent - *'Real Names' Policies* - denial of anonymity - denial of pseudonymity - denial of multiple identities - enforced publication of 'real name' and associated profile data - *Changes to Functionality and User Interface* - frequent - without advance notice to users - without any notice to users - without meaningful consent - *User Access to Their Data* - lack of clarity about whether data can be accessed - lack of clarity about how data can be accessed - failure to implement effective processes for user access - unreasonable limitations on a right of access - denial of a right of access - *User Deletion of Their Data* - lack of clarity about whether each category of data can be deleted - lack of clarity about how each category of data can be deleted - failure to implement effective processes for user-initiated deletion - unreasonable limitations on a right of deletion - denial of a right of deletion Privacy-Abusive Data Exploitation - *Exposure of User Data to Third Parties* - wide exposure, in violation of previous Terms of Service, of: - users' profile-data - even to the point of publishing street-address and mobile-phone number - users' postings - users' advertising and purchasing behaviour - users' declared social networks - users' inferred social networks, based on messaging-traffic - changes to the scope of exposure: - without advance notice to users - without any notice to users; and/or - without meaningful consent - ready access by government agencies, without demonstrated legal authority for the demand - *Exposure of Data about Other People* - upload of users' address-books, including: - their contact-points - other personal data, such as children's names - comments about them - by implication, their social networks - exploitation of non-users' interactions with users Regards Ambarish S Natu This list is from one of roger clarke's paper http://www.rogerclarke.com/II/COSM-1301.html On Tuesday, 27 January 2015, David Singer <singer@apple.com> wrote: > > > On Jan 27, 2015, at 11:46 , Mike O'Neill <michael.oneill@baycloud.com > <javascript:;>> wrote: > > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Hash: SHA1 > > > > There is also a international dimension, with transatlantic agreements > on privacy, cybersecurity and surveillance being publically discussed, and > it is clear these things are interrelated, addressing one will always > involve consideration of the others. > > > > There does not have to be a trade-off, no need to forgo privacy for the > sake of security. We should be able to build a system with them all. > > > > What is needed is a clearly expressed “statement of requirements” i.e. > we want to protect privacy and security within a transparent and > democratically accountable framework which, for example, allows law > enforcement to do its job (using warranted surveillance if necessary), but > rules out mass surveillance. Because the net knows no borders there has to > be a transnational component. > > > > The W3C could then do its part helping to create the necessary protocols > and standards, while the politicians take charge of the oversight process > and creating the legal environment. > > > > If you have even vague visions for what protocols and standards could help > here, could you sketch them out? > > David Singer > Manager, Software Standards, Apple Inc. > > > -- अंबरीष श्रिकृष्ण नातू Sent from Gmail Mobile
Received on Tuesday, 27 January 2015 12:56:07 UTC