Re: Materials from 2019-04-11 combined DID Spec and DID Resolution Spec meeting

On 2019-04-15 12:56 am, Markus Sabadello wrote:
> I agree one of the strengths of the DID concept is that different DID 
> methods will compete for trust while still being interoperable.
> 
> Unfortunately, I am not convinced that non-decentralized DIDs (Google, 
> Facebook, DNS) will end up low on the list, if we decide to "allow" them.

Especially since trust and transparency is at the core of how Facebook 
and Google make money. They have become very good at getting people to 
'trust' them, since their business model (stalking-based advertising) 
depends largely on their members not knowing about it.

Recently several federal governments have argued that how they do this 
is a disaster and linked directly to 'fake news', and threatens 
democratic institutions, and through that is subverting many social 
needs, including income equality, nuclear disarmament, healthcare 
equality, and emergency action that needs to be taken against climate 
change and species extinction.

And so my worry (and I believe Markus', though I don't want to put 
words into his mouth) is that DIDs, instead of offering a healthier 
alternative to this, are going to give more power to the major 
players, and alternatives will continue to be relegated to the fringes 
and be largely ignored, unless the main goals of data portability, 
privacy, pseudonymity, and user control are viable across all DID 
Methods, not only within a single DID Method.

I know this is a doomsday prediction, but there are those who think we 
are nearing doomsday very quickly; here's George Monbiot today in the 
Guardian saying we've reached the time for open rebellion. If he's 
right, the development of DIDs might be an important place for this 
rebellion to happen.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/15/rebellion-prevent-ecological-apocalypse-civil-disobedience

