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Re: multiplexing -- don't do it

From: Adrien W. de Croy <adrien@qbik.com>
Date: Mon, 02 Apr 2012 20:43:53 +0000
To: "Mike Belshe" <mike@belshe.com>, "Amos Jeffries" <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
Cc: "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Message-Id: <emd18d3d46-33f2-4aad-bcca-0ab09ffe8b67@boist>

------ Original Message ------
From: "Mike Belshe" mike@belshe.com
>On Mon, Apr 2, 2012 at 6:57 AM, Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz> wrote:
> On 1/04/2012 5:17 a.m., Adam Barth wrote:  
>  On Sat, Mar 31, 2012 at 4:54 AM, Mark Nottingham wrote:
>   On 31/03/2012, at 1:11 PM, Mike Belshe wrote:
>    For the record - nobody wants to avoid using port 80 for new 
>    protocols.  I'd love to!  There is no religious reason that we 
>    don't - its just that we know, for a fact, that we can't do it 
>    without subjecting a non-trivial number of users to hangs, data 
>    corruption, and other errors.  You might think its ok for someone 
>    else's browser to throw reliability out the window, but nobody at 
>    Microsoft, Google, or Mozilla has been willing to do that…
    Mike -
    I don't disagree on any specific point (as I think you know), but I 
    would observe that the errors you're talking about can themselves 
    be viewed as transient. I.e., just because they occur in 
    experiments now, doesn't necessarily mean that they won't be fixed 
    in the infrastructure in the future -- especially if they generate 
    a lot of support calls, because they break a lot MORE things than 
    they do now.
    Yes, there will be a period of pain, but I just wanted to highlight 
    one of the potential differences between deploying a standard and a 
    single-vendor effort.  It's true that we can't go too far here; if 
    we specify a protocol that breaks horribly 50% of the time, it 
    won't get traction. However, if we have a good base population and 
    perhaps a good fallback story, we *can* change things.
   That's not our experience as browser vendors.  If browsers offer an
   HTTP/2.0 that has a bad user experience for 10% of users, then major
   sites (e.g., Twitter) won't adopt it.  They don't want to punish 
   users any more than we do.
   Worse, if they do adopt the new protocol, users who have trouble will
   try another browser (e.g., one that doesn't support HTTP/2.0 such as
   IE 9), observe that it works, and blame the first browser for being
   buggy.  The net result is that we lose a user and no pressure is
   exerted on the intermediaries who are causing the problem in the 
   These are powerful market force that can't really be ignored.
  So the takeway there is pay attention to the intermediary people when 
  they say something cant be implemented (or won't scale reasonably).
 I agree we should pay attention to scalability - and we have.
 Please don't disregard that Google servers switched to SPDY with zero 
 additional hardware (the google servers are fully conformant http/1.1 
 proxies with a lot more DoS logic than the average site).  I know, 
 some people think Google is some magical place where scalability 
 defies physics and is not relevant, but this isn't true.  Google is 
 just like every other site, except much much bigger.   If we had a 10% 
 increase in server load with SPDY, Google never could have shipped it. 
  Seriously, who would roll out thousands of new machines for an 
 experimental protocol?  Nobody.  How would we have convinced the 
 executive team "this will be faster", if they were faced with some 
 huge cap-ex bill?  Doesn't sound very convincing, does it?  In my 
 mind, we have already proven clearly that SPDY scales just fine.
 But I'm open to other data.  So if you have a SPDY implementation and 
 want to comment on the effects on your server, lets hear it!   And I'm 
 not saying SPDY is free.  But, when you weigh costs (like compression 
 and framing) against benefits (like 6x fewer connections),  there is 
 no problem.  And could we make improvements still?  Of course.  But 
 don't pretend that these are the critical parts of SPDY.  These are 
 the mice nuts.
For a forward proxy, there are several main reasons to even exist:
a) implement and enforce access control policy
b) audit usage
c) cache
you block any of these by bypassing everything with TLS, you have a 
non-starter for corporate environments.  Even if currently admins kinda 
turn a blind eye (because they have to) and allow port 443 through, as 
more and more traffic moves over to 443, more pressure will come down 
from management to control it.
Best we don't get left with the only option being MITM.

> With plenty of bias, I agree.
Received on Monday, 2 April 2012 20:44:23 UTC

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