- From: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
- Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2001 13:02:48 -0700
- To: mark.baker@sympatico.ca
- Cc: Rich Salz <rsalz@zolera.com>, xml-dist-app@w3.org
On Thu, Jul 26, 2001 at 09:33:43AM -0400, Mark Baker wrote: > > > I would suggest that using a 200 results in more complex code, as > > > you need to open up the body to find out first, if there's a > > > problem, and second, what the problem is. > > > > How so? If we use 400/500 to signal a Fault, processors (both SOAP > > and non-SOAP) still need to open up the body to a) assure that it > > indeed is a SOAP fault b) ascertain the nature of the Fault. > > I'm not sure why a) would be necessary. It's part of what's > required to do b), but I don't see it as useful by itself. 4xx or 5xx status codes may be generated by software other than the SOAP processor; either the HTTP implementation of the sender, or an HTTP intermediary. > Also, the HTTP response status code gives you some information > about the nature of the fault, just not as much as the body > would. But it would be enough information to take action in > many cases. Exactly - and that action may be based on false assumptions. > > More to the point, I still haven't seen any concrete use cases for a > > device that needs to know the presence of a SOAP fault without > > cracking open the XML. Meanwhile, there have been several > > illustrations of devices that will misuse this information in the > > mistaken belief that it is a hint as to the nature of the HTTP > > message in a Web browsing context. > > How can anybody misuse a *subset* of the information that would be > available to you if you cracked open the body? It's not like you're > going to find anything in there that would tell you that the HTTP > response code you saw was the wrong one. Turn it around - an HTTP implementation that isn't aware of SOAP semantics may make assumptions based on the status code of the message. > > > How so? HTTP invocations are secure by virtue of their meanings > > > being publicly specified, and examined by security conscious folks. > > > If the XMLP WG cannot guarantee that the only SOAP based protocols > > > being tunneled over HTTP have been through this same process, then > > > you need a way to turn SOAP tunneling off. > > > > I'm not exactly sure what you mean here - could you expand on this? > > HTTP's application semantics are secure. I still don't know what this means. > [...] we need to give them a way to identify (so it can be turned > off) any SOAP tunneling. Content-Type. Of course, there are no guarantees that all SOAP-like messages sent by HTTP are flagged as such, but that's not our problem - it's a problem with filtering based on hints and heuristics in general. -- Mark Nottingham http://www.mnot.net/
Received on Thursday, 26 July 2001 16:02:50 UTC