- From: Roberto Peon <grmocg@gmail.com>
- Date: Sun, 17 Nov 2013 13:01:13 -0800
- To: Adrien de Croy <adrien@qbik.com>
- Cc: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>, "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAP+FsNfKmqDRMPsU3LiTq0=d6p_HfFc7=mAZs73X2eZ7mEtDXA@mail.gmail.com>
Folks won't rewrite for a new scheme until it is supported by all clients, and that won't happen until there is sufficient (and by that I mean overwhelming) demand for such. ... thus, a new scheme won't work as it is firmly in chicken-and-egg territory, even in intranets :/ Happy eyeballs-like strategies either introduce latency or introduce complexity, and sometimes both. For fun: which connection do you send any particular request down? HTTP/2 over :443 works just fine even with MITMs, as they will need to terminate the TLS channel, which means that they can refuse to negotiate HTTP/2 during the ALPN negotiation. -=R On Sun, Nov 17, 2013 at 12:47 PM, Adrien de Croy <adrien@qbik.com> wrote: > > compared with the existing proposed methods of determining whether > http/2.0 is available or not, including: > > * some new DNS record > * upgrade dance > > actually testing for connectivity on a new port is miles easier. A client > can send 2 SYN packets at the same time. Connectivity on a new > reserved/allocated port such as 100 would be a fairly clear indication that > we are dealing with http/2.0 > > Keep in mind, with a MITM, you can't presume that http/2.0 is deployable > as currently proposed over 443 with NPN or ALPN. In fact I believe that > due to the growth of MITM, the deployabilty of anything other than http/1.1 > over TLS is reducing. > > Crypto or not could then be negotiated on the connection. A server can > offer it, and a client can defer to a user as to whether the user is > prepared to go unencrypted or not. Agents so configured can make that > choice already, so that plaintext deployment is possible with low pain > level in situations that require it. > > No need or desire for a new scheme (and face it, no-one is going to > re-write their web apps for a new scheme to send people down the garden > path by advertising a new scheme which the client cannot access). > > Adrien > > > ------ Original Message ------ > From: "James M Snell" <jasnell@gmail.com> > To: "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org> > Sent: 18/11/2013 7:08:04 a.m. > Subject: A proposal > > The volume on the other threads on the security subject is causing far > too much noise. I have a proposal that offers a compromise approach. I > posted about this partially in one of the threads but I'm afraid it got > lost in the noise. Others have touched on the same basic idea: > > 1. By default, assign plain text http/2 to a new port. > 2. Document that plaintext http/2 can be sent over port 80 but document > the various possible issues with reliability. > 3. Strongly recommend that http/2 be sent over TLS instead of plaintext. > 4. Establish a new http2 URL protocol prefix for plaintext http2 over the > new default port > > This does several things. > > A. It makes plaintext http/2 possible but significantly harder. Some. > Would argue that makes plaintext http/2 "undeployable"... The same people > who have argued that have also argued that plaintext http/2 should not be > used at all. Therefore, those people really do not lose anything by > following this approach. > > B. It makes http/2 over TLS the default for the public internet since > that's the only option that would be broadly deployable on today's > infrastructure. > > C. It makes it less likely that we would have to deal with the upgrade > dance on port 80. Which is a good thing. Http:// URLs would always mean > http/1.x. Http2://example:80 would mean http/2 over port 80. > > D. Developers would be forced to make a conscious choice to use plaintext > http/2 over an established default port. There's zero ambiguity. > > The folks who are arguing for TLS only really lose nothing with this > approach. It still, over course, does nothing about the mitm issues on port > 443, but its a start. > > - James > >
Received on Sunday, 17 November 2013 21:01:40 UTC