Re: Verifiable Requests?

Yes, we also build a new credential from the issued one.  But most use cases in international trade would preclude going back to the issuer (because it’s just not their job) so we use the Merkel tree approach because the trust still has to be anchored to the issuer 

I’m not aware of the workday implementation but I guess it’s much the same as the open attestation one.  However almost certainly not exactly the same abd therefore most likely not interoperable 

Which is one of my concerns with the VC implementation guide doc.  It describes in abstract terms how something might be achieved, but not sufficiently concrete for any implementation to be interoperable with another  

Steven Capell
Mob: 0410 437854

> On 20 Dec 2020, at 9:17 am, Daniel Hardman <daniel.hardman@evernym.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> >So I’m curious how the W3C model will support redaction in VPs without any impact to the VC model?
> 
> The way we solve this is to derive a new artifact, just in time for a proving interaction. We're not redacting from the presented credential; we're building a new credential with nothing redacted but nothing superfluous presented. MS has proposed to do it by going back to the issuer; ZKP-oriented credentials do it by creating a new artifact for each proving interaction; Workday discussed a clever way to do this merkle proofs instead of full-blown ZKPs at IIW a while back.
> 
>> On Sat, Dec 19, 2020 at 3:12 PM Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com> wrote:
>> One vp activity that might impact the vc data model is selective redaction 
>> 
>> I thought (could be wrong) that the idea of a VP is that, as a holder, I can choose a subset of claims to present to a verifier.  Furthermore, I can do that without going back to the issuer to ask for a new vc containing a specific subset.  
>> 
>> We do this in international trade with the hash per element approach defined in the https://www.openattestation.com/ framework.
>> 
>> But it needs a VC model that includes the salted /hashed element tree - otherwise the redacted VP can’t work 
>> 
>> So I’m curious how the W3C model will support redaction in VPs without any impact to the VC model?
>> 
>> Steven Capell
>> Mob: 0410 437854
>> 
>>>> On 20 Dec 2020, at 9:03 am, Daniel Hardman <daniel.hardman@evernym.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> Gabe said:
>>> 
>>> >On the surface I agree with you. My stance then is either Verifiable Presentations should be removed from the VC spec, or Verifiable Requests be added. If you disagree, I’d like to know how you view Verifiable Presentations and Requests as asymmetric.
>>> 
>>> When you give testimony in court, the dynamics are asymmetric. The court requests your testimony; you give a verifiable response. You take an oath to tell the truth. The court does not. This asymmetry is normal. It is not *universal* -- I can imagine a witness agreeing to testify, but only after demanding proof that the court is legitimate, etc. But we don't fix that corner case by modeling the process of giving testimony as a reciprocal/symmetric process. We allow the giver-of-testimony and the requester-of-testimony to exist in an asymmetric relationship, with non-equivalent duties and powers -- and then we apply the asymmetric relationship in a new direction to compensate (ask the court to prove its legitimacy), as needed.
>>> 
>>> What I'm saying is that "Verifiable" Requests are not and need not be a thing, because usually the burden of proof on the request doesn't justify the "verifiable" label. A request is just like any sentence, statement, or message. If you need to say anything on the record so it's non-repudiable, great -- do that. We don't need a format to make it verifiable, and in particular we don't need to standardize requests for credential material as a format *for the purpose of verifiability.* We want to standardize requests for a different purpose.
>>> 
>>> This does not mean I'm against a standard format for making requests for credential material. I actually love the idea of the presentation definition that DIF's proposing. What I'm against is the idea that such a request needs special format properties to make it verifiable. It doesn't. It shouldn't have the word "verifiable" in front of it. If we want our request to be on the record, include a digital signature over its hash, or use some other auditable authentication, or whatever. No format changes needed. If what we want to do is check the bona fides of the party making the request, we do that by reversing the holder and verifier roles temporarily, and asking the verifier to prove something to us using VCs of their own, before we honor their own request for proof. There's already a format for that.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On Sat, Dec 19, 2020 at 10:15 AM David Chadwick <D.W.Chadwick@kent.ac.uk> wrote:
>>>> Hi Daniel
>>>> 
>>>> I would revise your requirements somewhat as follow
>>>> 
>>>> On 19/12/2020 04:06, Daniel Hardman wrote:
>>>> > FWIW, here are the things that I think we need to standardize:
>>>> >
>>>> > 1. A credential and a presentation (the VC spec)
>>>> > 2. How a credential is requested (what the new DIF spec calls a 
>>>> > "presentation definition", which is quite powerful and generally 
>>>> > useful, IMO)
>>>> 
>>>> Rather I would say: How a set of credentials, or alternative sets of 
>>>> credentials, are requested.
>>>> 
>>>> This request needs to be fully flexible to cater for (as near as 
>>>> possible) any conceivable requirements of the SP. In our implementation 
>>>> we use DNF and CNF as these can present any set of requirements.
>>>> 
>>>> > 3. How a response to a request explains the way that the response maps 
>>>> > to the request ("You asked me for either a driver's license or a 
>>>> > passport, plus proof of my current address. I chose to give you the 
>>>> > passport, and to prove my current address by showing you a utility 
>>>> > bill.")\
>>>> 
>>>> I actually don't think this is needed. The returned VP is the holder's 
>>>> answer to the request. It contains the requested VCs embedded in it. So 
>>>> it is self-explanatory. (The Holder does not need to say its a utility 
>>>> bill because the VC itself will say what type it is). It is the 
>>>> responsibility of the verifier to see if the VP does contain the set of 
>>>> VCs that meets the SP's requirements. There is little point in the 
>>>> holder giving an explanation because:
>>>> 
>>>> a) the explanation could be acceptable but the actual VC may not be (I 
>>>> am showing you a utility bill, but the utility bill issuer is unknown to 
>>>> the verifier)
>>>> 
>>>> b) the explanation might not be acceptable, but the VC might be (I am 
>>>> sending you my employment card (instead of passport), but this contains 
>>>> the holder's current address)
>>>> 
>>>> c) the explanation could be false and the VC could be something entirely 
>>>> different to the explanation, so what does the verifier believe, the 
>>>> explanation or the actual VC? (I am giving you my passport but the VC is 
>>>> an employment certificate.)
>>>> 
>>>> So I see no useful purpose for the explanation. I don't believe it is 
>>>> needed, but worse, I think it complicates the processing by the verifier.
>>>> 
>>>> Kind regards
>>>> 
>>>> David
>>>> 
>>>>