Re: new version trusted-proxy20 draft


On Feb 19, 2014, at 7:09 PM, William Chan (陈智昌) <willchan@chromium.org> wrote:

> Yeah, I'd like to see the "secure proxy" proposal separated out from
> the "trusted proxy" proposal. Let's move forward on the "secure proxy"
> one. I think the "trusted proxy" proposal is more complicated.

I agree
and the draft is really proposing a "secure proxy" solution 
in line with your definition of "secure proxy"

indeed we are only proposing the possibility for the proxy to ask consent
to opt in for http:// resources traffic

/Sal


> 
> On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 7:30 AM, Peter Lepeska <bizzbyster@gmail.com> wrote:
>> My two takeaways from Zurich on trusted proxy were as follows:
>> 
>> 1) We need to look at use cases of trusted proxy and seek alternative
>> technologies. I've attempted to start this process on another thread, which
>> I believe shows current (and future) alternatives are partial solutions that
>> we can conclude are inadequate overall in delivering the functionality and
>> performance users/admins/service providers demand.
>> 2) Until someone proposes a UI for opt-in and opt-out of trusted proxy that
>> is both user friendly and does not make MITM attacks (rogue trusted proxies)
>> easier to execute, then the debate on this topic is at a standstill. I am
>> working on ideas in this area but it will take more than just a few weeks.
>> It would be really great if others got involved.
>> 
>> Salvatore's draft has some really good ideas but it does not attempt to
>> address #2 above, which most agreed was the sticking point on trusted proxy,
>> which we distinguish from "secure proxy" by the fact that a trusted proxy
>> can see https-schemed traffic in plaintext.
>> 
>> Peter
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 11:54 PM, William Chan (陈智昌) <willchan@chromium.org>
>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 8:18 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 6:02 PM, William Chan (陈智昌)
>>>> <willchan@chromium.org>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> And furthermore, I should add that I don't really think it's in the
>>>>> users' interests to have an intermediary be able to snoop listen in on
>>>>> all their https traffic. I don't really see the value for end users in
>>>>> standardizing any mechanism for doing this. Is there any?
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> This still comes back to the theory that a trusted, explicit firewall,
>>>> such
>>>> as a corporate firewall, should be able to snoop on all traffic leaving
>>>> the
>>>> protected network. There are plenty of good reasons to do this, and
>>>> plenty
>>>> of people who disagree that there are any possible reasons.
>>> 
>>> Good point. This is a controversial topic that we're unlikely to see
>>> consensus on in the near future. Let me ask another question. Is there
>>> a user agent that plans on supporting this proposal? At the Zurich
>>> interim, IIRC, Patrick (Firefox), Rob (IE/WinInet), and I (Chromium)
>>> all said we do not support this. If that's in error, please speak up.
>>> Otherwise, if no user agent plans on supporting this, I don't see the
>>> value of standardizing this.
>>> 
>>

Received on Wednesday, 19 February 2014 21:18:17 UTC