Re: De-platforming humans [Was]: When Technical Standards Meet Geopolitical Reality

Apologies, I have not fully digested this thread.

But I just wanted to say I find "pubkey as name" to be a pretty suboptimal
solution.

People lose of want to change their keys regularly. I mean who all here has
lost there house keys right.

Thing is I lose my house keys, I don't lose my house. Same here, I should
be able to change or lose my keys without losing my name.

That is a big part of what DIDs are all about.

Thanks,
Will

On Fri, Jul 18, 2025, 07:22 Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> čt 17. 7. 2025 v 23:35 odesílatel Filip Kolarik <filip26@gmail.com>
> napsal:
>
>> On Thu, Jul 17, 2025 at 11:23 PM Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I don’t see how dns is centralised.  It’s a massively distributed lookup
>>> system technically. In a governance sense it empowers any beating heart to
>>> pick a domain name that isn’t already taken
>>>
>>
>> Technically, DNS is distributed, but governance is centralized. TLDs are
>> controlled by a small number of registries under government jurisdiction.
>> Recent domain bans and seizures (e.g. in Russia, Turkey, and India) show
>> how easily access can be revoked at the top. So yes, you can pick a name,
>> but you're still playing in someone else’s namespace.
>>
>
> There are open alternatives to DNS.
>
> The simplest way is to have a keypair.  The user holds a private key, and
> then the public key becomes their "name" on the internet.
>
> Short names are another class of problems, and for that the key property
> is that it's a non-proprietary level playing field.
>
> There are some believers in the "zooko triangle" unproven thesis that
> short names are impossible, but in fact, all you need is a fair tie-breaker
> for two people that want the same short name.  What did Zooko get wrong?
> He forgot about time, let people choose a name in time fairly, and then
> when two people choose the same name, the tie-breaker is which was earlier.
>
> I will implement these 2 strategies (pubkey as name, shortnames with
> tiebreaker) in addition to DNS, which I think gives users the choice and
> the best of all worlds.
>
>
>>
>> Best,
>> Filip, https://github.com/filip26
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> I must be missing something.
>>>
>>> On the other hand I’m deeply suspicious of anything that even smells
>>> like a blockchain.  Private ledgers are tech vendor snake oil.  Public
>>> ledgers are money laundering Ponzi schemes.  Can’t see how they are
>>> anything but that.
>>>
>>> Steven Capell
>>> Mob: 0410 437854
>>>
>>> On 17 Jul 2025, at 11:12 pm, Benjamin Young <byoung@digitalbazaar.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> 
>>> On Thu, Jul 17, 2025, 5:00 PM Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Anytime I hear anyone say anything like “Bitcoin is a good thing” it
>>>> makes me shudder and want to vomit. As far as I can tell  It’s a monstrous
>>>> Ponzi scheme that is good for money laundering and not much else
>>>>
>>>> Why do we perceive did:web (or its improved variants like did:webvh) as
>>>> “centralised”? What could be more decentralised than the web? Certainly not
>>>> any distributed ledger
>>>>
>>>
>>> DNS (as deployed) is the centralizing component of what most people call
>>> "the Web". An HTML-based ecosystem that (de)references things with
>>> universal identifiers (URIs) and locators (URLs) doesn't necessarily have
>>> that same constraint.
>>>
>>> In so far as did:web and did:webvh also have a strong dependence on
>>> DNS...they would sadly be centralized.
>>>
>>> However, if the are protocol (beyond HTTP) and/or naming (beyond DNS)
>>> agnostic, then they would still have some level of decentralization.
>>>
>>> But...like the Web...their dominant "expression" would likely be
>>> centralized (or at least entangled with a centralized system).
>>>
>>> (Obviously ignoring mDNS, /etc/hosts, and other means of local naming or
>>> DNS overriding)
>>>
>>> That's my understanding, anyway.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> Benjamin
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Steven Capell
>>>> Mob: 0410 437854
>>>>
>>>> On 17 Jul 2025, at 10:41 pm, Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> čt 17. 7. 2025 v 22:24 odesílatel Adrian Gropper <
>>>> agropper@healthurl.com> napsal:
>>>>
>>>>> Nostr might be a good start for de-platforming social media on the
>>>>> basis of pseudonymity and relay-based discovery, but unless
>>>>> the architecture also supports untraceable payment the major surveillance
>>>>> platforms will persist.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Nostr is tied to any payment system.  But it is largely built by people
>>>> in the bitcoin community, so there have been some integrations with bitcoin
>>>> technologies, such as the lightning network.
