- From: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
- Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2009 22:22:44 +1100
- To: Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com>
- Cc: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>, "www-talk@w3.org" <www-talk@w3.org>
On 12/02/2009, at 5:26 AM, Adam Barth wrote: > On Wed, Feb 11, 2009 at 10:14 AM, Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com> > wrote: >> Adobe found the security case compelling enough to break backwards >> compatibility in their crossdomain.xml policy file system to enforce >> this requirement. Most serious Web sites opt-in to requiring an >> explicit Content-Type. > > By the way, here's the chart of the various security protections Adobe > added to crossdomain.xml and which version they first appeared in: > > http://www.adobe.com/devnet/flashplayer/articles/fplayer9-10_security.html From that document; > Valid content-type values are: > > • text/* (any text type) > • application/xml > • application/xhtml+xml That's hardly "an explicit Content-Type"; it would be the default for a file with that name on the majority of servers on the planet; the only thing it's likely to affect is application/octet-stream, for those servers that don't have a clue about what XML is. > There is another one I forgot: > > You need to restrict the scope of a host-meta file to a specific IP > address. For example, if suppose you retrieve > http://example.com/host-meta from 123.123.123.123. Now, you shouldn't > apply the information you get from that host-meta file to content > retrieved from 34.34.34.34. You need to fetch another host-meta file > from that IP address. If you don't do that, the host-meta file will > be vulnerable to DNS Rebinding. For an explanation of how this caused > problems for crossdomain.xml, see: > > http://www.adambarth.com/papers/2007/jackson-barth-bortz-shao- > boneh.pdf > > Sadly, this makes life much more complicated for implementers. (Maybe > now you begin to see why this draft scares me.) Adam, my experience with security work is that there always needs to be a trade-off with usability (both implementer and end-user). While DNS rebinding is a concerning attack for *some* use cases, it doesn't affect all uses of this proposal; making such a requirement would needlessly burden implementers (as you point out). It's a bad trade-off. Cheers, -- Mark Nottingham http://www.mnot.net/
Received on Thursday, 12 February 2009 11:23:24 UTC