- From: Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>
- Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2025 16:24:41 -0400
- To: Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>
- Cc: Credentials Community Group <public-credentials@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CANYRo8g0MkAO=yAO09f3wY5N5BWGAeFXBOSs=Ljr6a=saESH6w@mail.gmail.com>
Nostr might be a good start for de-platforming social media on the basis of pseudonymity and relay-based discovery, but unless the architecture also supports untraceable payment the major surveillance platforms will persist. Adrian On Thu, Jul 17, 2025 at 3:58 PM Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com> wrote: > > > čt 17. 7. 2025 v 21:38 odesílatel Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com> > napsal: > >> It's clearly time for a new architecture. One that benefits from our >> experience with SSI as an anti-pattern that is too easily inverted or >> ignored. >> >> I would suggest an architecture that sees platforms for payment and >> social media as the problem instead of focusing on identity. An >> architecture that, like cash and geocaches, defaults to anonymity by design. >> >> I would also suggest an architecture that ignores licensed professionals >> and things. With the benefit of hindsight, the premise that identity >> standards must span licensing and supply chains seems inane. >> > > We have a fairly advanced ecosystem working on all these problems over at > Nostr, with several million users, and several thousand DAU. > > We also have a W3C Nostr Community Group [1] and have already begun work > on a did:nostr spec. > > [1] https://www.w3.org/community/nostr/ > > >> >> Sorry, >> - Adrian >> >> >> On Wed, Jul 16, 2025 at 3:59 AM Christopher Allen < >> ChristopherA@lifewithalacrity.com> wrote: >> >>> I have occasionally posted a link to one of my blog articles to this >>> group, but I thought this article deserved a broader discussion by our CCG >>> community, so I'm sharing here. >>> >>> The original article is at >>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/gdc25/ >>> >>> -- Christopher Allen >>> >>> Musings of a Trust Architect: When Technical Standards Meet Geopolitical >>> Reality >>> Digital Identity, Sovereignty, and the Erosion of Foundational Principles >>> By Christopher Allen <ChristopherA@LifeWithAlacrity.com> >>> 2025-07-15 >>> >>> *Reflections on recent conversations about digital identity, >>> sovereignty, and the erosion of foundational principles* >>> >>> Echoes from Geneva >>> >>> I wasn't present at the [Global Digital Collaboration]( >>> https://globaldigitalcollaboration.org/) conference (GDC25), but the >>> observations shared by colleagues who attended have crystallized some >>> issues I've been wrestling with for years. I should note there's a >>> selection bias here: I'm the author of the [10 principles of self-sovereign >>> identity]( >>> https://github.com/WebOfTrustInfo/self-sovereign-identity/blob/master/self-sovereign-identity-principles.md), >>> so my community tends to have strong opinions about digital identity. >>> Still, when multiple trusted voices independently report similar concerns, >>> patterns emerge that are worth examining. And these weren't casual >>> observers sharing these concerns. They were seasoned practitioners who've >>> spent decades building identity infrastructure. Their collective unease >>> speaks to something deeper than technical disagreements. >>> >>> It's hard to boil the problems at GDC25 down to a single issue, because >>> they were so encompassing. For example, there was a pattern of scheduling >>> issues that undercut the community co-organizing goal of the conference and >>> seemed to particularly impact decentralized talks. One session ended up in >>> a small, hot room on the top floor that was hard to find. (It was packed >>> anyway!) Generally, the decentralized-centric talks were in bad locations, >>> they were short, they had restricted topics, or they were shared with other >>> panelists. >>> >>> I think that logistical shuffling of events may point out one of the >>> biggest issues: decentralized systems weren't given much respect. This may >>> be true generally. There may be lip service to decentralized systems, but >>> not deeper commitments. Its value isn't appreciated, so we're losing its >>> principles. Worse, I see the intent of decentralization being inverted: >>> where our goal is to give individuals independence and power by reducing >>> the control of centralized