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Re: Issue 100 Zero-Edits Counter Proposal

From: Sam Ruby <rubys@intertwingly.net>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2010 06:20:01 -0400
Message-ID: <4C21DFD1.2000506@intertwingly.net>
To: "Tab Atkins Jr." <jackalmage@gmail.com>
CC: public-html@w3.org
This change proposal contains five objections to another change 
proposal.  Such objections will prove helpful at later stages in the 
resolution of the issue.  Meanwhile, this change proposal needs to be 
updated in order to provide rationale for the current text.  While the 
change proposal does state that "Authors get to use @srcdoc to easily 
make content adhere to the sandbox security model," but that statement 
is vague and draws conclusions without providing supporting rationale.

- Sam Ruby

On 04/12/2010 08:13 PM, Tab Atkins Jr. wrote:
> This proposal is also available in HTML format for easier reading at<
> http://www.xanthir.com/:4ku>.
> Issue 100 Counter-Proposal
> ==========================
> Summary
> -------
> There is no problem, and no change should be made to the spec.
> Rationale
> ---------
> Several rationales are given in the Issue 100 Change Proposal for
> removing @srcdoc:
> 1. @srcdoc doesn't provide adequate protection
> 2. @srcdoc escaping requirements are difficult
> 3. @srcdoc has bad fallback
> 4. There are existing alternatives to @srcdoc
> 5. @srcdoc is unneeded by the blogging community
> ### @srcdoc doesn't provide adequate protection ###
> This objection is irrelevant for multiple reasons.
> First, this is not an objection against @srcdoc.  @srcdoc is a
> convenient way to get content to interact with the sandbox security
> model, nothing more.  If the sandbox security model doesn't provide
> adequate protection, failures should be raised as bugs against it
> specifically.  Changing or removing @srcdoc will have no effect on the
> reliability of the sandbox security model.
> Second, the types of things that were listed as not being protected
> against, such as SQL injection, are entirely outside the scope of
> HTML.  **No technology within HTML can possibly address them.**
> Preventing an injection attack against your database, for example, is
> the responsibility of the database itself, or of the language
> interfacing with that database.
> ### @srcdoc escaping requirements are difficult ###
> When used in an HTML page, the escaping requirements for @srcdoc are
> trivial.  You have to replace " with&quot; and&  with&amp;.  The
> latter has no security implications if it's forgotten; it's merely to
> prevent words following an&  from accidentally being interpreted as
> entity references.  The former is important for security, but it
> should also fail very quickly and very obviously if it is left out -
> the very first post containing an unescaped " (and thus truncating
> itself and dumping the rest of the contents into the element's tag
> directly) will make it painfully obvious both that there is a problem
> and how to solve it.
> When used in an XHTML page, the escaping requirements may be slightly
> more involved.  If so, then it is a weakness of XML, not of @srcdoc.
> In any case, Issue 103 apparently resolves the issue adequately, by
> specifying exactly what additional characters need to be escaped for
> @srcdoc to be safely used in XML.  (Note: I'm not sure how many, if
> any, of these additional characters are necessary to escape for
> security purposes, and how many just need to be escaped to ensure
> adequate display of the content.)
> ### @srcdoc has bad fallback ###
> This objection has multiple levels.
> First, in a browser which doesn't understand @srcdoc at all, the
> <iframe>'s @src attribute is instead used to obtain the contents for
> the frame.  This is, in general, good fallback behavior - @srcdoc is
> intended to be identical to using @src, just without the additional
> network request.
> The second level, again, has to do with the sandbox security model
> itself, and thus has nothing to do with @srcdoc itself.  In browsers
> which also don't understand @sandbox, the @src fallback will execute
> in an un-sandboxed environment.  As well, the entire sandbox security
> model can be bypassed if the attacker can have the user visit the
> content's URL directly.  This is valid.  There are two possible ways
> around it:
> 1. Don't fallback at all - have the document pointed to by @src be an
> author-generated message that the browser the user is using doesn't
> support secure content.
> 2. Use the text/html-sandboxed mime type to serve the document pointed
> to by @src.  This will fail in the proper way (the page will not be
> displayed at all) in legacy browsers that don't understand @sandbox.
> In newer browsers that understand @sandbox but not @srcdoc, or when
> the user visits the url of the content directly in a browsers that
> understand @sandbox, the page will be displayed with the sandbox
> security model in place.
> ### There are existing alternatives to @srcdoc ###
> There were many alternatives proposed to @srcdoc in the discussion
> threads surrounding and preceding it.  The one that is most promising
> is to simply use a data: url in @src.  This has a few problems that
> make it inferior to @srcdoc:
> 1. data: urls have more complex escaping requirements than @srcdoc.
> All major web languages do provide an escaping function appropriate
> for urls, but it is easy to accidentally choose the wrong function.
> For example, in PHP the correct function to use is rawurlencode(), but
> the function urlencode() may be accidentally used instead.  In
> addition, despite both of these functions existing in PHP, multiple
> homebrew url-escaping functions can be found across the web, which may
> not escape everything that is necessary to escape.  Some of these
> lapses may result in non-obvious security holes that can be exploited
> by attackers, allowing arbitrary code injection into a web page.
> 2. In legacy browsers, data: urls will "fail open"; that is, they will
> display their contents even if the browser does not understand the
> sandbox security model, potentially exposing users to attack.  This
> can be mitigated by specifying a text/html-sandboxed mime type in the
> data: url, however.
> 3. As the data: url would be used in @src, there is no capability to
> fall back to another message if the browser does not understand the
> sandbox security model.
> 4. data: urls are usually interpreted to be a unique origin by
> default, for security.  It is possible that the `allow-same-origin`
> flag in @sandbox could be used to indicate that the data: url should
> be given the same origin as the outer page, but this would further
> complicate the already-confusing rules about when a data: url is
> same-origin and when it is unique-origin.
> ### @srcdoc is unneeded by the blogging community ###
> The creator of Wordpress, Matt Mullenweg, was asked about the need for
> @srcdoc in the Wordpress software.  He responded that Wordpress
> maintains a sanitation library that appears to work adequately.
> This is, again, not an argument against @srcdoc, it is an argument
> against the sandbox security model.
> ### Summary ###
> Most of the objections listed in the Change Proposal were completely
> irrelevant to the actual issue.  They are concerns with the sandbox
> security model itself.  @srcdoc is merely a convenient way to opt-in
> to the sandbox security model without incurring a network request each
> time.
> The objection concerning escaping requirements appears to be answered
> adequately by the Issue 103 change proposal.
> The objection concerning fallback is invalid, given the addition of
> the text/html-sandboxed MIME type.
> The objection concerning alternate solutions has been shown to be
> incorrect, as the best alternative solution, data: urls in @src, is
> still inferior to @srcdoc on several points.
> Details
> -------
> No change is made to the spec.
> Impact
> ------
> Positive
> : Authors get to use @srcdoc to easily make content adhere to the
> sandbox security model.
> Negative
> : As with all new elements and attributes, implementing this requires
> effort from implementors.
Received on Wednesday, 23 June 2010 10:20:33 UTC

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