Re: De-platforming humans [Was]: When Technical Standards Meet Geopolitical Reality

That's fair,

But even when swapping SIM cards there is an option to keep your number. In
the UK at least.

On Fri, Jul 18, 2025, 09:59 Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> pá 18. 7. 2025 v 10:26 odesílatel Will Abramson <will@legreq.com> napsal:
>
>> Apologies, I have not fully digested this thread.
>>
>> But I just wanted to say I find "pubkey as name" to be a pretty
>> suboptimal solution.
>>
>> People lose of want to change their keys regularly. I mean who all here
>> has lost there house keys right.
>>
>> Thing is I lose my house keys, I don't lose my house. Same here, I should
>> be able to change or lose my keys without losing my name.
>>
>> That is a big part of what DIDs are all about.
>>
>
> I think the argument is something of a strawman.
>
> Nobody uses DIDs to lock their house.
>
> On nostr, millions of users already rely on key-pairs for identity.
>
> There are several competing revocation options, and while the community
> hasn’t settled on one yet, they’re all compatible with did:nostr
>
> There’s still work to do, but instead of “moving house,” a better analogy
> is simply swapping SIM cards
>
>
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Will
>>
>> On Fri, Jul 18, 2025, 07:22 Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> čt 17. 7. 2025 v 23:35 odesílatel Filip Kolarik <filip26@gmail.com>
>>> napsal:
>>>
>>>> On Thu, Jul 17, 2025 at 11:23 PM Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I don’t see how dns is centralised.  It’s a massively distributed
>>>>> lookup system technically. In a governance sense it empowers any beating
>>>>> heart to pick a domain name that isn’t already taken
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Technically, DNS is distributed, but governance is centralized. TLDs
>>>> are controlled by a small number of registries under government
>>>> jurisdiction. Recent domain bans and seizures (e.g. in Russia, Turkey, and
>>>> India) show how easily access can be revoked at the top. So yes, you can
>>>> pick a name, but you're still playing in someone else’s namespace.
>>>>
>>>
>>> There are open alternatives to DNS.
>>>
>>> The simplest way is to have a keypair.  The user holds a private key,
>>> and then the public key becomes their "name" on the internet.
>>>
>>> Short names are another class of problems, and for that the key property
>>> is that it's a non-proprietary level playing field.
>>>
>>> There are some believers in the "zooko triangle" unproven thesis that
>>> short names are impossible, but in fact, all you need is a fair tie-breaker
>>> for two people that want the same short name.  What did Zooko get wrong?
>>> He forgot about time, let people choose a name in time fairly, and then
>>> when two people choose the same name, the tie-breaker is which was earlier.
>>>
>>> I will implement these 2 strategies (pubkey as name, shortnames with
>>> tiebreaker) in addition to DNS, which I think gives users the choice and
>>> the best of all worlds.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>> Filip, https://github.com/filip26
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I must be missing something.
>>>>>
>>>>> On the other hand I’m deeply suspicious of anything that even smells
>>>>> like a blockchain.  Private ledgers are tech vendor snake oil.  Public
>>>>> ledgers are money laundering Ponzi schemes.  Can’t see how they are
>>>>> anything but that.
>>>>>
>>>>> Steven Capell
>>>>> Mob: 0410 437854
>>>>>
>>>>> On 17 Jul 2025, at 11:12 pm, Benjamin Young <byoung@digitalbazaar.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Thu, Jul 17, 2025, 5:00 PM Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Anytime I hear anyone say anything like “Bitcoin is a good thing” it
>>>>>> makes me shudder and want to vomit. As far as I can tell  It’s a monstrous
>>>>>> Ponzi scheme that is good for money laundering and not much else
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Why do we perceive did:web (or its improved variants like did:webvh)
>>>>>> as “centralised”? What could be more decentralised than the web? Certainly
>>>>>> not any distributed ledger
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> DNS (as deployed) is the centralizing component of what most people
>>>>> call "the Web". An HTML-based ecosystem that (de)references things with
>>>>> universal identifiers (URIs) and locators (URLs) doesn't necessarily have
>>>>> that same constraint.
