- From: Bill Claxton <williamc@itr8.com>
- Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2020 11:32:39 +0800
- To: Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com>, Leonard Rosenthol <lrosenth@adobe.com>
- Cc: Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>, "public-credentials@w3.org" <public-credentials@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <01a802ed-0ff5-6be6-b7fb-9e49e268b522@itr8.com>
Following... TL;DR - if you don't know the verification process, beware of what you trust. 1. I agree with Adrian that "the machine representation [must be] the basis of trust". 2. I disagree with Steve's assertion: "the Singapore govt open attestation framework... ensures the human viewer and machine reader always see the same data". This is not true and is in fact a weakness of their verification mechanism. They do not display the claims made in the JSON document so the relying party will not know if the visual and machine representation tally. For example: the displayed presentation of a student degree could include mention of 'deans list' which is not supported by the certificate data or worse, it may state a 4.0 GPA when the certificate data indicates only a 3.8. The relying party would not notice this unless they inspected the credential manually. Furthermore, they is also a weakness is their issuance process in which individuals receive credentials in their wallet (ie- the Skills Passport) without confirming accuracy of the data (the recipient is never asked). This opens the possibility of repudiation by the recipient in the case they are wrongly awarded a job or a grant on the basis of their 4.0 GPA and being on the dean's list, when the credential itself indicates otherwise. This is all off-topic for whether PDFs make a good container for VCs, but I thought I should point out these important considerations regarding the relationship between the issued credential and its visual representation. Regards, Bill Claxton (williamc@itr8.com <mailto:williamc@itr8.com>) Facebook, Skype, MSN, Yahoo, Twitter, Flickr or Gmail: wmclaxton Voice, Text or Whatsapp: +65-9012-4327 On 11/9/2020 9:26 AM, Steve Capell wrote: > So - after all that I think I’ve talked myself out of the idea of PDF > as a VC container and I’m back to the idea of PDFs contained in VCs > that are referenced by a QR on the PDF > > There will be some that note the circular reference here. It’s > managed on the oracle as issuer side > - for low volume issue, the user uploads their PDF and we present a UI > to position a generated QR and then they download the PDF with QR and > use it as normal > - for high volume issue, the calling system first asks our API for the > link URL / QR, then generates their own PDF before giving it back to > us together with structured metadata > > I can’t think of a better way to handle this enormously complex > millions of stakeholders change management process .. > > Steven Capell > Mob: 0410 437854 > >> On 9 Nov 2020, at 12:20 pm, Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> I should add that, at present, we don’t embed the VC in the PDF - >> it’s actually the other way around >> - submitter provides data + PDF to oracle (issuer) who creates the VC >> and stores it as an encrypted file at a public (but unguessable) >> location : repository/uuid.json >> - url plus secret key for decrypting the vc is embedded in the QR >> that goes on the PDF. Theory is that if you are given the PDF with >> its data then you have rights to the digital version at the end of >> the QR link >> - so we finish up with a PDF + QR that is the thing that is shared >> around but isn’t actually the authoritative VC. The PDF is really >> just the key to get the VC >> >> Because there are so many hops and stakeholders in the supply chain, >> we can’t really Assume (at this stage in vc adoption maturity) that >> people will know what to do with a native digital vc. So >> verification works for either humans (immature or low volume >> verifiers) or machines (mature or high volume verifiers) as follows >> - humans just scan the QR and get taken to a verifier