>>>>
>>>> Innovation continues in this area.  I think that integration with
>>>> Blockstream's Liquid [1] would be a good start.
>>>>
>>>> [1] https://blockstream.com/liquid/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Adrian
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Jul 17, 2025 at 3:58 PM Melvin Carvalho <
>>>>> melvincarvalho@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> čt 17. 7. 2025 v 21:38 odesílatel Adrian Gropper <
>>>>>> agropper@healthurl.com> napsal:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It's clearly time for a new architecture. One that benefits from our
>>>>>>> experience with SSI as an anti-pattern that is too easily inverted or
>>>>>>> ignored.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I would suggest an architecture that sees platforms for payment and
>>>>>>> social media as the problem instead of focusing on identity. An
>>>>>>> architecture that, like cash and geocaches, defaults to anonymity by design.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I would also suggest an architecture that ignores licensed
>>>>>>> professionals and things. With the benefit of hindsight, the premise that
>>>>>>> identity standards must span licensing and supply chains seems inane.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We have a fairly advanced ecosystem working on all these problems
>>>>>> over at Nostr, with several million users, and several thousand DAU.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We also have a W3C Nostr Community Group [1] and have already begun
>>>>>> work on  a did:nostr spec.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [1] https://www.w3.org/community/nostr/
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Sorry,
>>>>>>> - Adrian
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 16, 2025 at 3:59 AM Christopher Allen <
>>>>>>> ChristopherA@lifewithalacrity.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I have occasionally posted a link to one of my blog articles to
>>>>>>>> this group, but I thought this article deserved a broader discussion by our
>>>>>>>> CCG community, so I'm sharing here.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The original article is at
>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/gdc25/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> -- Christopher Allen
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Musings of a Trust Architect: When Technical Standards Meet
>>>>>>>> Geopolitical Reality
>>>>>>>> Digital Identity, Sovereignty, and the Erosion of Foundational
>>>>>>>> Principles
>>>>>>>> By Christopher Allen <ChristopherA@LifeWithAlacrity.com>
>>>>>>>> 2025-07-15
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Reflections on recent conversations about digital identity,
>>>>>>>> sovereignty, and the erosion of foundational principles*
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Echoes from Geneva
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I wasn't present at the [Global Digital Collaboration](
>>>>>>>> https://globaldigitalcollaboration.org/) conference (GDC25), but
>>>>>>>> the observations shared by colleagues who attended have crystallized some
>>>>>>>> issues I've been wrestling with for years. I should note there's a
>>>>>>>> selection bias here: I'm the author of the [10 principles of self-sovereign
>>>>>>>> identity](
>>>>>>>> https://github.com/WebOfTrustInfo/self-sovereign-identity/blob/master/self-sovereign-identity-principles.md),
>>>>>>>> so my community tends to have strong opinions about digital identity.
>>>>>>>> Still, when multiple trusted voices independently report similar concerns,
>>>>>>>> patterns emerge that are worth examining. And these weren't casual
>>>>>>>> observers sharing these concerns. They were seasoned practitioners who've
>>>>>>>> spent decades building identity infrastructure. Their collective unease
>>>>>>>> speaks to something deeper than technical disagreements.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It's hard to boil the problems at GDC25 down to a single issue,
>>>>>>>> because they were so encompassing. For example, there was a pattern of
>>>>>>>> scheduling issues that undercut the community co-organizing goal of the
>>>>>>>> conference and seemed to particularly impact decentralized talks. One
>>>>>>>> session ended up in a small, hot room on the top floor that was hard to
>>>>>>>> find. (It was packed anyway!) Generally, the decentralized-centric talks
>>>>>>>> were in bad locations, they were short, they had restricted topics, or they
>>>>>>>> were shared with other panelists.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think that logistical shuffling of events may point out one of
>>>>>>>> the biggest issues: decentralized systems weren't given much respect. This
>>>>>>>> may be true generally. There may be lip service to decentralized systems,
>>>>>>>> but not deeper commitments. Its value isn't appreciated, so we're losing
>>>>>>>> its principles. Worse, I see the intent of decentralization being inverted:
>>>>>>>> where our goal is to give individuals independence and power by reducing
>>>>>>>> the control of centralized entities, we're often doing the opposite &mdash;
>>>>>>>> still in the name of decentralization.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Echo Chamber Paradox
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The problems at GDC25 remind me of Rebooting the Web of Trust
>>>>>>>> (RWOT) community discussions I've been following, which reiterate that this
>>>>>>>> is a larger issue. We debate the finer points of zero-knowledge proofs and
>>>>>>>> DID conformance while missing the forest for the trees. Case in point: the