Steven




> 
> Markus
> 
> On 4/15/19 12:59 AM, =Drummond Reed wrote:
>> I am worried that the arguments in this thread are not based on a 
>> solid understanding the role of DIDs in relationship to DID methods, 
>> DID registries (blockchains, DLTs, DHTs, etc.), verifiable 
>> credentials, and governance frameworks—in other words, to the "full 
>> stack" of decentralized trust infrastructure.
>>
>> An actual DID record, i.e., the DID and the DID document it resolves 
>> to—which can tell you the public key(s), authentication method(s), 
>> and service endpoint(s) associated with the DID at a specific point 
>> in time)—are just one element that a verifier (aka relying party) 
>> must consider in making a trust decision about accepting a proof of 
>> a particular verifiable credential.
>>
>> Yes, the DID of the credential issuer is a very important element in 
>> this chain, because if the verifier does not trust the authenticity 
>> or integrity of the DID document that the verifier resolved from the 
>> DID, then prima fascia, the verifier cannot trust the credential.
>>
>> But at this level, the verifier's trust decision is not about the 
>> DID itself. It's about *trusting the strength of the DID method and 
>> the DID registry that the DID method operates against*.
>>
>> When looked at from that perspective, I believe it becomes easier to 
>> address some of the concerns raised in this thread, because market 
>> forces should push verifiers towards trusting DID methods and DID 
>> registries that provide the strongest trust assurances. Almost by 
>> definition, single-provider solutions (e.g., Facebook for the 
>> theoretical "did:facebook:" or Google for "did:google:") would be 
>> low on that list because single-provider solutions are under the 
>> control of a single entity and suffer from all the disadvantages of 
>> single points of failure (no matter how "distributed" their actual 
>> network).
>>
>> So would any other company that offered "its own" DID method.
>>
>> Even a government that offered its own DID method might have trouble 
>> building trust in that method because presumably the validator nodes 
>> ("stewards") in that government's network are all ultimately under 
>> the control of that government—so the government could decide to 
>> fork the entire DID registry at some point and all the nodes would 
>> comply.
>>
>> In the end, it comes down to a "virtuous cycle" competition between 
>> different DID methods and the DID registries they operate against 
>> for who can provide the highest trust assurances. Those DID methods 
>> will be the ones issuers will choose for their DIDs simply because 
>> those are the ones who will be trusted by verifiers.
>>
>> I believe this point is important enough that I'll work with the 
>> other editors to craft a paragraph explaining this in the Community 
>> Final Draft  DID spec that we're trying to finish by the end of the 
>> month.
>>
>> On Sat, Apr 13, 2019 at 7:02 PM Michael Herman (Parallelspace) 
>> <mwherman@parallelspace.net <mailto:mwherman@parallelspace.net>> wrote:
>>
>>     Initially, I believe virtually every web site that supports
>>     authenticated logins/sign-ins today will have their own DID
>>     Scheme …with high probability.
>>
>>     My favorite example is http://www.meetup.com. Every meetup.com
>>     <http://meetup.com> member will likely have their own meetup.com
>>     <http://meetup.com> DID in their wallet.  Why would meetup.com
>>     <http://meetup.com> risk trusting anything/anyone else’s DIDs? 
>>     What’s the incentive?
>>
>>     Another example: Mike Brown is doing a great job at the Alberta
>>     provincial government owned ATB but why will anyone outside the
>>     province of Alberta trust an ATB DID?
>>
>>     Prepare to have a wallet with lots and lots of DIDs …at the
>>     beginning and for a long time  afterwards: Social Evolution and
>>     Technology Adoption
>>     (https://hyperonomy.com/2019/04/08/social-evolution-and-technology-adoption/).
>>
>>     Best regards,
>>
>>     Michael Herman (Toronto/Calgary/Seattle)
>>
>>     Independent Blockchain Developer
>>
>>     Hyperonomy Business Blockchain / Parallelspace Corporation
>>
>>     W: http://hyperonomy.com <http://hyperonomy.com/>
>>
>>     C:  +1 416 524-7702
>>
>>     *From:* Tim Bouma <trbouma@gmail.com <mailto:trbouma@gmail.com>>
>>     *Sent:* April 13, 2019 5:28 PM
>>     *To:* Steven Rowat <steven_rowat@sunshine.net
>>     <mailto:steven_rowat@sunshine.net>>
>>     *Cc:* Markus Sabadello <markus@danubetech.com
>>     <mailto:markus@danubetech.com>>; W3C Credentials CG (Public
>>     List) <public-credentials@w3.org <mailto:public-credentials@w3.org>>
>>     *Subject:* Re: Materials from 2019-04-11 combined DID Spec and
>>     DID Resolution Spec meeting
>>
>>     Hi,
>>
>>     Acceptance of DIDs will be something that the various trust
>>     frameworks will determine.
>>
>>     See section 5.6.1 on the IMSC Pan-Canadian Trust Framework Draft
>>     below
>>
>>     https://canada-ca.github.io/PCTF-CCP/
>>
>>     You will see Vectors of Trust as qualifiers.
>>
>>     We could add DID methods as another qualifier; it will likely be
>>     a qualifier added to conformance criteria for the credential
