AW: Utah State-Endorsed Digital Identity (SEDI) legislation

"So perhaps the question is not SSI vs government systems, but:

How do we accelerate implementation while aligning decentralization, usability, and regulatory trust?

The meaningful debate is about:

• Deployment speed

• Governance design

• Privacy guarantees

• Recovery & lifecycle management

• Real-world adoption


Trust, ultimately, is something we build into the system’s mechanics — not something we merely assert."

  *
Exactly


________________________________
Von: Amir Hameed <amsaalegal@gmail.com>
Gesendet: Montag, 16. Februar 2026 06:08
Bis: Steffen Schwalm <Steffen.Schwalm@msg.group>
Cc: Joe Andrieu <joe@legreq.com>; NIKOLAOS FOTIOY <fotiou@aueb.gr>; Kyle Den Hartog <kyle@pryvit.tech>; Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>; Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>; Filip Kolarik <filip26@gmail.com>; public-credentials <public-credentials@w3.org>
Betreff: Re: Utah State-Endorsed Digital Identity (SEDI) legislation


Caution: This email originated from outside of the organization. Despite an upstream security check of attachments and links by Microsoft Defender for Office, a residual risk always remains. Only open attachments and links from known and trusted senders.

Hi all,


I’m not sure we’re framing the discussion in the most productive way.


Self-sovereign identity (SSI) is no longer purely conceptual — elements of it already exist in our day-to-day digital interactions. The core shift is not simply about what identity model we choose, but about user control, privacy, and how trust is established.


A web-of-trust perspective reminds us that trust is not something we can centrally declare or predefine. It emerges from verifiable interactions, cryptographic proofs, and governance frameworks — rather than being assumed by default.


Decentralized identifiers (DIDs), for example, allow identity to function more like a network address anchored in cryptography instead of a record anchored solely in an institution. This introduces properties such as portability, reduced correlation, and resistance to single points of control. These characteristics are not theoretical; they are already being implemented and tested in real systems.


That said, government-led frameworks like EUDI or SEDI play an important role in:

• Legal recognition

• Interoperability at scale

• Liability and assurance models

• Cross-border acceptance


So perhaps the question is not SSI vs government systems, but:


How do we accelerate implementation while aligning decentralization, usability, and regulatory trust?


The meaningful debate is about:

• Deployment speed

• Governance design

• Privacy guarantees

• Recovery & lifecycle management

• Real-world adoption


Trust, ultimately, is something we build into the system’s mechanics — not something we merely assert.


Regards,

Amir Hameed Mir

Founder of Sirraya Labs


On Mon, 16 Feb 2026 at 10:26 AM, Steffen Schwalm <Steffen.Schwalm@msg.group> wrote:
Joe,


  1.
Trusted issuer registry show somebody is allowed to issue something and trustworthy because in the registry

  *
Controls on trusted issuer work in parallel e.g.
- requirements to inform about security breaches within 24 hours
Possibility for SB to start investigation or new conformity assessment by CAB
  *
Conformity assessment based on provable international standards
  *
Clear liability for QTSP

2) Means nothing dangerous in arguments of  Nikos, it`s pretty much similar to root stores from browsers but in hands of trustworthy authorities

3) there`s no centralized but distributed system as we have > 250 QTSP, 31 TL, n CAB

So recommend that we discuss alongside the actual regulation and eiDAS technical framework.

Best
Steffen


________________________________
Von: Joe Andrieu <joe@legreq.com<mailto:joe@legreq.com>>
Gesendet: Montag, 16. Februar 2026 05:45
Bis: NIKOLAOS FOTIOY <fotiou@aueb.gr<mailto:fotiou@aueb.gr>>
Cc: Kyle Den Hartog <kyle@pryvit.tech>; Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com<mailto:agropper@healthurl.com>>; Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com<mailto:msporny@digitalbazaar.com>>; Steffen Schwalm <Steffen.Schwalm@msg.group>; Filip Kolarik <filip26@gmail.com<mailto:filip26@gmail.com>>; public-credentials <public-credentials@w3.org<mailto:public-credentials@w3.org>>
Betreff: Re: Utah State-Endorsed Digital Identity (SEDI) legislation


Caution: This email originated from outside of the organization. Despite an upstream security check of attachments and links by Microsoft Defender for Office, a residual risk always remains. Only open attachments and links from known and trusted senders.

On Sun, Feb 15, 2026 at 1:15 PM NIKOLAOS FOTIOY <fotiou@aueb.gr<mailto:fotiou@aueb.gr>> wrote:
> “[browsers] don't have to "prove their code is secure” before engaging with a website during a regulated activity”.

This not true. Browsers have done this implicitly and many web sites trust “well-known” browsers. If you try to access a web page with an “unknown” or old browser you are denied access. Try for example "curl https://www.aa.com/“.


This is a wonderful example of how we are talking past each other.  In a previous email you also suggested curl  https://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/travel_and_visa.htm


And, in fact, a simple curl request to that URL fails. Fascinating. That surprised me.

However, if you install curl-impersonate, those two URLs open up like a jack-in-the-box on the third turn of the crank.

curl_ff98 https://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/travel_and_visa.html

curl_ff98 https://www.aa.com


So, I acknowledge that you are correct. Apparently, both American Airlines and the Japanese Embassy "maintain a list" of approved browsers. A useless list, but the filtering is happening.

Unfortunately, they lack a way to prevent impersonating browsers from accessing content.

The thing is, you *can* maintain a list of approved browsers, but it's not actually going to stop bad actors. At most, it will keep naive actors from taking advantage of your system.

Making matters worse, every browser with a developer mode allows current users nearly unlimited access to the browser. It's trivially hackable. The idea of a secure client is simply unrealistic.

The situation is much like the truism that "Locks don't keep thieves out; locks keep honest people honest." The only thing that "approved" lists achieve is preventing a bunch of potentially legitimate requests in exchange for the false hope that you are preventing malicious activity. You aren't actually preventing non-standard browsers from accessing your site. You're only preventing non-criminals from accessing your services in their preferred way. You think you're making things better, but you're actually preventing innovation in the client's processing context. I know. I've been fighting the Web's ineffective security-by-obfuscation for decades.

More dangerous is the fact that your advocacy creates a false sense of security, literally telling people something is secure when it is not. Seriously, your email here is a dangerous recommendation. For anyone reading, please DO NOT think that approved browser lists actually prevent "unapproved" browser access.

The truism that you can't trust the client is not just a web phenomenon or my opinion; it's a deep cybersecurity principle. You might want to argue with me, but I suggest you do some research before arguing against the combined wisdom of 50+ years of cybersecurity experience.

Seriously, search for "cybersecurity can't trust the client" and you'll see a wealth of diverse opinions explaining in various terms why you actually can't trust the client in cyberspace.

And what we're seeing in the EUDI is the false belief that you can somehow trust "certain" clients, leading to a security architecture that centralizes power in the name of security without actually creating a more secure system.

You may not agree that the bad things that many of us fear are bad. That's fine. Differences in values are fine reasons for differences in policy. However, you cannot legitimately assert that depending on secure clients is effective security. It isn't.

Since the system is ineffective and many people see real harm in its explicit centrality, several of us would love to see the EU shift away from this harmful and inevitably insecure approach.

-j

--
Joe Andrieu
President
joe@legreq.com<mailto:joe@legreq.com>
+1(805)705-8651
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