Re: TAG comments on EME

Hi Mark

I'm just confirming that we have seen your comments and appreciate the
quick response! We need a bit of time to coordinate ours (as you know, we
cross many time zones) — so I just wanted to thank you and tell you we'll
get back to you soon.



Le ven. 14 avr. 2017 à 18:24, Mark Watson <> a écrit :

> Dear TAG,
> I responded to Hadley's post last night and subsequently read the TAG's
> minutes on this issue.
> Respectfully, I do think your response misses a key point.
> EME not only gives browser implementors "a seat at the table" (as Alex
> pointed out) with respect to DRM but they make the *choice* *of* and have
> *responsibility* *for* the DRM implementation and/or its use*. Content
> providers no longer get to choose. This is a major shift in both technical
> and business architecture. Browser implementors have strong incentives to
> respect user security and privacy and obviously if the *user's agent* does
> not respect those things, we have much bigger problems.
> I've been working on this shift of responsibility to browsers for six
> years. It's the single most important thing in EME. W3C and browser
> implementor involvement has been a strong force for strengthening the
> security and privacy aspects of the specification and W3C's continued
> involvement would be a force against regression. So, its disappointing that
> this is not recognized in your comments, which read as if CDMs are just
> plugins-by-another-name over which browsers have no control.
> Also, several if not all browser implementors have been *exemplars of
> good practice* with respect encouraging, celebrating and rewarding
> independent security research and this is another reason to be optimistic
> that this shift in responsibility will pay dividends. There is no evidence
> that these implementors are carving out exceptions to their security
> approaches for the DRM component.
> The EFF's covenant did not get much support because it would entail a long
> and costly legal negotiation (cf patent policy) and reached much further
> than security research. I'd note that if one really wants to solve a
> problem in standards, it rarely works to come back with the same previously
> rejected proposal a year later (not saying the TAG did this, but others
> have). I think there could easily be a lighter-weight solution, but none of
> the people raising this problem have made any suggestions, so we have the
> guidelines as the only thing on the table.
> ...Mark
> * just to add, even if the DRM implementation is a platform capability,
> the browser implementor chooses whether it is safe to use it - and which to
> use if there are many - just as they do with any other platform capability.

Received on Friday, 14 April 2017 21:13:19 UTC