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Re: new version trusted-proxy20 draft

From: 陈智昌 <willchan@chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 10:09:19 -0800
Message-ID: <CAA4WUYiad1gSi2WinpKXt=n-UNWQuZ5fAxVzV=ACxJOD8OKizw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Peter Lepeska <bizzbyster@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@gmail.com>, Patrick McManus <pmcmanus@mozilla.com>, Salvatore Loreto <salvatore.loreto@ericsson.com>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>, "draft-loreto-httpbis-trusted-proxy20@tools.ietf.org" <draft-loreto-httpbis-trusted-proxy20@tools.ietf.org>, GUS BOURG <gb3635@att.com>
Yeah, I'd like to see the "secure proxy" proposal separated out from
the "trusted proxy" proposal. Let's move forward on the "secure proxy"
one. I think the "trusted proxy" proposal is more complicated.

On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 7:30 AM, Peter Lepeska <bizzbyster@gmail.com> wrote:
> My two takeaways from Zurich on trusted proxy were as follows:
>
> 1) We need to look at use cases of trusted proxy and seek alternative
> technologies. I've attempted to start this process on another thread, which
> I believe shows current (and future) alternatives are partial solutions that
> we can conclude are inadequate overall in delivering the functionality and
> performance users/admins/service providers demand.
> 2) Until someone proposes a UI for opt-in and opt-out of trusted proxy that
> is both user friendly and does not make MITM attacks (rogue trusted proxies)
> easier to execute, then the debate on this topic is at a standstill. I am
> working on ideas in this area but it will take more than just a few weeks.
> It would be really great if others got involved.
>
> Salvatore's draft has some really good ideas but it does not attempt to
> address #2 above, which most agreed was the sticking point on trusted proxy,
> which we distinguish from "secure proxy" by the fact that a trusted proxy
> can see https-schemed traffic in plaintext.
>
> Peter
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 11:54 PM, William Chan (陈智昌) <willchan@chromium.org>
> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 8:18 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> > On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 6:02 PM, William Chan (陈智昌)
>> > <willchan@chromium.org>
>> > wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> And furthermore, I should add that I don't really think it's in the
>> >> users' interests to have an intermediary be able to snoop listen in on
>> >> all their https traffic. I don't really see the value for end users in
>> >> standardizing any mechanism for doing this. Is there any?
>> >
>> >
>> > This still comes back to the theory that a trusted, explicit firewall,
>> > such
>> > as a corporate firewall, should be able to snoop on all traffic leaving
>> > the
>> > protected network. There are plenty of good reasons to do this, and
>> > plenty
>> > of people who disagree that there are any possible reasons.
>>
>> Good point. This is a controversial topic that we're unlikely to see
>> consensus on in the near future. Let me ask another question. Is there
>> a user agent that plans on supporting this proposal? At the Zurich
>> interim, IIRC, Patrick (Firefox), Rob (IE/WinInet), and I (Chromium)
>> all said we do not support this. If that's in error, please speak up.
>> Otherwise, if no user agent plans on supporting this, I don't see the
>> value of standardizing this.
>>
>
Received on Wednesday, 19 February 2014 18:09:46 UTC

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