- From: Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>
- Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2025 21:58:04 +0200
- To: Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>
- Cc: Credentials Community Group <public-credentials@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAKaEYh+huCkZr4=NSAnL46af8h_P5m96dYC+JSyqZMSyAENtBw@mail.gmail.com>
čt 17. 7. 2025 v 21:38 odesílatel Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com> napsal: > It's clearly time for a new architecture. One that benefits from our > experience with SSI as an anti-pattern that is too easily inverted or > ignored. > > I would suggest an architecture that sees platforms for payment and social > media as the problem instead of focusing on identity. An architecture that, > like cash and geocaches, defaults to anonymity by design. > > I would also suggest an architecture that ignores licensed professionals > and things. With the benefit of hindsight, the premise that identity > standards must span licensing and supply chains seems inane. > We have a fairly advanced ecosystem working on all these problems over at Nostr, with several million users, and several thousand DAU. We also have a W3C Nostr Community Group [1] and have already begun work on a did:nostr spec. [1] https://www.w3.org/community/nostr/ > > Sorry, > - Adrian > > > On Wed, Jul 16, 2025 at 3:59 AM Christopher Allen < > ChristopherA@lifewithalacrity.com> wrote: > >> I have occasionally posted a link to one of my blog articles to this >> group, but I thought this article deserved a broader discussion by our CCG >> community, so I'm sharing here. >> >> The original article is at >> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/gdc25/ >> >> -- Christopher Allen >> >> Musings of a Trust Architect: When Technical Standards Meet Geopolitical >> Reality >> Digital Identity, Sovereignty, and the Erosion of Foundational Principles >> By Christopher Allen <ChristopherA@LifeWithAlacrity.com> >> 2025-07-15 >> >> *Reflections on recent conversations about digital identity, sovereignty, >> and the erosion of foundational principles* >> >> Echoes from Geneva >> >> I wasn't present at the [Global Digital Collaboration]( >> https://globaldigitalcollaboration.org/) conference (GDC25), but the >> observations shared by colleagues who attended have crystallized some >> issues I've been wrestling with for years. I should note there's a >> selection bias here: I'm the author of the [10 principles of self-sovereign >> identity]( >> https://github.com/WebOfTrustInfo/self-sovereign-identity/blob/master/self-sovereign-identity-principles.md), >> so my community tends to have strong opinions about digital identity. >> Still, when multiple trusted voices independently report similar concerns, >> patterns emerge that are worth examining. And these weren't casual >> observers sharing these concerns. They were seasoned practitioners who've >> spent decades building identity infrastructure. Their collective unease >> speaks to something deeper than technical disagreements. >> >> It's hard to boil the problems at GDC25 down to a single issue, because >> they were so encompassing. For example, there was a pattern of scheduling >> issues that undercut the community co-organizing goal of the conference and >> seemed to particularly impact decentralized talks. One session ended up in >> a small, hot room on the top floor that was hard to find. (It was packed >> anyway!) Generally, the decentralized-centric talks were in bad locations, >> they were short, they had restricted topics, or they were shared with other >> panelists. >> >> I think that logistical shuffling of events may point out one of the >> biggest issues: decentralized systems weren't given much respect. This may >> be true generally. There may be lip service to decentralized systems, but >> not deeper commitments. Its value isn't appreciated, so we're losing its >> principles. Worse, I see the intent of decentralization being inverted: >> where our goal is to give individuals independence and power by reducing >> the control of centralized entities, we're often doing the opposite — >> still in the name of decentralization. >> >> The Echo Chamber Paradox >> >> The problems at GDC25 remind me of Rebooting the Web of Trust (RWOT) >> community discussions I've been following, which reiterate that this is a >> larger issue. We debate the finer points of zero-knowledge proofs and DID >> conformance while missing the forest for the trees. Case in point: the >> recent emergence of "[`did:genuineid`](https://genuinein.com/DIDMethod)" >> — a centralized identifier system that fundamentally contradicts the >> "D" in DID. >> >> Obviously, decentralization is a threat to those who currently hold power >> (whether they be governments, corporations, billionaires, or others who >> hold any sort of power), because it tries to remove their centralization >> (and therefore their power), to instead empower the individual. But if we >> can't even maintain the semantic integrity of "decentralized" within our >> own technical community, devoted to the ideal, how can we fight for it in >> the larger world? >> >> The Corpocratic Complication >> >> GDC25 was held in Geneva, Switzerland. 