>>     authentication trusted process. As for trusting Facebook,
>>     Microsoft, etc., we will need to see how the ecosystem sorts
>>     itself out based on fair standards.
>>
>>     Trusting a DID is only one piece as there are many other pieces
>>     that need to be trusted.
>>
>>     Tim
>>
>>     On Sat, Apr 13, 2019, 6:44 PM Steven Rowat,
>>     <steven_rowat@sunshine.net <mailto:steven_rowat@sunshine.net>>
>>     wrote:
>>
>>         On 2019-04-12 2:05 pm, Markus Sabadello wrote:
>>         > Slides, recording and notes for the 2019-04-11 combined
>>         DID Spec and DID
>>         > Resolution Spec meeting is here:
>>         >
>>         https://github.com/w3c-ccg/meetings/tree/gh-pages/2019-04-11-did-spec-and-resolution
>>         >
>>
>>         In these notes there's a fairly long discussion of the
>>         possibility of
>>         "did:facebook" etc, and what those silo's methods might
>>         mean. Marcus
>>         said at one point:
>>
>>         > [2019-04-11T20:18:13.165Z] <dlongley> markus_sabadello:
>>         The only argument I heard that I understand a little bit
>>         from Joe Andrieu is that ... we could argue that the DID URL
>>         scheme as a whole would still be decentralized because you
>>         can argue to use which method you want. This would be a big
>>         change from how we use DIDs so far, but I could understand a
>>         little bit. If you don't want to use a facebook DID you can
>>         use Sovrin or Veres One. So the whole space [would be]
>>         decentralized though individual methods might not be.
>>
>>         As far as I can understand from reading these meeting notes,
>>         Markus
>>         was pointing out what seems to be a major discrepancy
>>         between the
>>         original goals (and still current via the DID .012 spec) and
>>         the
>>         possibility that methods could be written for DID for
>>         did:facebook,
>>         etc. that don't follow these goals.
>>
>>         I'd like some clarification about this because it seems to
>>         change a
>>         lot that I had assumed was happening in this group.
>>
>>         Specifically, does this mean that, say, if Facebook, Google,
>>         Microsoft, Apple, (etc.) each write their own DID method,
>>         and write
>>         them so that they're as silo'd as possible (which they may
>>         well do),
>>         then it's likely that:
>>
>>         a) There is no data portability for all the people using
>>         those silo'd
>>         DIDs;
>>         b) There may be limited (or no) pseudonymity or privacy for
>>         the people
>>         using those DIDs; and perhaps other limits.
>>
>>         Is this accurate?
>>
>>
>>         Steven
>>
>>     On Sat, Apr 13, 2019, 6:44 PM Steven Rowat,
>>     <steven_rowat@sunshine.net <mailto:steven_rowat@sunshine.net>>
>>     wrote:
>>
>>         On 2019-04-12 2:05 pm, Markus Sabadello wrote:
>>         > Slides, recording and notes for the 2019-04-11 combined
>>         DID Spec and DID
>>         > Resolution Spec meeting is here:
>>         >
>>         https://github.com/w3c-ccg/meetings/tree/gh-pages/2019-04-11-did-spec-and-resolution
>>         >
>>
>>         In these notes there's a fairly long discussion of the
>>         possibility of
>>         "did:facebook" etc, and what those silo's methods might
>>         mean. Marcus
>>         said at one point:
>>
>>         > [2019-04-11T20:18:13.165Z] <dlongley> markus_sabadello:
>>         The only argument I heard that I understand a little bit
>>         from Joe Andrieu is that ... we could argue that the DID URL
>>         scheme as a whole would still be decentralized because you
>>         can argue to use which method you want. This would be a big
>>         change from how we use DIDs so far, but I could understand a
>>         little bit. If you don't want to use a facebook DID you can
>>         use Sovrin or Veres One. So the whole space [would be]
>>         decentralized though individual methods might not be.
>>
>>         As far as I can understand from reading these meeting notes,
>>         Markus
>>         was pointing out what seems to be a major discrepancy
>>         between the
>>         original goals (and still current via the DID .012 spec) and
>>         the
>>         possibility that methods could be written for DID for
>>         did:facebook,
>>         etc. that don't follow these goals.
>>
>>         I'd like some clarification about this because it seems to
>>         change a
>>         lot that I had assumed was happening in this group.
>>
>>         Specifically, does this mean that, say, if Facebook, Google,
>>         Microsoft, Apple, (etc.) each write their own DID method,
>>         and write
>>         them so that they're as silo'd as possible (which they may
>>         well do),
>>         then it's likely that:
>>
>>         a) There is no data portability for all the people using
>>         those silo'd
>>         DIDs;
>>         b) There may be limited (or no) pseudonymity or privacy for
>>         the people
>>         using those DIDs; and perhaps other limits.
>>
>>         Is this accurate?
>>
>>
>>         Steven
>>
>

Received on Monday, 15 April 2019 17:03:27 UTC