>>>>>
>>>>> In so far as did:web and did:webvh also have a strong dependence on
>>>>> DNS...they would sadly be centralized.
>>>>>
>>>>> However, if the are protocol (beyond HTTP) and/or naming (beyond DNS)
>>>>> agnostic, then they would still have some level of decentralization.
>>>>>
>>>>> But...like the Web...their dominant "expression" would likely be
>>>>> centralized (or at least entangled with a centralized system).
>>>>>
>>>>> (Obviously ignoring mDNS, /etc/hosts, and other means of local naming
>>>>> or DNS overriding)
>>>>>
>>>>> That's my understanding, anyway.
>>>>>
>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>> Benjamin
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Steven Capell
>>>>>> Mob: 0410 437854
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 17 Jul 2025, at 10:41 pm, Melvin Carvalho <
>>>>>> melvincarvalho@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> čt 17. 7. 2025 v 22:24 odesílatel Adrian Gropper <
>>>>>> agropper@healthurl.com> napsal:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Nostr might be a good start for de-platforming social media on the
>>>>>>> basis of pseudonymity and relay-based discovery, but unless
>>>>>>> the architecture also supports untraceable payment the major surveillance
>>>>>>> platforms will persist.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nostr is tied to any payment system.  But it is largely built by
>>>>>> people in the bitcoin community, so there have been some integrations with
>>>>>> bitcoin technologies, such as the lightning network.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Innovation continues in this area.  I think that integration with
>>>>>> Blockstream's Liquid [1] would be a good start.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [1] https://blockstream.com/liquid/
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Adrian
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Thu, Jul 17, 2025 at 3:58 PM Melvin Carvalho <
>>>>>>> melvincarvalho@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> čt 17. 7. 2025 v 21:38 odesílatel Adrian Gropper <
>>>>>>>> agropper@healthurl.com> napsal:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It's clearly time for a new architecture. One that benefits from
>>>>>>>>> our experience with SSI as an anti-pattern that is too easily inverted or
>>>>>>>>> ignored.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I would suggest an architecture that sees platforms for payment
>>>>>>>>> and social media as the problem instead of focusing on identity. An
>>>>>>>>> architecture that, like cash and geocaches, defaults to anonymity by design.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I would also suggest an architecture that ignores licensed
>>>>>>>>> professionals and things. With the benefit of hindsight, the premise that
>>>>>>>>> identity standards must span licensing and supply chains seems inane.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We have a fairly advanced ecosystem working on all these problems
>>>>>>>> over at Nostr, with several million users, and several thousand DAU.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We also have a W3C Nostr Community Group [1] and have already begun
>>>>>>>> work on  a did:nostr spec.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [1] https://www.w3.org/community/nostr/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Sorry,
>>>>>>>>> - Adrian
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 16, 2025 at 3:59 AM Christopher Allen <
>>>>>>>>> ChristopherA@lifewithalacrity.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I have occasionally posted a link to one of my blog articles to
>>>>>>>>>> this group, but I thought this article deserved a broader discussion by our
>>>>>>>>>> CCG community, so I'm sharing here.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The original article is at
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/gdc25/
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> -- Christopher Allen
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Musings of a Trust Architect: When Technical Standards Meet
>>>>>>>>>> Geopolitical Reality
>>>>>>>>>> Digital Identity, Sovereignty, and the Erosion of Foundational
>>>>>>>>>> Principles
>>>>>>>>>> By Christopher Allen <ChristopherA@LifeWithAlacrity.com>
>>>>>>>>>> 2025-07-15
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *Reflections on recent conversations about digital identity,
>>>>>>>>>> sovereignty, and the erosion of foundational principles*
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Echoes from Geneva
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I wasn't present at the [Global Digital Collaboration](
>>>>>>>>>> https://globaldigitalcollaboration.org/) conference (GDC25), but
>>>>>>>>>> the observations shared by colleagues who attended have crystallized some
>>>>>>>>>> issues I've been wrestling with for years. I should note there's a
>>>>>>>>>> selection bias here: I'm the author of the [10 principles of self-sovereign
>>>>>>>>>> identity](
>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/WebOfTrustInfo/self-sovereign-identity/blob/master/self-sovereign-identity-principles.md),
>>>>>>>>>> so my community tends to have strong opinions about digital identity.
