- From: Robert Robbins <rrobbins@gdb.org>
- Date: Sat, 22 Jul 1995 07:16:44 -0400 (EDT)
- To: Koen Holtman <koen@win.tue.nl>
- Cc: www-talk@w3.org, Robert Robbins <rrobbins@gdb.org>
The following pertains only to session-ID issues that arise from a desire for better usage tracking. It does not relate to session-ID issues that arise from the need to create stateful connections... Would it not be useful to think about the privacy aspects of client-generated session IDs as they resemble caller-IDs provided by some telephone companies? Caller-ID provides a very useful service in some ways and offers a powerful invasion of privacy in another. Good potential solutions reside in looking at all of the needs of all of the parties, then seeking answers that meet as many needs as possible, while avoiding "solutions" that actively block the meeting of some needs. With this analogy, the client is the caller, the server the recipient of the the call. With caller-ID, most of the benefits devolve on the recipients of calls, but a few upon callers (e.g., an emergency call placed by someone not able to identify himself). Some callers have a great desire to identify themselves (e.g., the emergency situation above), some are indifferent, and some have a great desire for privacy (some for legitimate reasons, some because they wish to place threatening calls). Some recipients have a great desire to identify callers (providers of services for fees, maintainers of secure sites, etc); some recipients are interested in identifying callers (for marketing purposes, say), but are willing to accept calls that cannot be identified; some do not care about the identity of their callers. (I cannot think of examples of recipients of calls that would actively not want to know the identity of callers, but some may exist.) Once we accept that enough value resides in providing caller ID service, systems need to be developed to meet the needs of all classes of callers and recipients, in all classes of calls -- e.g., calls placed by those who seek privacy vs those who don't care; calls directed to recipients who seek caller identities vs those who don't care. A good solution cannot be based on the pronouncement that some classes of callers or recipients (or combinations thereof) have needs that do not deserve to be met ("why worry about the privacy issue -- people can identify you when you walk in their store, who cares if they can identify you when you call their store"). The solution: develop technical caller-ID systems and protocols that enable both callers and recipients to behave in ways that meet their local needs and assume that market and other social forces will sort out the rest. Technical solutions that are based on social judgements have problems, the biggest of which is their lack of generality. With caller ID, a simple solution is to develop protocols that (a) allow callers to block the sending of calls with a caller-ID and (b) allow recipients to block the receipt of calls without a caller-ID. The caller who does not want to identify himself blocks the sending of caller-ID, the recipient who insists upon knowing the identity of all incoming calls blocks the receipt of unidentified calls. Done! Market forces will sort out the rest. The privacy-seeking person who greatly desires the services of a caller-requiring recipient will, if the desire is sufficiently great, identify himself. The identity-seeking recipient who wishs a broader audience of callers will yield and begin accepting unidentified calls. Everybody else will be happy from the beginning. As for figuring out how to explain the config parameters to naive users, use the caller-ID metaphor and give client-side users the ability to turn caller-ID on or off, as a preferences setting (default should probably be off to protect privacy), and also provide the ability to over-ride the preferences setting on a "call by call" basis. ==================== Note: soap-box oration follows, stop reading here if not interested... Computer systems that seek large market share should not attempt to behave in a paternalistic manner, deciding for users what their legitimate needs are and meeting those needs (and only those needs). Systems that are paternalistic ("what we do, we do incredibly well; what we don't do, you don't need to do and indeed shouldn't do") can obtain intense, almost religious support from those who agree with the particular paternalistic view, but they are not likely to gain large market share and may indeed lose market share over time to systems that allow the user to do what he wants without requiring him to do it only that way. One might argue that the Macintosh is a prime example of a paternalistic system that gained intense support in some circles, but now is seeing its already small market share drop to record lows (8.3 % of desktop sales last year), but that's another story...
Received on Saturday, 22 July 1995 07:57:52 UTC