>>>>>>>> recent emergence of "[`did:genuineid`](
>>>>>>>> https://genuinein.com/DIDMethod)" &mdash; a centralized identifier
>>>>>>>> system that fundamentally contradicts the "D" in DID.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Obviously, decentralization is a threat to those who currently hold
>>>>>>>> power (whether they be governments, corporations, billionaires, or others
>>>>>>>> who hold any sort of power), because it tries to remove their
>>>>>>>> centralization (and therefore their power), to instead empower the
>>>>>>>> individual. But if we can't even maintain the semantic integrity of
>>>>>>>> "decentralized" within our own technical community, devoted to the ideal,
>>>>>>>> how can we fight for it in the larger world?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Corpocratic Complication
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> GDC25 was held in Geneva, Switzerland. 30+ standards organizations
>>>>>>>> convened to discuss the future of digital identity. Participants spanned
>>>>>>>> the world from the United States to China. There was the opportunity that
>>>>>>>> GDC25 was going to be a truly international conference. Indeed, Swiss
>>>>>>>> presenters were there, and they spoke of privacy, democratic involvement,
>>>>>>>> and achieving public buy-in. It was exactly the themes that we as
>>>>>>>> decentralized technologists wanted to hear.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But from what I've heard, things quickly degraded from that ideal.
>>>>>>>> Take the United States. The sole representative of the country as a whole
>>>>>>>> attended via teleconference. (He was the only presenter who did so!) His
>>>>>>>> talk was all about Real ID, framed as a response to 9/11 and rooted in the
>>>>>>>> Patriot Act. It lay somewhere between security-theatre and
>>>>>>>> identity-as-surveillance, and that's definitely not what we wanted to hear.
>>>>>>>> (The contrast between the US and Swiss presentations was apparently
>>>>>>>> jarring.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> And with that representative only attending remotely, the United
>>>>>>>> State's real representatives ended up being Google and Apple, each
>>>>>>>> advancing their own corpocratic interests, not the interests of the people
>>>>>>>> we try to empower with decentralized identities.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This isn't just an American problem. It's a symptom of a deeper
>>>>>>>> issue happening across our digital infrastructure. It's likely the heart of
>>>>>>>> the inversions of decentralized goals that we're seeing &mdash; and likely
>>>>>>>> why those logistical reshufflings occurred: to please the gold sponsors. In
>>>>>>>> fact, the conference sponsors tell the story: Google, Visa, Mastercard, and
>>>>>>>> Huawei were positioned as "leading organizations supporting the advancement
>>>>>>>> of wallets, credentials and trusted infrastructure in a manner of global
>>>>>>>> collaboration."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> While Huawei's presence demonstrates international diversity — a
>>>>>>>> Swiss conference bringing together Europe and Asia — it also raised
>>>>>>>> questions about whose vision of "trust" would ultimately prevail. When
>>>>>>>> payment platforms and surveillance-capable tech giants frame the future of
>>>>>>>> identity infrastructure, we shouldn't be surprised when the architecture
>>>>>>>> serves their interests first.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This echoes my concerns from ["Has SSI Become Morally Bankrupt?"](
>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/musings-ssi-bankruptcy/).
>>>>>>>> We've allowed the narrative of self-sovereignty to be co-opted by the very
>>>>>>>> platforms it was meant to challenge. The technical standards exist, but
>>>>>>>> they're being implemented in ways that invert their original purpose. Even
>>>>>>>> [UNECE sessions acknowledged](
>>>>>>>> https://unece.org/trade/events/global-digital-collaboration-conference-international-trade-identity-across-borders)
>>>>>>>> the risk of "diluting the autonomy and decentralization that SSI is meant
>>>>>>>> to provide."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Sovereignty Shell Game
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Google was partnered with German Sparkasse on ZKP technology and
>>>>>>>> that revealed a specific example of this co-opting.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Google's open-sourcing of its Zero-Knowledge Proof libraries,
>>>>>>>> announced July 3rd in partnership with Germany's network of public savings
>>>>>>>> banks, was positioned as supporting privacy in age verification. Yet as
>>>>>>>> [Carsten Stöcker pointed out](
>>>>>>>> https://www.linkedin.com/posts/dr-carsten-st%C3%B6cker-1145871_opening-up-zero-knowledge-proof-technology-activity-7348195852085067776-nKDB),
>>>>>>>> zero-knowledge doesn't mean zero-tracking when the entire stack runs
>>>>>>>> through platform intermediaries. Carsten noted that Google has "extensive
>>>>>>>> tracking practices across mobile devices, web platforms and advertising
>>>>>>>> infrastructure." Meanwhile, the Google Play API makes no promises that the
>>>>>>>> operations are protected from the rest of the OS.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Google ZKP libraries ("longfellow-sk") could be a great
>>>>>>>> [building block](
>>>>>>>> https://news.dyne.org/longfellow-zero-knowledge-google-zk/) for
>>>>>>>> truly user-centric systems, as they link Zero-Knowledge Proofs to legacy
>>>>>>>> cryptographic signature systems that are still mandatory for some hardware.