>>>>>>>>>> Still, when multiple trusted voices independently report similar concerns,
>>>>>>>>>> patterns emerge that are worth examining. And these weren't casual
>>>>>>>>>> observers sharing these concerns. They were seasoned practitioners who've
>>>>>>>>>> spent decades building identity infrastructure. Their collective unease
>>>>>>>>>> speaks to something deeper than technical disagreements.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It's hard to boil the problems at GDC25 down to a single issue,
>>>>>>>>>> because they were so encompassing. For example, there was a pattern of
>>>>>>>>>> scheduling issues that undercut the community co-organizing goal of the
>>>>>>>>>> conference and seemed to particularly impact decentralized talks. One
>>>>>>>>>> session ended up in a small, hot room on the top floor that was hard to
>>>>>>>>>> find. (It was packed anyway!) Generally, the decentralized-centric talks
>>>>>>>>>> were in bad locations, they were short, they had restricted topics, or they
>>>>>>>>>> were shared with other panelists.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I think that logistical shuffling of events may point out one of
>>>>>>>>>> the biggest issues: decentralized systems weren't given much respect. This
>>>>>>>>>> may be true generally. There may be lip service to decentralized systems,
>>>>>>>>>> but not deeper commitments. Its value isn't appreciated, so we're losing
>>>>>>>>>> its principles. Worse, I see the intent of decentralization being inverted:
>>>>>>>>>> where our goal is to give individuals independence and power by reducing
>>>>>>>>>> the control of centralized entities, we're often doing the opposite &mdash;
>>>>>>>>>> still in the name of decentralization.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The Echo Chamber Paradox
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The problems at GDC25 remind me of Rebooting the Web of Trust
>>>>>>>>>> (RWOT) community discussions I've been following, which reiterate that this
>>>>>>>>>> is a larger issue. We debate the finer points of zero-knowledge proofs and
>>>>>>>>>> DID conformance while missing the forest for the trees. Case in point: the
>>>>>>>>>> recent emergence of "[`did:genuineid`](
>>>>>>>>>> https://genuinein.com/DIDMethod)" &mdash; a centralized
>>>>>>>>>> identifier system that fundamentally contradicts the "D" in DID.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Obviously, decentralization is a threat to those who currently
>>>>>>>>>> hold power (whether they be governments, corporations, billionaires, or
>>>>>>>>>> others who hold any sort of power), because it tries to remove their
>>>>>>>>>> centralization (and therefore their power), to instead empower the
>>>>>>>>>> individual. But if we can't even maintain the semantic integrity of
>>>>>>>>>> "decentralized" within our own technical community, devoted to the ideal,
>>>>>>>>>> how can we fight for it in the larger world?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The Corpocratic Complication
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> GDC25 was held in Geneva, Switzerland. 30+ standards
>>>>>>>>>> organizations convened to discuss the future of digital identity.
>>>>>>>>>> Participants spanned the world from the United States to China. There was
>>>>>>>>>> the opportunity that GDC25 was going to be a truly international
>>>>>>>>>> conference. Indeed, Swiss presenters were there, and they spoke of privacy,
>>>>>>>>>> democratic involvement, and achieving public buy-in. It was exactly the
>>>>>>>>>> themes that we as decentralized technologists wanted to hear.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But from what I've heard, things quickly degraded from that
>>>>>>>>>> ideal. Take the United States. The sole representative of the country as a
>>>>>>>>>> whole attended via teleconference. (He was the only presenter who did so!)
>>>>>>>>>> His talk was all about Real ID, framed as a response to 9/11 and rooted in
>>>>>>>>>> the Patriot Act. It lay somewhere between security-theatre and
>>>>>>>>>> identity-as-surveillance, and that's definitely not what we wanted to hear.
