- From: Alan Ruttenberg <alanruttenberg@gmail.com>
- Date: Fri, 5 Nov 2010 00:48:49 -0400
- To: Larry Masinter <masinter@adobe.com>
- Cc: Jonathan Rees <jar@creativecommons.org>, "www-tag@w3.org" <www-tag@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <AANLkTikJuCcuBcFANQasD9y1PrHL8ddOZ8zVvzAnh8=Q@mail.gmail.com>
FWIW, I can't understand what you are talking about here. On Thu, Nov 4, 2010 at 2:03 PM, Larry Masinter <masinter@adobe.com> wrote: > Personally, one of the things that I find myself dwelling on is the > infinite order -- there are uncountably many "things", but only a > countable number of "descriptions". > Definitions? Proof? Even if there was a counting argument to be made here, I can't see how you would arrive at "things that *can* be described". You might perhaps land up with "things that *have* been described". But there isn't a unique mapping of countable on to uncountable sets. > At least, for me, the distinction isn't silly or meaningless. In addition, > the notion of "identity" is > associated with the description rather than the thing-described > Which notion of identity? There are a number. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/ There are certainly notions of identity associated with (any)things. > ,which seems to me to be an important distinction; I'd rather elaborate > these > ideas than leave them unstated. > Elaboration would be good. > > That is, "things" don't really form a set, in the sense of having > a clear equality relationship. > ? > We talked about this before and I don't think I convinced you, but perhaps > you'll have more sympathy for > my continuing to talk about "anything that can be described" vs "anything". > I'd be interested in an attempt to be convinced. But as another heads up, what you are saying here seems in contradiction to the basis of all the SemWeb languages, which I think would be setting precedent. -Alan
Received on Friday, 5 November 2010 04:49:39 UTC