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Weekend Project: DID MEME

From: Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries>
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2020 12:42:58 -0500
Message-ID: <CAN8C-_K6VDNOhifRn7PPpXGvm-Qia_7RMP7VG-j+AVpA0ZV5Nw@mail.gmail.com>
To: "W3C Credentials CG (Public List)" <public-credentials@w3.org>
On the weekends, I get to work on whatever I want :)

Inspired by the new `did:twit` method, recently registered here:
https://github.com/w3c/did-spec-registries/pull/90

I created `did:meme` (not registered yet...)

https://didme.me/did:meme:1zgswzdje885tzr8408m37sjmaa0sthw265ty6hmwzmau48kd809zzrgra4w5w
https://github.com/OR13/didme.me

Obviously this is kind of a joke... However, I think there may be some
interesting technical firsts here, and if they are not firsts, I'm sure
readers of this mailing list will be able to correct me.

1. First use of bech32 to encode a did identifier

In order to make the DIDs look different from IPID / IPLD / IPFS / IPNS...
I transformed them using bech32.

2. First use of a covert channel for a verifiable data registry.

The image (meme) contains the multi codec representation of the public key
(same as is used by did:key)...

This means that the did document is recovered from data stored in an image.
(not encrypted!)... this technique is called
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography

It is useful when you need to exchange messages without it being obvious
that you are doing so, for example:
https://twitter.com/didtwitt3r/status/1285446654112350209

Sadly this technique is often abused by the baddies, to hide botnet command
and control traffic on public platforms...

However, I would not consider steganography to be inherently good or
evil... it's just another way of encoding (not encrypting).

Finally, the data goes on the public IPFS network... so thanks to
https://infura.io/ for making it possible to make this demo on a public
github pages backed website.

Regards,

OS

-- 
*ORIE STEELE*
Chief Technical Officer
www.transmute.industries

<https://www.transmute.industries>
Received on Monday, 27 July 2020 17:43:23 UTC

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