Hi Paul
not sure I like much the text for the opportunistic.
STARTTLS in SMTP/IMAP works by the server firstly advertising
availability of encryption. This would only trigger a client to
actually ask for it only if the client were so configured. In many mail
clients for instance, this won't actually cause any encryption to happen
at all with default config. So there's no contract about making any
best effort to achieve crypto. It can be no effort and no crypto and
commonly is.
So maybe this doesn't describe what is meant by opportunistic encryption
and we need another term, or do we change the meaning?
Adrien
------ Original Message ------
From: "Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@gmail.com>
To: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>
Cc: "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Sent: 21/11/2013 1:20:04 p.m.
Subject: Re: Getting our definitions of encryption straight for the
HTTP/2 security discussion
>I agree that my earlier term "authenticated encryption" would have
>collisions with other technologies, and I updated the definitions to
>match James' wording.