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Re: XAdES - More secure than XML Dsig?

From: Rich Salz <rsalz@datapower.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2004 14:08:08 -0500
Message-ID: <4050B918.6050606@datapower.com>
To: Joseph Swaminathan <jswamina@cisco.com>
Cc: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com>, w3c-ietf-xmldsig@w3.org

>         A novice question. Pardon me if it is obvious.
> What is the need for signing the X509 certificate.

Suppose I have a single keypair, but multiple certificates for that 
pair.  For example, I might have a cert that identifies me as an 
employee, for signing email, and I might have a cert that identifies me 
as an officer of the company, for signing official documents.

Unless I sign the cert, I can swap the two roles, and the receiver 
cannot tell.

Even worse, a "fraudulent" or irrespoinsible CA can mint a new 
certificate for my public key that contains all sorts of things.  Unless 
the receiver does full cert-chain validation (and really, who does that? 
  nobody:), they can be fooled by this fraudulent cert.

	/r$
-- 
Rich Salz, Chief Security Architect
DataPower Technology                           http://www.datapower.com
XS40 XML Security Gateway   http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html
XML Security Overview  http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html
Received on Thursday, 11 March 2004 13:56:40 GMT

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