- From: Walter H. <Walter.H@mathemainzel.info>
- Date: Tue, 01 Dec 2015 09:22:01 +0100
- To: Roland Zink <roland@zinks.de>
- CC: Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com>, ietf-http-wg@w3.org
Received on Tuesday, 1 December 2015 08:22:33 UTC
On 01.12.2015 01:19, Roland Zink wrote: > Am 01.12.2015 um 00:32 schrieb Jim Manico: >> > TLS is also end-to-end >> >> No way is that true. TLS per the standard can be MITM'ed by proxies >> in ways that subvert both certificate pinning and HSTS in ways that >> do NOT inform the user in any browser today. I'm happy to provide >> references to this if you like. >> > The browser will build a end to end TLS tunnel through known proxies. > Intercepting proxies may do MITM and and exact these intercepting proxies can't validate this content, if it contains malware or not; as I said, THIS DRAFT IS NONSENS; > RFC7469 says it is allowed for clients to turn off pin validation > based on some policy and still be compliant. Is this what you want to > reference? > > However it is also compliant to not do this and do pin validation. > what does this help preventing clients receiving malware, that will be raised through this draft?
Received on Tuesday, 1 December 2015 08:22:33 UTC