- From: Sandro Hawke <sandro@w3.org>
- Date: Thu, 05 Sep 2002 13:51:31 -0400
- To: "Peter F. Patel-Schneider" <pfps@research.bell-labs.com>
- cc: www-rdf-rules@w3.org, timbl@w3.org
[ thread turning hard left, towards greater precision; hang on... ] > > A logical reasoner knowing one particular rule (which I think is > > "modus ponens": A, A->B |- A) will do the same thing given "p->q" as a > > rules engine would if it were given "p |- q". In fact, a reasoner > > using any other sound and sufficiently-complete set of inference rules > > would act the same given "p->q" as a rules engine would with "p |- q". > > This is definitely not true. A rules engine with p |- q will not conclude > anything from not q whereas a complete reasoner for the propositional > calculus will conclude not b from not a and a implies b. [corrected] Yes, I understand this. My term "sufficiently-complete" was meant to indicate to readers familiar with modus tollens, resolution, and other common inference rules that I was aware there were such rules but thought they would cloud the issue more than clarify it. What I meant was that the logical reasoner would produce everything the rules engine would produce _and possibly more_. I'm sorry for not saying that. > > More generally, if you turn the "|-" into "->" in any collection of > > rules, and feed the rules to a reasoner using at least modus ponens, > > the reasoner will produce (eventually) the same results as the rules > > engine. > > Again, not true. But you would agree with this: More generally, if you turn the "|-" into "->" in any collection of rules, and feed the rules to a reasoner using at least modus ponens, the reasoner will produce (eventually) all the results you would get from a rules engine (and possibly more). ? > > Let's apply this to n3. cwm is a rules engine; TimBL thinks of > > log:implies as constructing a rule. For example, he is happy to write > > > > # n3 example 1 > > { :a :b :c } > > log:implies > > { { :d :e :f } > > log:implies > > { :g :h :i } > > }. > > > > and describe that as one rule which, if triggered by the presence of > > ":a :b :c" will cause the addition of a second rule. That second > > rule, if triggered by the presense of ":d :e :f" will cause the > > addition of ":g :h :i". > > Here one of the problems with N3. There is no indication in N3 of whether > log:implies is supposed to be material implication, a proof rule, or some > other logical connective (such as, for example, some sort of relevance > implication). That's exactly what I'm trying to settle here. The meta-question is how much we need to settle it, if the material conditional and a proof rule are indistinguishable in some large set of situations. Or to put that differently, if Tim wants to think of log:implies as constructing proof rules, can I define it as the material conditional without actually causing any problems? > > On the other hand, if we treat log:implies as a logical implication > > operator, it's clear you can rewrite the sentence above as: > > > > # n3 example 2 > > { :a :b :c. :d :e :f } > > log:implies > > { :g :h :i } > > > > which has the same final effect. (You might worry the inner rule > > will only be inferred in the rules-style, not in the logic-style. > > That's not really true; a reasoner using sufficiently-complete > > inference rules would also infer from example 2, given ":a :b :c" that > > "{:d :e :f} log:implies {:g :h :i}". > > Again this depends on what the meaning of log:implies is. I believe TimBL consideres it to be a proof rule constructor, and I'm exploring whether it wouldn't be better considered to be the material conditional. I think he prefers the proof-rule approach as being more general (and probably also as more obvious to many prospective users and implementors; and perhaps as higher performance). I now beleive it's only more general when you use it indirectly, as a kind of meta-logic. Doing that is fine, but it doesn't mean that the rules-language is more expressive; rather it means it's enough less expressive that you find yourself wanting to use it as a meta-logic to define the stuff you really want. > > Is there any way to distinguish what cwm does from what a sound and > > complete FOL reasoner would do with the same inputs? I don't think > > so. > > I do not know how cwm works. However, my guess is that it is incomplete > with respect to the propositional calculus. Absolutely. So a sound and complete FOL reasoner would output all that cwm would output, and quite possibly more. As long as the language does not include negation, however, I doubt there would be much of interest in that additional output. I'd like to characterize that more precisely at some point. > > If one were using such a reasoner, one might be tempted to add > > negation to the language (because there's no additional cost), which > > could be interesting and useful. But that's a different issue. > > > > My conclusion is this: we can treat log:implies as either creating an > > inference rule ( |- ) or as the material conditional ( -> ); from the > > outside no one will be able to tell the difference. > > Not true, or, at least, not true without the presence of some other > machinery. Let's say the inference rule data is going to be used as a rules by a rules engine, and material conditional data is going to be used as data by a rules engine using only modus ponens. Will you get the same output? In other words for all formulas x, e(mp + r(n), x) = e(mp, f(n) & x) where n -- an n3 document containing only log:implies rules r(n) -- a set of rules produced from n by considering log:implies to define rules f(n) -- a logical formula produced from n by considering log:implies to be the material conditional mp -- the rule modus ponens res -- the resolultion rule (which is sound and complete for FOL) + -- operator to conjoin two sets of rules & -- operator to conjoin two logical formulas e(R, I) -- the set of formulas produced by some rules engine using rule R on input data I. (Or perhaps I should call this the closure of applying rules R on formula I, to get away from performance and implementation issues.) This is not exactly what I meant in the previous message; I'd forgotten the mp on the left. I also assert using resultion and f(n), we would conclude everything we would conclude from using r(n), and possibly more: for all formulas x, there exists formula y such that e(r(n), x) & y = e(res, f(n) & x) (This gives me a fun idea for a cwm test: write resolution in n3, and see what things I can get cwm to prove. I bet I can get cwm to prove this isn't the way to implement a fast theorem prover. :-) -- sandro
Received on Thursday, 5 September 2002 13:53:51 UTC