site that they >> trust (typically the exporting country regulator). The site is a >> hosted verifier and gets the referenced VC (secret key in QR >> remember), validates it, And also presents the originally notarised >> metadata and PDF - asking the human to confirm that they one they are >> holding is the same as what the verifier is showing them >> - the machine verifier is typically the importing regulator but could >> be any other high volume user along the way such as a bank. The >> holder (presenter is maybe a better word) loads then PDF with QR to >> the verifier website such as a national trade single window. The >> website extracts the QR , retrieves the VC, validates the VC, >> consumes VC metadata, checks that the hash of the presented PDF is >> the same as the hash of the Attached PDF in the VC >> >> It may seem a bit clunky but the overriding issue is human change >> management. Even a small economy will produce around 100 million >> cross border VCs in a year - each one going to any one of nearly 200 >> countries and potentially being touched by dozens of different roles. >> Count the number of exporters and importers around the world and the >> possible combinations of specific entities across that 100m >> consignments is also in the 100’s of millions. There’s no practical >> way to engage them all up front to change their normal business practice >> >> So we like PDF as the carrier of the secret key and link and we like >> oracle issued VCs as the thing they link to - because this >> combination seems like the only practical way to take a first step to >> transform world trade >> >> Hope that makes sense. Happy to hear alternative suggestions >> >> Steven Capell >> Mob: 0410 437854 >> >>> On 9 Nov 2020, at 11:52 am, steve capell <steve.capell@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> thanks Leonard, >>> >>> >Same way you protect the VC itself – Sign it! >>> >>> Except that, in our use case, the VC issuer is the "oracle" >>> (Exporting Government Authority) that the verifier (Importing >>> Government Authority) trusts. But the PDF is created by some other >>> party in the exporting jurisdiction. So, even if they sign it, the >>> signing identity won't match the VC issuer identity. Basically the >>> verifier can check that it is signed and that the signature is valid >>> - but it doesnt really help because the verifier doesnt know the PDF >>> creator. >>> >>> We are using the oracle as issuer VC model because to do otherwise >>> would impose more complexity on both the regulated community in the >>> exporting jurisdiction and on the verifier - to follow and confirm >>> the trust chain via a set of linked / embedded VCs. This is a >>> better future state but seems too much of a leap to start with. >>> >>> AS for not putting verification data on the human consumable form, >>> that also imposes too much of a leap for such a diverse set of >>> stakeholders in the internaitonal supply chain. >>> >>> Thinking about it, I think the best way is for the oracle as issuer >>> (exporting government) to notarise the PDF and include the hash of >>> the pdf attachment in the VC. then the verifier can just confirm >>> that the hash of the PDF they are holding is the same as the hash of >>> the PDF that the oracle notarised. >>> >>> no? >>> >>> >>> On Mon, 9 Nov 2020 at 11:24, Leonard Rosenthol <lrosenth@adobe.com >>> <mailto:lrosenth@adobe.com>> wrote: >>> >>> > In the ideal world there are no PDFs that you need to trust, >>> there is only data that the machine you trust can verify >>> >>> > >>> >>> You and I live in different ideal worlds 😊. >>> >>> > The attack vector that I’m trying to figure out a simple way >>> to mitigate is where Malik manipulates the PDF rendered >>> information without touching the (linked or embedded) VC >>> >>> > >>> >>> Same way you protect the VC itself – Sign it! Apply a standard >>> DigSig to the PDF – most likely one that is PAdES compliant for >>> better acceptance world-wide. >>> >>> The other thing to consider is how technology/approaches such as >>> the Content Authenticity Initiative >>> (https://contentauthenticity.org/ >>> <https://contentauthenticity.org/>) can also be applied here to >>> establish provenance of the document and its content throughout >>> its lifecycle. >>> >>> > The community “learns” that a QR on a PDF means it is >>> verifiable and when you see a green tick on scanning the QR, you >>> look no further >>> >>> > >>> >>> Yes, this is why standards such as PAdES Part 6 are very clear >>> about **not** putting any form of validation information in the >>> content of the page. Too easy for forge. >>> >>> Leonard >>> >>> *From: *Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com >>> <mailto:steve.capell@gmail.com>> >>> *Date: *Sunday, November 8, 2020 at 5:40 PM >>> *To: *Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com >>> <mailto:agropper@healthurl.com>> >>> *Cc: *Leonard Rosenthol <lrosenth@adobe.com >>> <mailto:lrosenth@adobe.com>>, Bill Claxton <williamc@itr8.com >>> <mailto:williamc@itr8.com>>, "public-credentials@w3.org >>> <mailto:public-credentials@w3.org>" <public-credentials@w3.org >>> <mailto:public-credentials@w3.org>> >>> *Subject: *Re: Requirements for PDF as container for VC's >>> >>> Yes I think the machine version has to be the basis of trust. >>> In the ideal world there are no PDFs that you need to trust, >>> there is only data that the machine you trust can verify >>> >>> The attack vector that I’m trying to figure out a simple way to >>> mitigate is where Malik manipulates the PDF rendered information >>> without touching the (linked or embedded) VC. Let’s say the VCs >>> are a certificate of origin and a commercial invoice. These >>> documents can change hands many times between issuer and >>> verifier. Manufacturer, exporter, forwarder, carrier, financial >>> service provider, bank, insurer, importer, customs agent, >>> regulator - just a sampling of parties, any one of which could >>> be Malik >>> >>> Today, there is only paper and people may verify the bit of >>> paper by calling up the issuer. A time consuming and expensive >>> process >>> >>> In the end state, machines that people Trust algorithmically >>> verify the VC data. Much better. >>> >>> It’s the intermediate state that worries me. Sometimes people >>> look at the paper (PDF) version of the data supposedly in the vc >>> and sometimes machines verify the vc. The community “learns” >>> that a QR on a PDF means it is verifiable and when you see a >>> green tick on scanning the QR, you look no further. This is the >>> danger window. And a few spectacular attacks could kill the >>> whole VC framework in an industry sector >>> >>> Steven Capell >>> >>> Mob: 0410 437854 >>> >>> >>> >>> On 9 Nov 2020, at 9:14 am, Adrian Gropper >>> <agropper@healthurl.com <mailto:agropper@healthurl.com>> wrote: >>> >>> By analogy with DID resolution, I can't imagine how anything >>> other than the machine representation could be the basis of >>> trust. (trying to avoid the master language). >>> >>> It's then up to the verifier to confirm any human-consumable >>> representation that is offered to them. They could send the >>> PDF to a trusted resolver for confirmation or they could run >>> a transform locally. >>> >>> If the issuer wants to sign the human-consumable >>> representation, it should be up to them to use a transform >>> they trust and they could really be signing just the machine >>> readable version anyway because they trust their transformer. >>> >>> Can it be any other way? >>> >>> Adrian >>> >>> On Sun, Nov 8, 2020 at 3:52 PM Leonard Rosenthol >>> <lrosenth@adobe.com <mailto:lrosenth@adobe.com>> wrote: >>> >>> I realized after writing that my comment on #2 was not >>> accessibility friendly. It really should be “human >>> consumable representation” since the content may be >>> consumed in non-visible representations for the same >>> purpose. >>> >>> Leonard >>> >>> *From: *Leonard Rosenthol <lrosenth@adobe.com >>> <mailto:lrosenth@adobe.com>> >>> *Date: *Sunday, November 8, 2020 at 4:49 PM >>> *To: *Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com >>> <mailto:steve.capell@gmail.com>> >>> *Cc: *Bill Claxton <williamc@itr8.com >>> <mailto:williamc@itr8.com>>, "public-credentials@w3.org >>> <mailto:public-credentials@w3.org>" >>> <public-credentials@w3.org >>> <mailto:public-credentials@w3.org>> >>> *Subject: *Re: Requirements for PDF as container for VC's >>> *Resent-From: *<public-credentials@w3.org >>> <mailto:public-credentials@w3.org>> >>> *Resent-Date: *Sunday, November 8, 2020 at 4:48 PM >>> >>> Steven – we have to be careful to not to conflate issues… >>> >>> 1 – Can a machine determine if the data being used for >>> presentation directly matches that used as “data”? >>> That problem can be solved by either have a single set >>> of data that is used in both cases – though I am not >>> aware of any situation where that is the case – in all >>> cases there is a TRANSFORM from one to the other. So if >>> you aren’t using the same data, then you need a way to >>> “connect the dots” so that it is clear what part of the >>> presentation matches what part of the data. PDF >>> supports that using semantic tagging of content (as I >>> showed in my presentation). >>> >>> 2 – Can a human determine if the data is correct? Yes, >>> by having a human visible representation the human >>> verified that what they see is what they expect. >>> >>> 3 – Determine which representation – human or machine – >>> is the “master”. In the eInvoicing standards of the EU, >>> the machine readable XML is the master copy and the PDF >>> presentation si just that – human readable >>> presentation. I would expect that in our VC cases the >>> same would be true. No? >>> >>> Leonard >>> >>> *From: *Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com >>> <mailto:steve.capell@gmail.com>> >>> *Date: *Sunday, November 8, 2020 at 4:09 PM >>> *To: *Leonard Rosenthol <lrosenth@adobe.com >>> <mailto:lrosenth@adobe.com>> >>> *Cc: *Bill Claxton <williamc@itr8.com >>> <mailto:williamc@itr8.com>>, "public-credentials@w3.org >>> <mailto:public-credentials@w3.org>" >>> <public-credentials@w3.org >>> <mailto:public-credentials@w3.org>> >>> *Subject: *Re: Requirements for PDF as container for VC's >>> >>> As you all probably already know, the Singapore govt >>> open attestation framework has a nice way of separating >>> an issuer defined tenderer from the vc payload - which >>> ensures the human viewer and machine reader always see >>> the same data >>> >>> Of course the problem is that the verifier needs a link >>> to the rendered view and that is often a QR on a PDF. >>> But in that case there is no guarantee that the data on >>> the PDF page is the same as the data in the linked VC - >>> other than a human “yep, they look the same” eyeball. >>> >>> I’m not a PDF expert but I note that even the EU / >>> German e-invoicing franework seems to have the same >>> problem. The XML data is attached to the PDF as meta >>> data but there’s nothing to guarantee that the values in >>> the xml (eg amounts and bank details) are the same as >>> what’s in the PDF view. That opens up rather obvious >>> avenues for fraud. >>> >>> Have I misunderstood? Does someone have a solution that >>> can ensure that PDF rendered data is the same as PDF >>> attached metadata ? >>> >>> Steven Capell >>> >>> Mob: 0410 437854 >>> >>> >>> >>> On 9 Nov 2020, at 2:08 am, Leonard Rosenthol >>> <lrosenth@adobe.com <mailto:lrosenth@adobe.com>> wrote: >>> >>> Bill, thanks for sharing. I read your evaluation >>> link and there is a lot of good stuff there. >>> However, I am surprised that your concerns about PDF >>> are around layout and rendering – since in that >>> case, PDF is a better solution since the layout is >>> defined by the issuer and the renderer simply >>> follows the rules of ISO 32000. So there is never a >>> question about the rendering not matching what the >>> issuer desires. >>> >>> However, I think you have an item later on that is >>> more relevant and we should consider the importance of: >>> >>> > How do you assure that what’s in the layout >>> matches the JSON data? >>> >>> Although I would change that to not be the layout >>> (since the layout, or what I would call >>> presentation) but instead be the data presented. >>> >>> Leonard >>> >>> *From: *Bill Claxton <williamc@itr8.com >>> <mailto:williamc@itr8.com>> >>> *Date: *Sunday, November 8, 2020 at 8:35 AM >>> *To: *"public-credentials@w3.org >>> <mailto:public-credentials@w3.org>" >>> <public-credentials@w3.org >>> <mailto:public-credentials@w3.org>> >>> *Subject: *Re: Requirements for PDF as container for >>> VC's >>> *Resent-From: *<public-credentials@w3.org >>> <mailto:public-credentials@w3.org>> >>> *Resent-Date: *Sunday, November 8, 2020 at 8:32 AM >>> >>> Kostas, hi - >>> >>> We spoke recently about this and I'm following the >>> thread to see what the community thinks. Happy that >>> you're getting lots of input. >>> >>> I thought you may want to review my recent article >>> "Evaluating Decentralised Identity Projects >>> <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwmclaxton.medium.com%2F&data=04%7C01%7Clrosenth%40adobe.com%7C829871a090cf4804445808d884374f14%7Cfa7b1b5a7b34438794aed2c178decee1%7C0%7C0%7C637404720436249091%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=vpmPzdXSJHeF6UgdbU6kq7RD6Fdcsoj1kfkbMQ8eQ0k%3D&reserved=0>". >>> It's a sort of reviewer's guide for decentralised >>> identity apps. In particular, I would draw your >>> attention to the point: "Have you separated layout >>> from the rendering application, so that 3rd-parties >>> (including verifiers) can render your certs?" I >>> intend to write a follow up about presentation layer >>> and mention PDF encapsulation as an alternative, but >>> one I am not much in favor of, for the reasons we >>> discussed. >>> >>> /PS - For anyone else reading this thread, I was a >>> PDF evangelist back in the early days of v4 and v5. >>> I am familiar with the encapsulation methods and >>> indeed used them for a National Archives project in >>> Singapore./ >>> >>> Regards, Bill Claxton (williamc@itr8.com >>> <mailto:williamc@itr8.com>) >>> Facebook, Skype, MSN, Yahoo, Twitter, Flickr or >>> Gmail: wmclaxton >>> Voice, Text or Whatsapp: +65-9012-4327 >>> >>> On 11/8/2020 5:17 PM, Kostas Karasavvas wrote: >>> >>> Hi Leonard, >>> >>> Thanks for initiating this. I have been thinking >>> of this as well. >>> >>> On Sun, Nov 8, 2020 at 3:23 AM Leonard Rosenthol >>> <lrosenth@adobe.com <mailto:lrosenth@adobe.com>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Kicking off some discussions here – I’d like >>> to start by putting down what I think are >>> some “primary” requirements for the use of >>> PDF in this context. Am I missing >>> anything? Do you disagree with any of >>> these? Feedback welcome!! >>> >>> *## Requirements* >>> >>> -Shall store the VC in native JSON-LD >>> (w/optional compression) >>> >>> -VC should be in an easily accessible >>> location (for both reading & writing) >>> >>> Agree. And JSON-LD is what we intend to use. >>> There could also be a 'serialization/type' >>> option to specify the serialization to >>> accommodate other use cases (XML? CBOR-LD?), if >>> need be. >>> >>> -Should require no language changes to PDF >>> (except "metadata"-like values) >>> >>> -implies compatibility with both PDF 1.7 and 2.0 >>> >>> Agree. I assume that PDF 1.7 implies >>> compatibility with older versions as well? >>> >>> -Shall be usable in conjunction with >>> standard PDF Signing/Certification >>> >>> Makes sense. I have questions here wrt the PDF >>> spec and how signing is happening (the 'hole' in >>> the file approach) but these are for later. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Kostas >>> >>> Leonard >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Konstantinos A. Karasavvas >>> >>> Software Architect, Blockchain Engineer, >>> Researcher, Educator >>> >>> https://twitter.com/kkarasavvas >>> <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2Fkkarasavvas&data=04%7C01%7Clrosenth%40adobe.com%7C829871a090cf4804445808d884374f14%7Cfa7b1b5a7b34438794aed2c178decee1%7C0%7C0%7C637404720436259088%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=wV1IUTDVZ0KO%2BpqhwJpAMCuEUOL1yi96kEI%2BXnbjdpU%3D&reserved=0> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Steve Capell >>>
Received on Monday, 9 November 2020 03:33:06 UTC