>>>>>>>>>> (The contrast between the US and Swiss presentations was apparently
>>>>>>>>>> jarring.)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> And with that representative only attending remotely, the United
>>>>>>>>>> State's real representatives ended up being Google and Apple, each
>>>>>>>>>> advancing their own corpocratic interests, not the interests of the people
>>>>>>>>>> we try to empower with decentralized identities.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This isn't just an American problem. It's a symptom of a deeper
>>>>>>>>>> issue happening across our digital infrastructure. It's likely the heart of
>>>>>>>>>> the inversions of decentralized goals that we're seeing &mdash; and likely
>>>>>>>>>> why those logistical reshufflings occurred: to please the gold sponsors. In
>>>>>>>>>> fact, the conference sponsors tell the story: Google, Visa, Mastercard, and
>>>>>>>>>> Huawei were positioned as "leading organizations supporting the advancement
>>>>>>>>>> of wallets, credentials and trusted infrastructure in a manner of global
>>>>>>>>>> collaboration."
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> While Huawei's presence demonstrates international diversity — a
>>>>>>>>>> Swiss conference bringing together Europe and Asia — it also raised
>>>>>>>>>> questions about whose vision of "trust" would ultimately prevail. When
>>>>>>>>>> payment platforms and surveillance-capable tech giants frame the future of
>>>>>>>>>> identity infrastructure, we shouldn't be surprised when the architecture
>>>>>>>>>> serves their interests first.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This echoes my concerns from ["Has SSI Become Morally Bankrupt?"](
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/musings-ssi-bankruptcy/).
>>>>>>>>>> We've allowed the narrative of self-sovereignty to be co-opted by the very
>>>>>>>>>> platforms it was meant to challenge. The technical standards exist, but
>>>>>>>>>> they're being implemented in ways that invert their original purpose. Even
>>>>>>>>>> [UNECE sessions acknowledged](
>>>>>>>>>> https://unece.org/trade/events/global-digital-collaboration-conference-international-trade-identity-across-borders)
>>>>>>>>>> the risk of "diluting the autonomy and decentralization that SSI is meant
>>>>>>>>>> to provide."
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The Sovereignty Shell Game
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Google was partnered with German Sparkasse on ZKP technology and
>>>>>>>>>> that revealed a specific example of this co-opting.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Google's open-sourcing of its Zero-Knowledge Proof libraries,
>>>>>>>>>> announced July 3rd in partnership with Germany's network of public savings
>>>>>>>>>> banks, was positioned as supporting privacy in age verification. Yet as
>>>>>>>>>> [Carsten Stöcker pointed out](
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.linkedin.com/posts/dr-carsten-st%C3%B6cker-1145871_opening-up-zero-knowledge-proof-technology-activity-7348195852085067776-nKDB),
>>>>>>>>>> zero-knowledge doesn't mean zero-tracking when the entire stack runs
>>>>>>>>>> through platform intermediaries. Carsten noted that Google has "extensive
>>>>>>>>>> tracking practices across mobile devices, web platforms and advertising
>>>>>>>>>> infrastructure." Meanwhile, the Google Play API makes no promises that the
>>>>>>>>>> operations are protected from the rest of the OS.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The Google ZKP libraries ("longfellow-sk") could be a great
>>>>>>>>>> [building block](
>>>>>>>>>> https://news.dyne.org/longfellow-zero-knowledge-google-zk/) for
>>>>>>>>>> truly user-centric systems, as they link Zero-Knowledge Proofs to legacy
>>>>>>>>>> cryptographic signature systems that are still mandatory for some hardware.
>>>>>>>>>> But they'd have to be detached from the rest of Google's technology stack.
>>>>>>>>>> Without that, there are too many questions. Could Google access some of the
>>>>>>>>>> knowledge supposedly protected by ZKPs? Could they link it to other data?