entities, we're often doing the opposite — >>> still in the name of decentralization. >>> >>> The Echo Chamber Paradox >>> >>> The problems at GDC25 remind me of Rebooting the Web of Trust (RWOT) >>> community discussions I've been following, which reiterate that this is a >>> larger issue. We debate the finer points of zero-knowledge proofs and DID >>> conformance while missing the forest for the trees. Case in point: the >>> recent emergence of "[`did:genuineid`](https://genuinein.com/DIDMethod)" >>> — a centralized identifier system that fundamentally contradicts the >>> "D" in DID. >>> >>> Obviously, decentralization is a threat to those who currently hold >>> power (whether they be governments, corporations, billionaires, or others >>> who hold any sort of power), because it tries to remove their >>> centralization (and therefore their power), to instead empower the >>> individual. But if we can't even maintain the semantic integrity of >>> "decentralized" within our own technical community, devoted to the ideal, >>> how can we fight for it in the larger world? >>> >>> The Corpocratic Complication >>> >>> GDC25 was held in Geneva, Switzerland. 30+ standards organizations >>> convened to discuss the future of digital identity. Participants spanned >>> the world from the United States to China. There was the opportunity that >>> GDC25 was going to be a truly international conference. Indeed, Swiss >>> presenters were there, and they spoke of privacy, democratic involvement, >>> and achieving public buy-in. It was exactly the themes that we as >>> decentralized technologists wanted to hear. >>> >>> But from what I've heard, things quickly degraded from that ideal. Take >>> the United States. The sole representative of the country as a whole >>> attended via teleconference. (He was the only presenter who did so!) His >>> talk was all about Real ID, framed as a response to 9/11 and rooted in the >>> Patriot Act. It lay somewhere between security-theatre and >>> identity-as-surveillance, and that's definitely not what we wanted to hear. >>> (The contrast between the US and Swiss presentations was apparently >>> jarring.) >>> >>> And with that representative only attending remotely, the United State's >>> real representatives ended up being Google and Apple, each advancing their >>> own corpocratic interests, not the interests of the people we try to >>> empower with decentralized identities. >>> >>> This isn't just an American problem. It's a symptom of a deeper issue >>> happening across our digital infrastructure. It's likely the heart of the >>> inversions of decentralized goals that we're seeing — and likely why >>> those logistical reshufflings occurred: to please the gold sponsors. In >>> fact, the conference sponsors tell the story: Google, Visa, Mastercard, and >>> Huawei were positioned as "leading organizations supporting the advancement >>> of wallets, credentials and trusted infrastructure in a manner of global >>> collaboration." >>> >>> While Huawei's presence demonstrates international diversity — a Swiss >>> conference bringing together Europe and Asia — it also raised questions >>> about whose vision of "trust" would ultimately prevail. When payment >>> platforms and surveillance-capable tech giants frame the future of identity >>> infrastructure, we shouldn't be surprised when the architecture serves >>> their interests first. >>> >>> This echoes my concerns from ["Has SSI Become Morally Bankrupt?"]( >>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/musings-ssi-bankruptcy/). >>> We've allowed the narrative of self-sovereignty to be co-opted by the very >>> platforms it was meant to challenge. The technical standards exist, but >>> they're being implemented in ways that invert their original purpose. Even >>> [UNECE sessions acknowledged]( >>> https://unece.org/trade/events/global-digital-collaboration-conference-international-trade-identity-across-borders) >>> the risk of "diluting the autonomy and decentralization that SSI is meant >>> to provide." >>> >>> The Sovereignty Shell Game >>> >>> Google was partnered with German Sparkasse on ZKP technology and that >>> revealed a specific example of this co-opting. >>> >>> Google's open-sourcing of its Zero-Knowledge Proof libraries, announced >>> July 3rd in partnership with Germany's network of public savings banks, was >>> positioned as supporting privacy in age verification. Yet as [Carsten >>> Stöcker pointed out]( >>> https://www.linkedin.com/posts/dr-carsten-st%C3%B6cker-1145871_opening-up-zero-knowledge-proof-technology-activity-7348195852085067776-nKDB), >>> zero-knowledge