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RE: comments on draft-barth-mime-sniffing

From: Larry Masinter <masinter@adobe.com>
Date: Sun, 31 May 2009 10:22:17 -0700
To: Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com>
CC: "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Message-ID: <8B62A039C620904E92F1233570534C9B0118CD95EC7B@nambx04.corp.adobe.com>
In reply to:

On Sat, May 30, 2009 at 6:06 PM, Larry Masinter <masinter@adobe.com> wrote:
>> 1.  Isn't the incidence of server misconfiguration far less than 10 years
>> ago? Can you provide more evidence that this problem is as significant as it
>> once was?

Adam replied:

> I don't have any data to compare current server behavior with
> historical server behavior, but sniffing is required to process
> approximately 1% of HTTP responses correctly.

In the interest of monitoring this, and possibly removing content
type sniffing in the future, is it possible to publish (and reference)
the methodology used?

I heard at least one question that this number might be inflated by
HTML pages that were intentionally labeled as text/plain. Also, the
proportion of mislabeled HTTP responses from the searchable Internet 
may be different from the HTTP responses from the "private" Internet
behind firewalls. 

I don't want to question whether content-sniffing is appropriate
now, but this seems to be based on current behavior which may
be correctable in the future.

As far as conformance requirements go, I agree with the idea that
it shouldn't be necessary to mandate content-type sniffing as
a normative requirement for HTML user agents, but rather advise
specific classes of user agents that they MAY wish to follow
this behavior IF they wish to continue to be compatible with
the deployed infrastructure, to the extent that there remains
a significant proportion of the deployed Internet of concern
to clients.

I see no justification whatsoever for allowing conforming user
agents to sniff types for new elements such as <video>, or
encouraging such behavior, which is just opening the door
for whole other categories of spoofing.  Certainly this
isn't represented by any deployed infrastructure.

Received on Sunday, 31 May 2009 17:22:56 UTC

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