- From: Adrien W. de Croy <adrien@qbik.com>
- Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2013 01:23:04 +0000
- To: "Roberto Peon" <grmocg@gmail.com>, "RUELLAN Herve" <Herve.Ruellan@crf.canon.fr>
- Cc: "Poul-Henning Kamp" <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>, "Ted Hardie" <ted.ietf@gmail.com>, "Eliezer Croitoru" <eliezer@ngtech.co.il>, "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>, "John C Klensin" <john-ietf@jck.com>
- Message-Id: <emc608f7da-5150-49c8-8a34-47173157f343@bombed>
I wouldn't stop there. * split querystring into individual tuples as well and put them in a querystring sub-section. * deprecate %encoding (no longer needed since nothing is parsed) Adrien ------ Original Message ------ From: "Roberto Peon" <grmocg@gmail.com> To: "RUELLAN Herve" <Herve.Ruellan@crf.canon.fr> Cc: "Poul-Henning Kamp" <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>; "Ted Hardie" <ted.ietf@gmail.com>; "Adrien W. de Croy" <adrien@qbik.com>; "Eliezer Croitoru" <eliezer@ngtech.co.il>; "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>; "John C Klensin" <john-ietf@jck.com> Sent: 31/01/2013 1:45:33 p.m. Subject: Re: Do we kill the "Host:" header in HTTP/2 ? >Scheme,host, and path separation is a good compromise (imo, of course) >because it leaks no information that anyone wouldn't have already been >able to get earlier. > >-=R > > >On Wed, Jan 30, 2013 at 4:08 PM, RUELLAN Herve ><Herve.Ruellan@crf.canon.fr> wrote: >>Splitting host, path and scheme is a kind of prefix-matching. So yes >>generic prefix matching is not safe (this is the basic definition of >>what Deflate do). However restricted prefix-matching is. >>So we should find the sweet point in the middle that will allow us to >>have both good compaction and no security threat. >> >>Hervé. >>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>From: Roberto Peon [grmocg@gmail.com] >>Sent: Thursday, January 31, 2013 00:04 >>To: Poul-Henning Kamp >>Cc: Ted Hardie; Adrien W. de Croy; Eliezer Croitoru; >>ietf-http-wg@w3.org; John C Klensin >> >>Subject: Re: Do we kill the "Host:" header in HTTP/2 ? >> >>The only thing we know if safe from CRIME attacks is whole-atom >>matching-- prefix matching is not safe. >>So, if we have a host header and a path component and a scheme >>component, the scheme and the host won't have to be repeated in a >>CRIME-safe encoder/compressor. If it is all one string, either it has >>to be special cased (in which case it still ends up being host, path, >>scheme on the wire), or we are disallowed from doing compression for >>it. >> >>I'll point out that it is extremely rare for the whole URL to match a >>prior URL, and it is extremely common for the scheme and the host to >>remain constant across a large number of queries. >> >> >>I'm not sure I understand the part where you say that you'd have to >>text-process the entire headers to find the fqdn. I think that is >>assuming that something like the first-line is preserved as-is, which >>is not how I understand things are working out right now (that would >>throw out compression on those entries). >> >>Sending the components of the URI separately reduces the need to parse >>these things, and better, since most of the time the host won't have >>changed, a simple single 'if' allows us to proceed with the fqdn of >>the previous request without any parsing at all. >> >>Assuming that we end up with some kind of compressor that only sends >>what has changed, in fact, one gets to reuse parsed state, eliminating >>any need for parsing at all... >>-=R >> >> >>On Wed, Jan 30, 2013 at 2:55 PM, Poul-Henning Kamp >><phk@phk.freebsd.dk> wrote: >>>Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 >>>-------- >>>In message < >>> Remove "Host: " ${fqdn} CR NL >>> >>>Which looks like a one byte saving to me ? >>> >>> >I haven't yet heard of a real performance advantage for dropping it. >>>Is >>> >there one? >>> >>>High-performance implementations would not have to text-process the >>>entire >>>header to find the fqdn they use for routing decisions. >>> >>>-- >>>Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20 >>>phk@FreeBSD.ORG | TCP/IP since RFC 956 >>>FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe >>>Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by >>>incompetence. >> >
Received on Thursday, 31 January 2013 01:23:50 UTC