30+ standards organizations >> convened to discuss the future of digital identity. Participants spanned >> the world from the United States to China. There was the opportunity that >> GDC25 was going to be a truly international conference. Indeed, Swiss >> presenters were there, and they spoke of privacy, democratic involvement, >> and achieving public buy-in. It was exactly the themes that we as >> decentralized technologists wanted to hear. >> >> But from what I've heard, things quickly degraded from that ideal. Take >> the United States. The sole representative of the country as a whole >> attended via teleconference. (He was the only presenter who did so!) His >> talk was all about Real ID, framed as a response to 9/11 and rooted in the >> Patriot Act. It lay somewhere between security-theatre and >> identity-as-surveillance, and that's definitely not what we wanted to hear. >> (The contrast between the US and Swiss presentations was apparently >> jarring.) >> >> And with that representative only attending remotely, the United State's >> real representatives ended up being Google and Apple, each advancing their >> own corpocratic interests, not the interests of the people we try to >> empower with decentralized identities. >> >> This isn't just an American problem. It's a symptom of a deeper issue >> happening across our digital infrastructure. It's likely the heart of the >> inversions of decentralized goals that we're seeing — and likely why >> those logistical reshufflings occurred: to please the gold sponsors. In >> fact, the conference sponsors tell the story: Google, Visa, Mastercard, and >> Huawei were positioned as "leading organizations supporting the advancement >> of wallets, credentials and trusted infrastructure in a manner of global >> collaboration." >> >> While Huawei's presence demonstrates international diversity — a Swiss >> conference bringing together Europe and Asia — it also raised questions >> about whose vision of "trust" would ultimately prevail. When payment >> platforms and surveillance-capable tech giants frame the future of identity >> infrastructure, we shouldn't be surprised when the architecture serves >> their interests first. >> >> This echoes my concerns from ["Has SSI Become Morally Bankrupt?"]( >> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/musings-ssi-bankruptcy/). >> We've allowed the narrative of self-sovereignty to be co-opted by the very >> platforms it was meant to challenge. The technical standards exist, but >> they're being implemented in ways that invert their original purpose. Even >> [UNECE sessions acknowledged]( >> https://unece.org/trade/events/global-digital-collaboration-conference-international-trade-identity-across-borders) >> the risk of "diluting the autonomy and decentralization that SSI is meant >> to provide." >> >> The Sovereignty Shell Game >> >> Google was partnered with German Sparkasse on ZKP technology and that >> revealed a specific example of this co-opting. >> >> Google's open-sourcing of its Zero-Knowledge Proof libraries, announced >> July 3rd in partnership with Germany's network of public savings banks, was >> positioned as supporting privacy in age verification. Yet as [Carsten >> Stöcker pointed out]( >> https://www.linkedin.com/posts/dr-carsten-st%C3%B6cker-1145871_opening-up-zero-knowledge-proof-technology-activity-7348195852085067776-nKDB), >> zero-knowledge doesn't mean zero-tracking when the entire stack runs >> through platform intermediaries. Carsten noted that Google has "extensive >> tracking practices across mobile devices, web platforms and advertising >> infrastructure." Meanwhile, the Google Play API makes no promises that the >> operations are protected from the rest of the OS. >> >> The Google ZKP libraries ("longfellow-sk") could be a great [building >> block](https://news.dyne.org/longfellow-zero-knowledge-google-zk/) for >> truly user-centric systems, as they link Zero-Knowledge Proofs to legacy >> cryptographic signature systems that are still mandatory for some hardware. >> But they'd have to be detached from the rest of Google's technology stack. >> Without that, there are too many questions. Could Google access some of the >> knowledge supposedly protected by ZKPs? Could they link it to other data? >> We have no idea. >> >> The European Union's eIDAS Regulation, set to take effect in 2026, >> encourages Member States to integrate privacy-enhancing technologies like >> ZKP into the European Digital Identity Wallet, but integration at the >> platform level offers similar dangers and could again invert the very >> privacy guarantees ZKP promises. >> >> Historical Echoes, Modern Inversions >> >> Identity technology's goals being inverted, so that identity becomes a >> threat rather than a boon, isn't a new problem. In ["Echoes of History"]( >> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/articles/echoes-history/), I examined >> how the contrasting approaches of Lentz and Carmille during WWII >> demonstrate the life-or-death importance of data minimization. Lentz's >> comprehensive Dutch identity system enabled the Holocaust's efficiency; >> Carmille's deliberate exclusion of religious data from French records saved >> lives. Even when they're decentralized, today's digital identity systems >> face the same fundamental questions: what data should we collect, what >> should we reveal, and what should we refuse to record entirely? >> >> But we're adding a new layer of complexity. Not only must we consider >> what data to collect, but who controls the infrastructure that processes >> it. When Google partners with Sparkasse on "privacy-preserving" age >> verification, when eIDAS mandates integration at the operating system >> level, we're not just risking data collection: we're embedding it within >> platforms whose business models depend on surveillance. Even if the data is >> theoretically self-sovereign, the threat of data collected is still data >> revealed — just as happened with Lentz's records. >> >> The European eIDAS framework, which I analyzed in a [follow-up piece to >> "Echoes from History"](https://www.blockchaincommons.com/articles/eidas/), >> shows how even well-intentioned regulatory efforts can accelerate platform >> capture when they mandate integration at the operating system level. As I >> wrote at the time, a history of problematic EU legislation that had the >> best