- From: Ryan Hamilton <rch@google.com>
- Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 06:18:36 -0700
- To: "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
- Cc: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Received on Friday, 14 July 2017 13:19:05 UTC
Howdy Folks, I've been talking with Chrome security folks about the issue of skipping DNS resolutions when using an existing HTTP/2 connection for a new origin announced via an ORIGIN frame. It is crystal clear that saving DNS resolutions represents a real performance win, especially for long-tail users. However, we are not comfortable with the increased ability of an off-path attacker to exploit a mis-issued certificate. A DNS resolution is not the strongest security assertion in the world, but it's definitely something. Before trusting a certificate for a connection, we'd like an assertion from some other trusted source. This could be: * On-path presence, for example DNS resolution, or proxy configuration * A previous assertion from the origin itself (Alt-Svc) * CT logs, etc. Without such an assertion, we're not comfortable trusting the connection and plan to continue consulting DNS when making use of the ORIGIN frame in Chrome. Cheers, Ryan
Received on Friday, 14 July 2017 13:19:05 UTC