>>>>>>>>>> We have no idea.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The European Union's eIDAS Regulation, set to take effect in
>>>>>>>>>> 2026, encourages Member States to integrate privacy-enhancing technologies
>>>>>>>>>> like ZKP into the European Digital Identity Wallet, but integration at the
>>>>>>>>>> platform level offers similar dangers and could again invert the very
>>>>>>>>>> privacy guarantees ZKP promises.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Historical Echoes, Modern Inversions
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Identity technology's goals being inverted, so that identity
>>>>>>>>>> becomes a threat rather than a boon, isn't a new problem. In ["Echoes of
>>>>>>>>>> History"](
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/articles/echoes-history/), I
>>>>>>>>>> examined how the contrasting approaches of Lentz and Carmille during WWII
>>>>>>>>>> demonstrate the life-or-death importance of data minimization. Lentz's
>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive Dutch identity system enabled the Holocaust's efficiency;
>>>>>>>>>> Carmille's deliberate exclusion of religious data from French records saved
>>>>>>>>>> lives. Even when they're decentralized, today's digital identity systems
>>>>>>>>>> face the same fundamental questions: what data should we collect, what
>>>>>>>>>> should we reveal, and what should we refuse to record entirely?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But we're adding a new layer of complexity. Not only must we
>>>>>>>>>> consider what data to collect, but who controls the infrastructure that
>>>>>>>>>> processes it. When Google partners with Sparkasse on "privacy-preserving"
>>>>>>>>>> age verification, when eIDAS mandates integration at the operating system
>>>>>>>>>> level, we're not just risking data collection: we're embedding it within
>>>>>>>>>> platforms whose business models depend on surveillance. Even if the data is
>>>>>>>>>> theoretically self-sovereign, the threat of data collected is still data
>>>>>>>>>> revealed &mdash; just as happened with Lentz's records.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The European eIDAS framework, which I analyzed in a [follow-up
>>>>>>>>>> piece to "Echoes from History"](
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/articles/eidas/), shows how
>>>>>>>>>> even well-intentioned regulatory efforts can accelerate platform capture
>>>>>>>>>> when they mandate integration at the operating system level. As I wrote at
>>>>>>>>>> the time, a history of problematic EU legislation that had the best of
>>>>>>>>>> intentions but resulted in unintended consequences has laid the groundwork,
>>>>>>>>>> and now identity is straight in that crosshairs. One of the first, and most
>>>>>>>>>> obvious problems with eIDAS is the mandate "that web browsers accept
>>>>>>>>>> security certificates from individual member states and the EU can refuse
>>>>>>>>>> to revoke them even if they’re dangerous." There are many more &mdash; and
>>>>>>>>>> I'm not [the only voice](
>>>>>>>>>> https://news.dyne.org/the-problems-of-european-digital-identity/)
>>>>>>>>>> on eIDAS and EUDI issues.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Supposedly self-sovereign certificates phoning home whenever
>>>>>>>>>> they're accessed is another recent threat that demonstrates best intentions
>>>>>>>>>> gone awry. This not only violates privacy, but it undercuts some of our
>>>>>>>>>> best arguments for self-sovereign control of credentials by returning
>>>>>>>>>> liability for data leaks to the issuer. The [No Phone Home](
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/news/No-Phone-Home/)
>>>>>>>>>> initiative that Blockchain Commons joined last month represents one attempt
>>>>>>>>>> to push back on that, but it feels like plugging holes in a dam that's
>>>>>>>>>> already cracking. It all does.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The Builder's Dilemma
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> What troubles me most is the split I see in our community. On one
>>>>>>>>>> side, technology purists build increasingly sophisticated protocols in
>>>>>>>>>> isolation from policy reality. On the other, pragmatists make compromise
>>>>>>>>>> after compromise until nothing remains of the original vision.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The recent debates about [`did:web` conformance](
>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/w3c-ccg/did-method-web) illustrate this
>>>>>>>>>> perfectly. Joe Andrieu correctly notes that `did:web` can't distinguish
>>>>>>>>>> between deactivation and non-existence &mdash; a fundamental security
>>>>>>>>>> boundary. Yet `did:web` remains essential to many implementation strategies
>>>>>>>>>> because it bridges the gap between ideals and adoption. It provides
>>>>>>>>>> developers and users with experience with DIDs, but in doing so undercut
