- From: Steffen Schwalm <Steffen.Schwalm@msg.group>
- Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2026 04:41:05 +0000
- To: Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>, NIKOLAOS FOTIOY <fotiou@aueb.gr>
- CC: Kyle Den Hartog <kyle@pryvit.tech>, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>, Filip Kolarik <filip26@gmail.com>, public-credentials <public-credentials@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <AM8P191MB12999E6B99AD791AD0A0D90DFA6CA@AM8P191MB1299.EURP191.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>
My question was about the verifier of the credential, and who allows them to even ask the question: the law My question was who approves the school? The responsible public authority, e.g. in Germany a dedicated authority per Federal State defines which kind of schools and how many of them and where are established with which rights. Who approve the credential? Depends on legal framework and internal organization Who works in the IT department at the school to make this happen? Depends on school ow much cost does this add to running the school? In Germany in many federal states exactly 0,- € because public solution How centralized do they have to make the system to be able to ask the question in the first place? As requested by law The web knows TrustLists as well called root stores from browsers. Best Steffen ________________________________ Von: Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com> Gesendet: Sonntag, 15. Februar 2026 23:14 Bis: NIKOLAOS FOTIOY <fotiou@aueb.gr> Cc: Kyle Den Hartog <kyle@pryvit.tech>; Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>; Steffen Schwalm <Steffen.Schwalm@msg.group>; Filip Kolarik <filip26@gmail.com>; public-credentials <public-credentials@w3.org> Betreff: Re: Utah State-Endorsed Digital Identity (SEDI) legislation Caution: This email originated from outside of the organization. Despite an upstream security check of attachments and links by Microsoft Defender for Office, a residual risk always remains. Only open attachments and links from known and trusted senders. On Sun, Feb 15, 2026 at 4:14 PM NIKOLAOS FOTIOY <fotiou@aueb.gr> wrote: > > “[browsers] don't have to "prove their code is secure” before engaging with a website during a regulated activity”. > > This not true. Browsers have done this implicitly and many web sites trust “well-known” browsers. There is no way for a website to know if it is speaking to a particular browser... and 5.5 billion people in the world exist in that ecosystem today. Yes, there is fraud, and yes we want to do better, but the further you lock a system down, the more expensive and harder it is to operate within that system until people just route around the system. This whole "trusted wallets" thing the EU is trying to do is folly. Browsers can lie about their User-Agent string. Browsers can (and sometimes do) pretend to be other browsers. You can try to sniff browser behavior as a website, but it's not something you can count on. Browsers can be proxied. Browsers can be emulated. Browser sniffing is considered an anti-pattern... and so on: https://www.sitepoint.com/why-browser-sniffing-stinks/ https://www.w3.org/TR/fingerprinting-guidance/ > If you try to access a web page with an “unknown” or old browser you are denied access. Try for example "curl https://www.aa.com/“. Only if the browser is being honest. If the browser is dishonest, or proxied, the website will never be able to tell. Never trust the client: https://medium.com/@berniedurfee/never-trust-a-client-not-even-your-own-2de342723674 Browsers do not, in any way, "prove their code is secure" to a website. If I downloaded and rebuilt Google Chromium to display every red pixel as a blue pixel, and put a dancing rabbit on every page... the website wouldn't know. It's just trusting the browser to do the right thing without verifying that it is actually doing the right thing. > > “For example, do verifiers—such as all the underfunded public schools in my district—now have to pay to be put on some list somewhere for every type of credential they could ask for, just so that I can prove that I’m the parent of my kids or that I live in the school district?” > > For the average EU citizen, I believe the answer to this is yes: they would strongly expect formal proof that such a system has taken all necessary measures to prevent anyone from falsely proving that they are someone else’s child’s parent. That wasn't my question. My question wasn't about the issuer of the credential. My question was about the verifier of the credential, and who allows them to even ask the question. My question was who approves the school? Who approve the credential? Who works in the IT department at the school to make this happen? How much cost does this add to running the school? How centralized do they have to make the system to be able to ask the question in the first place? These are all problems that "Mandatory to Enforce, Trusted Verifier Lists" create... and we learned this lesson during the early days of the Web, only for the EU to forget the lesson 30 years on. We continue to talk past each other... I think I know what you are saying wrt. browser sniffing, but I assert that browsers don't work in the way that you think they do (with links to how they do work). On the second point, you are answering a question I didn't ask... and on that point, we're talking past each other. :) -- manu -- Manu Sporny - https://www.linkedin.com/in/manusporny/ Founder/CEO - Digital Bazaar, Inc. https://www.digitalbazaar.com/
Received on Monday, 16 February 2026 04:41:15 UTC