- From: Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com>
- Date: Wed, 28 Jun 2017 16:43:10 -0700
- To: Cory Doctorow <cory@eff.org>
- Cc: Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe@cdt.org>, Tim Berners-Lee <timbl@w3.org>, w3c-ac-forum <w3c-ac-forum@w3.org>, "public-html-media@w3.org" <public-html-media@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAEnTvdBPCYfxfcgQY=m3QAyYA0rAZM8OsGOgqVO5APqNZUofbw@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Jun 28, 2017 at 4:25 PM, Cory Doctorow <cory@eff.org> wrote: > Hey, Joe! Thank you for this. I think it's notable for being only the > second time that an actual meaningful compromise has been offered in > respect of EME, DRM and anti-circumvention liability (the other one was > EFF's initial proposal for a wider-scoped covenant). > It's similar to the proposal made by Yandex when this was first discussed more than a year ago. There was little interest then. > > That is to say, this is the first proposal since the initial covenant > that actual would affect how EME interacted with the world -- as opposed > to voluntary, nonbinding policy working groups whose (again, nonbinding) > work product wouldn't even be ready when and if EME was published. > > EFF is very supportive of the idea of immunizing security researchers > from liability for revealing defects in browsers, even if they do so > without permission from vendors. Indeed, no immunity is required if > permission is granted, to say nothing of the fact that it's absurd to > say that companies should EVER get to decide who/when/how defects in > their products can be revealed. > > With all that said, we can't support this. If a W3C standard creates new > legal rights for its members -- the right to stop people from uttering > true facts about defects in products,to stop people who adapt technology > for people with disabilities, to kill competing interoperable products, > then the W3C should take every feasible step to undo this unintended > consequence of its standardisation. > > New legal rights from technical standards are bugs, not features. CDT's > proposal starts from the premise that the W3C has it in its power to > limit the exercise of anti-circumvention laws, but stops short of the > obvious use of that power: preventing the use of anti-circumvention > except when there is some bona fide cause of action, such as copyright > infringement, theft of trade secrets, or tortious interference. > > Standards should be a means of maximizing interoperability, not a > coercive tool for firms to punish competitors who engage in lawful conduct. > > But we are very interested in what other members say about this. The > very narrow covenant you've described falls short of addressing the > concerns of the wider security community (vulnerabilities that don't > impact the privacy dimension are still vulnerabilities that can be used > to attack literally billions of web users!), and is totally silent on > the question of accessibility. > > But the DRM advocates in the W3C -- and the Director -- have > consistently said that W3C-standardized DRM is better than > industry-based, ad-hoc DRM because the former creates meaningful privacy > protections that the industry wouldn't bother with, left to its own > devices. > > If industry promises privacy, but won't swear not to punish people who > reveal that their privacy promise has been broken, then they're not > promising much of anything. > > Which is why we're very interested in hearing what entertainment > industry members like Netflix, Cable Labs, Comcast, RIAA and the MPAA, > as well as DRM vendors and implementers like Adobe, Google, Apple, > Microsoft and Mozilla have to say about this. > I don't have anything new to say. So - for once - I am going to refrain from repeating what I have said before. ...Mark > > Thanks, > > Cory > > > On 06/28/2017 02:50 PM, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote: > > I would like to propose a compromise on the issue of EME going forward > > that I think might make both sides, so to speak, a bit sad and a bit > > happy at the same time: > > > > The idea would be to adopt a covenant, but make it very narrow. > > > > That is, we would essentially limit the scope of a litigation > > non-aggression covenant to specifically cover privacy and security > > researchers examining implementations of w3c specifications for > > privacy and security flaws. For example, the batteryStatus research > > from Lukasz and Arvidn (and subsequent pulling of that feature from > > browsers) is a good example of the kind of work we want to make sure > > researchers know they will face little risk working on: > > http://randomwalker.info/publications/battery-status-case-study.pdf ) > > > > Since there were so many objections (23 I believe), the Director has a > > firm basis for saying that there is definitely substantial support > > for a covenant here, but by limiting the scope of the covenant to a > > very narrow set of activities related to discovering privacy and > > security flaws in implementations of w3c specifications, the covenant > > will be less open-ended to those opposed to the covenant and gets to > > the heart of a core concern of the supporters (security research > > protections). > > > > This may be a crazy idea, but I think it could actually move things > > forward (it is a typical CDT answer: everyone will be a little upset, > > rather than some people being very very upset and some not at all). > > > > I'd of course welcome thoughts as this strikes me as a very unusual > > place for w3c members and w3m to be in. > > > > Cheers, Joe > > > -- > > FOR PUBLIC SAFETY REASONS, THIS EMAIL HAS BEEN INTERCEPTED BY YOUR > GOVERNMENT AND WILL BE RETAINED FOR FUTURE ANALYSIS > > -- > > Cory Doctorow > Apollo 1201 Project > > cory@eff.org > > For avoidance of doubt: This email does not constitute permission to add > me to your mailing list. > > READ CAREFULLY. By reading this email, you agree, on behalf of your > employer, to release me from all obligations and waivers arising from > any and all NON-NEGOTIATED agreements, licenses, terms-of-service, > shrinkwrap, clickwrap, browsewrap, confidentiality, non-disclosure, > non-compete and acceptable use policies ("BOGUS AGREEMENTS") that I have > entered into with your employer, its partners, licensors, agents and > assigns, in perpetuity, without prejudice to my ongoing rights and > privileges. You further represent that you have the authority to release > me from any BOGUS AGREEMENTS on behalf of your employer. > > As is the case with every email you've ever received, this email has not > been scanned for all known viruses. > > Duh. > -- > > FOR PUBLIC SAFETY REASONS, THIS EMAIL HAS BEEN INTERCEPTED BY YOUR > GOVERNMENT AND WILL BE RETAINED FOR FUTURE ANALYSIS > > -- > > Cory Doctorow > doctorow@craphound.com > Wickr: doctorow > > For avoidance of doubt: This email does not constitute permission to add > me to your mailing list. > > blog: boingboing.net > upcoming appearances: craphound.com/?page_id=4667 > books (novels, collections graphic novels, essay collections): > craphound.com > latest novel: Walkaway > latest nonfiction: Information Doesn't Want to Be Free > latest graphic novel: In Real Life > podcast: feeds.feedburner.com/doctorow_podcast > latest YA novel: Homeland craphound.com/homeland > latest short story collection: Expanded Overclocked > > Join my mailing list and find out about upcoming books, stories, > articles and appearances: > > http://www.ctyme.com/mailman/listinfo/doctorow > > READ CAREFULLY. By reading this email, you agree, on behalf of your > employer, to release me from all obligations and waivers arising from > any and all NON-NEGOTIATED agreements, licenses, terms-of-service, > shrinkwrap, clickwrap, browsewrap, confidentiality, non-disclosure, > non-compete and acceptable use policies ("BOGUS AGREEMENTS") that I have > entered into with your employer, its partners, licensors, agents and > assigns, in perpetuity, without prejudice to my ongoing rights and > privileges. You further represent that you have the authority to release > me from any BOGUS AGREEMENTS on behalf of your employer. > > As is the case with every email you've ever received, this email has not > been scanned for all known viruses. > > Duh. > -- > > FOR PUBLIC SAFETY REASONS, THIS EMAIL HAS BEEN INTERCEPTED BY YOUR > GOVERNMENT AND WILL BE RETAINED FOR FUTURE ANALYSIS > > -- > > Cory Doctorow > Apollo 1201 Project > > cory@eff.org > > For avoidance of doubt: This email does not constitute permission to add > me to your mailing list. > > READ CAREFULLY. By reading this email, you agree, on behalf of your > employer, to release me from all obligations and waivers arising from > any and all NON-NEGOTIATED agreements, licenses, terms-of-service, > shrinkwrap, clickwrap, browsewrap, confidentiality, non-disclosure, > non-compete and acceptable use policies ("BOGUS AGREEMENTS") that I have > entered into with your employer, its partners, licensors, agents and > assigns, in perpetuity, without prejudice to my ongoing rights and > privileges. You further represent that you have the authority to release > me from any BOGUS AGREEMENTS on behalf of your employer. > > As is the case with every email you've ever received, this email has not > been scanned for all known viruses. > > Duh. > >
Received on Wednesday, 28 June 2017 23:43:45 UTC