>>>>>>>> But they'd have to be detached from the rest of Google's technology stack.
>>>>>>>> Without that, there are too many questions. Could Google access some of the
>>>>>>>> knowledge supposedly protected by ZKPs? Could they link it to other data?
>>>>>>>> We have no idea.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The European Union's eIDAS Regulation, set to take effect in 2026,
>>>>>>>> encourages Member States to integrate privacy-enhancing technologies like
>>>>>>>> ZKP into the European Digital Identity Wallet, but integration at the
>>>>>>>> platform level offers similar dangers and could again invert the very
>>>>>>>> privacy guarantees ZKP promises.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Historical Echoes, Modern Inversions
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Identity technology's goals being inverted, so that identity
>>>>>>>> becomes a threat rather than a boon, isn't a new problem. In ["Echoes of
>>>>>>>> History"](
>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/articles/echoes-history/), I
>>>>>>>> examined how the contrasting approaches of Lentz and Carmille during WWII
>>>>>>>> demonstrate the life-or-death importance of data minimization. Lentz's
>>>>>>>> comprehensive Dutch identity system enabled the Holocaust's efficiency;
>>>>>>>> Carmille's deliberate exclusion of religious data from French records saved
>>>>>>>> lives. Even when they're decentralized, today's digital identity systems
>>>>>>>> face the same fundamental questions: what data should we collect, what
>>>>>>>> should we reveal, and what should we refuse to record entirely?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But we're adding a new layer of complexity. Not only must we
>>>>>>>> consider what data to collect, but who controls the infrastructure that
>>>>>>>> processes it. When Google partners with Sparkasse on "privacy-preserving"
>>>>>>>> age verification, when eIDAS mandates integration at the operating system
>>>>>>>> level, we're not just risking data collection: we're embedding it within
>>>>>>>> platforms whose business models depend on surveillance. Even if the data is
>>>>>>>> theoretically self-sovereign, the threat of data collected is still data
>>>>>>>> revealed &mdash; just as happened with Lentz's records.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The European eIDAS framework, which I analyzed in a [follow-up
>>>>>>>> piece to "Echoes from History"](
>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/articles/eidas/), shows how even
>>>>>>>> well-intentioned regulatory efforts can accelerate platform capture when
>>>>>>>> they mandate integration at the operating system level. As I wrote at the
>>>>>>>> time, a history of problematic EU legislation that had the best of
>>>>>>>> intentions but resulted in unintended consequences has laid the groundwork,
>>>>>>>> and now identity is straight in that crosshairs. One of the first, and most
>>>>>>>> obvious problems with eIDAS is the mandate "that web browsers accept
>>>>>>>> security certificates from individual member states and the EU can refuse
>>>>>>>> to revoke them even if they’re dangerous." There are many more &mdash; and
>>>>>>>> I'm not [the only voice](
>>>>>>>> https://news.dyne.org/the-problems-of-european-digital-identity/)
>>>>>>>> on eIDAS and EUDI issues.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Supposedly self-sovereign certificates phoning home whenever
>>>>>>>> they're accessed is another recent threat that demonstrates best intentions
>>>>>>>> gone awry. This not only violates privacy, but it undercuts some of our
>>>>>>>> best arguments for self-sovereign control of credentials by returning
>>>>>>>> liability for data leaks to the issuer. The [No Phone Home](
>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/news/No-Phone-Home/) initiative
>>>>>>>> that Blockchain Commons joined last month represents one attempt to push
>>>>>>>> back on that, but it feels like plugging holes in a dam that's already
>>>>>>>> cracking. It all does.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Builder's Dilemma
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> What troubles me most is the split I see in our community. On one
>>>>>>>> side, technology purists build increasingly sophisticated protocols in
>>>>>>>> isolation from policy reality. On the other, pragmatists make compromise
>>>>>>>> after compromise until nothing remains of the original vision.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The recent debates about [`did:web` conformance](
>>>>>>>> https://github.com/w3c-ccg/did-method-web) illustrate this
>>>>>>>> perfectly. Joe Andrieu correctly notes that `did:web` can't distinguish
>>>>>>>> between deactivation and non-existence &mdash; a fundamental security
>>>>>>>> boundary. Yet `did:web` remains essential to many implementation strategies