>>>>>>>>>> decentralized ideals for those users. We're caught between philosophical
>>>>>>>>>> purity and practical irrelevance.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In my recent writings on [Values in Design](
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/ValuesDesign/) and the
>>>>>>>>>> [Right to Transact](
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/RightToTransact/),
>>>>>>>>>> I've tried to articulate what we're fighting for. But values without
>>>>>>>>>> implementation are just philosophy, and implementation without values is
>>>>>>>>>> just surrender.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The Global Digital Collaboration highlighted this tension
>>>>>>>>>> perfectly. International progress on digital identity proceeds apace:
>>>>>>>>>> Europe, Singapore, and China all advance their frameworks, but there are
>>>>>>>>>> still essential issues that invert our fundamental goals in designing
>>>>>>>>>> self-sovereign systems. Meanwhile, the U.S. remains even more stalled, its
>>>>>>>>>> position represented only by the platforms that benefit from the status
>>>>>>>>>> quo. Alongside this, technical standards discussions proceed in isolation
>>>>>>>>>> from the policy, regulatory, and social frameworks that will determine
>>>>>>>>>> their real-world impact.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Where Do We Go From Here?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I find myself returning to first principles. When we designed
>>>>>>>>>> [TLS 1.0](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2246), we
>>>>>>>>>> understood that technical protocols encode power relationships. When we
>>>>>>>>>> established the [principles of self-sovereign identity](
>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/WebOfTrustInfo/self-sovereign-identity/blob/master/self-sovereign-identity-principles.md),
>>>>>>>>>> we knew that architecture was politics. Ongoing battles, such as those
>>>>>>>>>> between Verifiable Credentials and ISO mDLs, between DIDComm and OpenID4VC,
>>>>>>>>>> demonstrate disagreements over these power relationships made visible in
>>>>>>>>>> technological discussions.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The question now is whether we can reclaim our ideals before
>>>>>>>>>> they're completely inverted by the side of centralized power and controlled
>>>>>>>>>> architecture.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The path forward requires bridging the gaps Geneva revealed:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> - Between corporate platform dominance and global digital
>>>>>>>>>> sovereignty
>>>>>>>>>> - Between the promise of decentralization and the reality of
>>>>>>>>>> recentralization
>>>>>>>>>> - Between technical standards and policy reality
>>>>>>>>>> - Between privacy absolutism and implementation pragmatism
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A Personal Note
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> After three decades of building internet infrastructure, I've
>>>>>>>>>> learned that the most dangerous moment isn't when systems fail, it's when
>>>>>>>>>> they succeed in ways that invert their purpose. We built protocols for
>>>>>>>>>> human autonomy and watched them become instruments of platform control. We
>>>>>>>>>> created standards for decentralization and saw them twisted into new forms
>>>>>>>>>> of centralization.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This conversation continues in private Signal groups, in
>>>>>>>>>> conference hallways, in the space between what we built and what we've
>>>>>>>>>> become. The [Atlantic Council warns](
>>>>>>>>>> https://dfrlab.org/2024/10/01/analysis-a-brave-new-reality-after-the-uns-global-digital-compact/)
>>>>>>>>>> of power centralizing "in ways that threaten the open and bottom-up
>>>>>>>>>> governance traditions of the internet." When critics from across the
>>>>>>>>>> geopolitical spectrum &mdash; from sovereignty advocates to digital rights
>>>>>>>>>> groups &mdash; all sense something amiss, it suggests a fundamental
>>>>>>>>>> architectural problem that transcends ideology.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it's time for a new architecture: one that acknowledges
>>>>>>>>>> these inversions and builds resistance into its very foundations.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> But that's a longer conversation for another day.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *Christopher Allen has been architecting trust systems for over
>>>>>>>>>> 30 years, from co-authoring TLS to establishing self-sovereign identity
>>>>>>>>>> principles. He currently works on alternative approaches to digital
>>>>>>>>>> identity through [Blockchain Commons](
>>>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/).*
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>