doesn't mean zero-tracking when the entire stack runs >>> through platform intermediaries. Carsten noted that Google has "extensive >>> tracking practices across mobile devices, web platforms and advertising >>> infrastructure." Meanwhile, the Google Play API makes no promises that the >>> operations are protected from the rest of the OS. >>> >>> The Google ZKP libraries ("longfellow-sk") could be a great [building >>> block](https://news.dyne.org/longfellow-zero-knowledge-google-zk/) for >>> truly user-centric systems, as they link Zero-Knowledge Proofs to legacy >>> cryptographic signature systems that are still mandatory for some hardware. >>> But they'd have to be detached from the rest of Google's technology stack. >>> Without that, there are too many questions. Could Google access some of the >>> knowledge supposedly protected by ZKPs? Could they link it to other data? >>> We have no idea. >>> >>> The European Union's eIDAS Regulation, set to take effect in 2026, >>> encourages Member States to integrate privacy-enhancing technologies like >>> ZKP into the European Digital Identity Wallet, but integration at the >>> platform level offers similar dangers and could again invert the very >>> privacy guarantees ZKP promises. >>> >>> Historical Echoes, Modern Inversions >>> >>> Identity technology's goals being inverted, so that identity becomes a >>> threat rather than a boon, isn't a new problem. In ["Echoes of History"]( >>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/articles/echoes-history/), I examined >>> how the contrasting approaches of Lentz and Carmille during WWII >>> demonstrate the life-or-death importance of data minimization. Lentz's >>> comprehensive Dutch identity system enabled the Holocaust's efficiency; >>> Carmille's deliberate exclusion of religious data from French records saved >>> lives. Even when they're decentralized, today's digital identity systems >>> face the same fundamental questions: what data should we collect, what >>> should we reveal, and what should we refuse to record entirely? >>> >>> But we're adding a new layer of complexity. Not only must we consider >>> what data to collect, but who controls the infrastructure that processes >>> it. When Google partners with Sparkasse on "privacy-preserving" age >>> verification, when eIDAS mandates integration at the operating system >>> level, we're not just risking data collection: we're embedding it within >>> platforms whose business models depend on surveillance. Even if the data is >>> theoretically self-sovereign, the threat of data collected is still data >>> revealed — just as happened with Lentz's records. >>> >>> The European eIDAS framework, which I analyzed in a [follow-up piece to >>> "Echoes from History"](https://www.blockchaincommons.com/articles/eidas/), >>> shows how even well-intentioned regulatory efforts can accelerate platform >>> capture when they mandate integration at the operating system level. As I >>> wrote at the time, a history of problematic EU legislation that had the >>> best of intentions but resulted in unintended consequences has laid the >>> groundwork, and now identity is straight in that crosshairs. One of the >>> first, and most obvious problems with eIDAS is the mandate "that web >>> browsers accept security certificates from individual member states and the >>> EU can refuse to revoke them even if they’re dangerous." There are many >>> more — and I'm not [the only voice]( >>> https://news.dyne.org/the-problems-of-european-digital-identity/) on >>> eIDAS and EUDI issues. >>> >>> Supposedly self-sovereign certificates phoning home whenever they're >>> accessed is another recent threat that demonstrates best intentions gone >>> awry. This not only violates privacy, but it undercuts some of our best >>> arguments for self-sovereign control of credentials by returning liability >>> for data leaks to the issuer. The [No Phone Home]( >>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/news/No-Phone-Home/) initiative that >>> Blockchain Commons joined last month represents one attempt to push back on >>> that, but it feels like plugging holes in a dam that's already cracking. It >>> all does. >>> >>> The Builder's Dilemma >>> >>> What troubles me most is the split I see in our community. On one side, >>> technology purists build increasingly sophisticated protocols in isolation >>> from policy reality. On the other, pragmatists make compromise after >>> compromise until nothing remains of the original vision. >>> >>> The recent debates about [`did:web` conformance]( >>> https://github.com/w3c-ccg/did-method-web) illustrate this perfectly. >>> Joe Andrieu correctly notes that `did:web` can't distinguish between >>> deactivation and non-existence — a fundamental security boundary. Yet >>> `did:web` remains essential to many implementation strategies because it >>> bridges the gap between ideals and adoption. It provides developers and >>> users with experience with DIDs, but in doing so undercut decentralized >>> ideals for those users. We're caught between philosophical purity and >>> practical irrelevance. >>> >>> In my recent writings on [Values in Design]( >>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/ValuesDesign/) and the [Right >>> to Transact](https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/RightToTransact/), >>> I've tried to articulate what we're fighting for. But values without >>> implementation are just philosophy, and implementation without values is >>> just surrender. >>> >>> The Global Digital Collaboration highlighted this tension perfectly. >>> International progress on digital identity proceeds apace: Europe, >>> Singapore, and China all advance their frameworks, but there are still >>> essential issues that invert our fundamental goals in designing >>> self-sovereign systems. Meanwhile, the U.S. remains even more stalled, its >>> position represented only by the platforms that benefit from the status >>> quo. Alongside this, technical standards discussions proceed in isolation >>> from the policy, regulatory, and social frameworks that will determine >>> their real-world impact. >>> >>> Where Do We Go From Here? >>> >>> I find myself returning to first principles. When we designed [TLS 1.0]( >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2246), we understood that >>> technical protocols encode power relationships. When we established the >>> [principles of self-sovereign identity]( >>> https://github.com/WebOfTrustInfo/self-sovereign-identity/blob/master/self-sovereign-identity-principles.md), >>> we knew that architecture was politics. Ongoing battles, such as those >>> between Verifiable Credentials and ISO mDLs, between DIDComm and OpenID4VC, >>> demonstrate disagreements over these power relationships made visible in >>> technological discussions. >>> >>> The question now is whether we can reclaim our ideals before they're >>> completely inverted by the side of centralized power and controlled >>> architecture. >>> >>> The path forward requires bridging the gaps Geneva revealed: >>> >>> - Between corporate platform dominance and global digital sovereignty >>> - Between the promise of decentralization and the reality of >>> recentralization >>> - Between technical standards and policy reality >>> - Between privacy absolutism and implementation pragmatism >>> >>> A Personal Note >>> >>> After three decades of building internet infrastructure, I've learned >>> that the most dangerous moment isn't when systems fail, it's when they >>> succeed in ways that invert their purpose. We built protocols for human >>> autonomy and watched them become instruments of platform control. We >>> created standards for decentralization and saw them twisted into new forms >>> of centralization. >>> >>> This conversation continues in private Signal groups, in conference >>> hallways, in the space between what we built and what we've become. The >>> [Atlantic Council warns]( >>> https://dfrlab.org/2024/10/01/analysis-a-brave-new-reality-after-the-uns-global-digital-compact/) >>> of power centralizing "in ways that threaten the open and bottom-up >>> governance traditions of the internet." When critics from across the >>> geopolitical spectrum — from sovereignty advocates to digital rights >>> groups — all sense something amiss, it suggests a fundamental >>> architectural problem that transcends ideology. >>> >>> Perhaps it's time for a new architecture: one that acknowledges these >>> inversions and builds resistance into its very foundations. >>> >>> But that's a longer conversation for another day. >>> >>> --- >>> >>> *Christopher Allen has been architecting trust systems for over 30 >>> years, from co-authoring TLS to establishing self-sovereign identity >>> principles. He currently works on alternative approaches to digital >>> identity through [Blockchain Commons]( >>> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/).* >>> >>
Received on Thursday, 17 July 2025 20:24:58 UTC