of intentions but resulted in unintended consequences has laid the >> groundwork, and now identity is straight in that crosshairs. One of the >> first, and most obvious problems with eIDAS is the mandate "that web >> browsers accept security certificates from individual member states and the >> EU can refuse to revoke them even if they’re dangerous." There are many >> more — and I'm not [the only voice]( >> https://news.dyne.org/the-problems-of-european-digital-identity/) on >> eIDAS and EUDI issues. >> >> Supposedly self-sovereign certificates phoning home whenever they're >> accessed is another recent threat that demonstrates best intentions gone >> awry. This not only violates privacy, but it undercuts some of our best >> arguments for self-sovereign control of credentials by returning liability >> for data leaks to the issuer. The [No Phone Home]( >> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/news/No-Phone-Home/) initiative that >> Blockchain Commons joined last month represents one attempt to push back on >> that, but it feels like plugging holes in a dam that's already cracking. It >> all does. >> >> The Builder's Dilemma >> >> What troubles me most is the split I see in our community. On one side, >> technology purists build increasingly sophisticated protocols in isolation >> from policy reality. On the other, pragmatists make compromise after >> compromise until nothing remains of the original vision. >> >> The recent debates about [`did:web` conformance]( >> https://github.com/w3c-ccg/did-method-web) illustrate this perfectly. >> Joe Andrieu correctly notes that `did:web` can't distinguish between >> deactivation and non-existence — a fundamental security boundary. Yet >> `did:web` remains essential to many implementation strategies because it >> bridges the gap between ideals and adoption. It provides developers and >> users with experience with DIDs, but in doing so undercut decentralized >> ideals for those users. We're caught between philosophical purity and >> practical irrelevance. >> >> In my recent writings on [Values in Design]( >> https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/ValuesDesign/) and the [Right >> to Transact](https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/RightToTransact/), >> I've tried to articulate what we're fighting for. But values without >> implementation are just philosophy, and implementation without values is >> just surrender. >> >> The Global Digital Collaboration highlighted this tension perfectly. >> International progress on digital identity proceeds apace: Europe, >> Singapore, and China all advance their frameworks, but there are still >> essential issues that invert our fundamental goals in designing >> self-sovereign systems. Meanwhile, the U.S. remains even more stalled, its >> position represented only by the platforms that benefit from the status >> quo. Alongside this, technical standards discussions proceed in isolation >> from the policy, regulatory, and social frameworks that will determine >> their real-world impact. >> >> Where Do We Go From Here? >> >> I find myself returning to first principles. When we designed [TLS 1.0]( >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2246), we understood that >> technical protocols encode power relationships. When we established the >> [principles of self-sovereign identity]( >> https://github.com/WebOfTrustInfo/self-sovereign-identity/blob/master/self-sovereign-identity-principles.md), >> we knew that architecture was politics. Ongoing battles, such as those >> between Verifiable Credentials and ISO mDLs, between DIDComm and OpenID4VC, >> demonstrate disagreements over these power relationships made visible in >> technological discussions. >> >> The question now is whether we can reclaim our ideals before they're >> completely inverted by the side of centralized power and controlled >> architecture. >> >> The path forward requires bridging the gaps Geneva revealed: >> >> - Between corporate platform dominance and global digital sovereignty >> - Between the promise of decentralization and the reality of >> recentralization >> - Between technical standards and policy reality >> - Between privacy absolutism and implementation pragmatism >> >> A Personal Note >> >> After three decades of building internet infrastructure, I've learned >> that the most dangerous moment isn't when systems fail, it's when they >> succeed in ways that invert their purpose. We built protocols for human >> autonomy and watched them become instruments of platform control. We >> created standards for decentralization and saw them twisted into new forms >> of centralization. >> >> This conversation continues in private Signal groups, in conference >> hallways, in the space between what we built and what we've become. The >> [Atlantic Council warns]( >> https://dfrlab.org/2024/10/01/analysis-a-brave-new-reality-after-the-uns-global-digital-compact/) >> of power centralizing "in ways that threaten the open and bottom-up >> governance traditions of the internet." When critics from across the >> geopolitical spectrum — from sovereignty advocates to digital rights >> groups — all sense something amiss, it suggests a fundamental >> architectural problem that transcends ideology. >> >> Perhaps it's time for a new architecture: one that acknowledges these >> inversions and builds resistance into its very foundations. >> >> But that's a longer conversation for another day. >> >> --- >> >> *Christopher Allen has been architecting trust systems for over 30 years, >> from co-authoring TLS to establishing self-sovereign identity principles. >> He currently works on alternative approaches to digital identity through >> [Blockchain Commons](https://www.blockchaincommons.com/).* >> >
Received on Thursday, 17 July 2025 19:58:21 UTC