"What set of capabilities can be offered to an intermediary that would induce it to reduce the scope of its powers?" Martin, I completely agree that this is the direction to go in and have a proposal that I'm running by a smaller group off list. I'll post it as soon as I've incorporated the group's feedback. Thanks, Peter On Mon, Nov 25, 2013 at 5:13 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>wrote: > On 25 November 2013 13:09, Peter Lepeska <bizzbyster@gmail.com> wrote: > > I think we need to come up with a protocol-supported way to solve the > > problems of trusted proxies without modifying TLS. > > Isn't it the case that we want to limit the amount of trust that we > bestow upon our favourite intermediary? > > If this truly were a 100% trusted intermediary, then we'd already be > done here. TLS hop-by-hop is enough for that. I don't think that is > where all this time is going. > > I think that all this discussion is getting all knotted over is what > we want to allow intermediaries to do. What set of capabilities can > be offered to an intermediary that would induce it to reduce the scope > of its powers? > > It has been suggested that the powers of stealth be denied. That > sounds reasonable, but I always stumble at the UX story there. > > The power of content modification - with some fuzziness around whether > that includes "metadata" - has also been suggested as another > potential power to strip. > > I think that leaves intermediaries with the ability to see what is > going on and prevent it if they choose. Is that enough? I've heard > it said that it is not. >
Received on Monday, 25 November 2013 23:02:41 UTC