>>>>>>>> because it bridges the gap between ideals and adoption. It provides
>>>>>>>> developers and users with experience with DIDs, but in doing so undercut
>>>>>>>> decentralized ideals for those users. We're caught between philosophical
>>>>>>>> purity and practical irrelevance.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In my recent writings on [Values in Design](
>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/ValuesDesign/) and the
>>>>>>>> [Right to Transact](
>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/RightToTransact/), I've
>>>>>>>> tried to articulate what we're fighting for. But values without
>>>>>>>> implementation are just philosophy, and implementation without values is
>>>>>>>> just surrender.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Global Digital Collaboration highlighted this tension
>>>>>>>> perfectly. International progress on digital identity proceeds apace:
>>>>>>>> Europe, Singapore, and China all advance their frameworks, but there are
>>>>>>>> still essential issues that invert our fundamental goals in designing
>>>>>>>> self-sovereign systems. Meanwhile, the U.S. remains even more stalled, its
>>>>>>>> position represented only by the platforms that benefit from the status
>>>>>>>> quo. Alongside this, technical standards discussions proceed in isolation
>>>>>>>> from the policy, regulatory, and social frameworks that will determine
>>>>>>>> their real-world impact.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Where Do We Go From Here?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I find myself returning to first principles. When we designed [TLS
>>>>>>>> 1.0](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2246), we understood
>>>>>>>> that technical protocols encode power relationships. When we established
>>>>>>>> the [principles of self-sovereign identity](
>>>>>>>> https://github.com/WebOfTrustInfo/self-sovereign-identity/blob/master/self-sovereign-identity-principles.md),
>>>>>>>> we knew that architecture was politics. Ongoing battles, such as those
>>>>>>>> between Verifiable Credentials and ISO mDLs, between DIDComm and OpenID4VC,
>>>>>>>> demonstrate disagreements over these power relationships made visible in
>>>>>>>> technological discussions.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The question now is whether we can reclaim our ideals before
>>>>>>>> they're completely inverted by the side of centralized power and controlled
>>>>>>>> architecture.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The path forward requires bridging the gaps Geneva revealed:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - Between corporate platform dominance and global digital
>>>>>>>> sovereignty
>>>>>>>> - Between the promise of decentralization and the reality of
>>>>>>>> recentralization
>>>>>>>> - Between technical standards and policy reality
>>>>>>>> - Between privacy absolutism and implementation pragmatism
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A Personal Note
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> After three decades of building internet infrastructure, I've
>>>>>>>> learned that the most dangerous moment isn't when systems fail, it's when
>>>>>>>> they succeed in ways that invert their purpose. We built protocols for
>>>>>>>> human autonomy and watched them become instruments of platform control. We
>>>>>>>> created standards for decentralization and saw them twisted into new forms
>>>>>>>> of centralization.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This conversation continues in private Signal groups, in conference
>>>>>>>> hallways, in the space between what we built and what we've become. The
>>>>>>>> [Atlantic Council warns](
>>>>>>>> https://dfrlab.org/2024/10/01/analysis-a-brave-new-reality-after-the-uns-global-digital-compact/)
>>>>>>>> of power centralizing "in ways that threaten the open and bottom-up
>>>>>>>> governance traditions of the internet." When critics from across the
>>>>>>>> geopolitical spectrum &mdash; from sovereignty advocates to digital rights
>>>>>>>> groups &mdash; all sense something amiss, it suggests a fundamental
>>>>>>>> architectural problem that transcends ideology.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Perhaps it's time for a new architecture: one that acknowledges
>>>>>>>> these inversions and builds resistance into its very foundations.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But that's a longer conversation for another day.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Christopher Allen has been architecting trust systems for over 30
>>>>>>>> years, from co-authoring TLS to establishing self-sovereign identity
>>>>>>>> principles. He currently works on alternative approaches to digital
>>>>>>>> identity through [Blockchain Commons](
>>>>>>>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/).*
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>