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Re: Revised Test Cases

From: Tommy Lindberg <tommy.lindberg@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2004 12:00:26 +0100
Message-ID: <18ec59cc04101304002a76840f@mail.gmail.com>
To: Yunhao Zhang <yzhang@sqldata.com>
Cc: www-xkms@w3.org

Hi Yunhao -

Here are some comments and suggestions that came to mind up front:

While I am personally OK with the approach, using XKISS messages to 
verify that XKRSS operations have produced the expected results may
exclude implementors that only intend implementing XKRSS, or portions
thereof, from executing some tests.

Assuming that XKISS messages are used to verify expected results of XKRSS
requests, it may be more meaningful to incorporate the XKISS messages in the
actual XKRSS test case as opposed to having them separately, using T101 as
an example:

  - verify that binding-to-be-registered does not exist (Validate/Locate)
  - attempt registration
  - verify that binding-to-be-registered does exist (Validate/Locate)

I suggest we use Identifier's and DN's that identify the entity acting as a
client. This will make it easier to do partial purges and will also keep the
result messages smaller.

I am not in favor of using the same shared secret for everyone.  Not only is
it not realistic, but it also allows for accidental inteference
between individual

I'd like to see a way to identify the shared secret used in an HMAC signature. I
propose using a KeyInfo.KeyName in the enclosing Signature element.

There's no need to require a certain passphrase in a revocation
operation based on a
revocation code.  The client can choose this at his own discretion.  I'd like to
see this disappear from T106 to avoid interference.

T106 uses revocation by revocation code; I'd like to see the other two
options exercised too

  - revoke by HMAC signature
  - revoke by private key signature

Shouldn't we mandate checking the optional ProofOfPosession in T101? And T104?

How about registering/reissuing a DSA key?

While not strictly required we might want to state the symmetric
algorithm used in T103
and T105.  Personally I (claim to) support all symmetric algorithms
mentioned in the XML
Encryption standard.


On Tue, 12 Oct 2004 17:45:22 -0400, Yunhao Zhang <yzhang@sqldata.com> wrote:
> Sorry I missed today's call. 
> Attached is a set of revised test cases for XKRSS. As Stephen suggested, I
> added several Validate tests to verify state changes. Comments or
> suggestions are welcome. 
> Regards, 
> Yunhao 
Received on Wednesday, 13 October 2004 11:00:31 UTC

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