the CDN would have to consent to the client interacting with the server,
thus not affecting performance, scale and security, and it'd only be for
non-CDN-safe resources such as private content anyway.
On 2020-04-20 7:59 p.m., Lucas Pardue wrote:
> Hey,
>
> On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 11:28 PM Soni L. <fakedme+http@gmail.com
> <mailto:fakedme%2Bhttp@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> you'd still have a reverse proxy that's terminating TLS and
> talking HTTP with the backend.
>
> you'd just also have a way for that reverse proxy to pass a raw
> TLS stream through, so the client can talk HTTPS with the backend
> when needed. it'd still be in the middle of the connection and
> fully capable of terminating it if it detects potentially abusive
> behaviour.
>
> On 2020-04-20 7:20 p.m., Brian Campbell wrote:
>> That's really quite different than the intended scope of the
>> draft, which was/is a reverse proxy that's terminating TLS (from
>> the client's perspective anyway) and taking HTTP with the backend.
>>
> I'm with Brian on this; CDN/reverse proxies provide an offload of HTTP
> processing from the origin that brings advantages such as performance,
> scale, and security. Although it could be technically possible to pass
> through TLS (pretty much covered by CONNECT already), the concept
> negates the value proposition of a CDN architecture. I think Brian's
> document has more value with the scope that he has described.
>
> Cheers
> Lucas
>
>